Monday, December 8, 2008

Editor's Introduction - December 2008

"The Activist." Harper's Magazine. November 2008.

An Annotation

The ongoing conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan has been illustrative of the need for improved international diplomacy in conflict resolution and peace building. In an account of his experiences traveling in Darfur with academic and diplomat Alex de Waal, author Nick McDonell raises compelling questions about the role of traditional diplomacy in creating lasting peace. For McDonell, the establishment of lasting peace in the region demands recognition of the complex realities on the ground. Specifically, McDonell writes that the numerous obstacles to the peace process, such as natural resource depletion, ethnic strife, and competing political rivalries, must be addressed.

“Issue-awareness campaigns may draw attention to important causes, but they can also motivate counterproductive demands among warring factions.”

For McDonell, traditional diplomacy has not been effective in securing peace and stability in the region. According to the international community, the arrest warrant request for Omar Hassan al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in July marked a significant turn of events for perceived perpetrators of the conflict. However, as McDonell discusses, de Waal asserts that the need for the international community to hold Bashir responsible for acts of genocide and crimes against humanity is detrimental to the fragile peace that has been made. Since July, de Waal has been outspoken about the adverse effects of unintended consequences that may have drastic and deadly repercussions on the ground in Darfur, and that the ICC warrant “will endanger the people we wish to defend.”

“[Alex de Waal’s] primary argument was that a threatened Bashir could do much to damage the already fragile peace, and that the ICC had no ability to back up its threat with an actual arrest or trial.”

The delicate peace among warring ethnic and political factions within government and among rebel groups cannot be sustained indefinitely. Importantly, there are various challenges to peace in the region such as determining who has the authority to make an agreement, defining who exactly the janjaweed are, and deciding how justice should be achieved, all of which must be addressed if peace is to be secured for all. McDonell, as a former student of de Waal, suggests that in order for lasting peace to be established in Darfur, conventional forms of international diplomacy that seek to place blame and accountability for crimes committed must look to the complex situation on the ground. However, the points raised by McDonell and de Waal speak more generally about the need for improved and diverse forms of international diplomacy in conflict resolution and peace building. Moreover, as McDonell emphasizes, peace processes and the establishment of lasting peace is not simplistic. The establishment of peace in Darfur, and in future violent conflicts, must address the reality of the welfare and safety of those on the ground in addition to ensuring justice and accountability for crimes committed.

These issues and others are considered in this month’s Roundtable.

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Peace without Justice, or Justice without Peace?

by Clair Apodaca, Florida International University
"Seeking justice by ending the impunity for crimes and seeking redress for the victims is the only way to build a stable long-lasting peace. Such justice allows for social reconciliation, restoration and perhaps forgiveness."

Peace without justice is an illusion. The use of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate and prosecute human rights violations not only provides restorative justice for those harmed by the wrongdoing but also retributive justice towards the perpetrators. Restorative justice seeks to help heal the wounds of the victims and community by acknowledging and witnessing the pain and suffering of the victim. Retributive justice seeks to punish the offenders. The hope is that retribution will deter or prevent future acts of violence by holding perpetrators accountable for the violations of human rights, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Many people believe that the path to justice is through criminal prosecution of the offenders. McDonell succinctly summarizes the relationship between restorative and retributive justice when he describes the victim’s viewpoint as follows: “if peace comes, and I know the person who killed my brother, raped my sister, killed my mother, how can I live with this person?” Seeking justice by ending the impunity for crimes and seeking redress for the victims is the only way to build a stable long-lasting peace. Such justice allows for social reconciliation, restoration and perhaps forgiveness.

However, a question remains. When should the process of retributive justice begin? Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, submitted an application for an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir before the Sudanese situation could even be characterized as post-conflict. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in 2005, is a fragile truce at best. Because Bashir can expect to be prosecuted once peace is established or when/if he leaves power, the likelihood that Bashir will turn over power to more moderate and restrained leaders is very low. Furthermore, the early issuance of the arrest warrant would make it in Bashir’s interests to see to it that the conflict and the killings continue. Will the ICC risk future carnage in order to make a forceful, yet premature, gesture of justice? If the arrest warrant is issued it may well be that the civilian population will suffer Bashir’s scorn and contempt. The Sudanese Congress already warned of the unleashing of more blood and violence in the Darfur region of Sudan if the warrant is issued. The Sudanese military and government supporters may retaliate directing their attacks against the international staff and facilities, namely the UNMIS and UNAMID. Or we may see the expulsion of humanitarian aid organizations altogether, the very lifeline for the millions of desperate and vulnerable internally displaced Dafuris—those most in need of aid and protection. Thus, the possibility of any restorative or retributive justice is greatly hindered by a lack of a negotiated and stable peace agreement.

On the other hand, in the interests of justice, the international community cannot allow the genocidal leadership in Sudan to threaten the tenuous peace prospects in order to escape prosecution for their crimes. To do so would betray the victims of Darfur. Furthermore, this would send the message to future tyrants that ignoring international law has no consequences. Therefore, I am not convinced that, in the words of Sadiqu al-Mahdi as quoted by McDonell, in the “conflict between accountability and stability… [avoiding a trial is] a case of accepting the lesser evil.” It may be the choice of exiled leaders wishing to regain power. But can we be sure that it is also the choice of the Darfuri victims who lost loved ones, had their human dignity stolen, their bodies abused, and are deprived of their homes and livelihoods? In the debate between which comes first between justice or peace, the ultimate determination ought to be the people of Darfur. Certainly, the issue should not be decided by international humanitarian “experts” such as de Waal who took it upon himself to notify Bashir’s regime of the impending announcement of Moreno-Ocampo’s application for the arrest warrant. Perhaps Moreno-Ocampo should issue a warrant for hindering prosecution too.

Luis Moreno-Ocampo may have put the cart before the horse. Pursuing justice before a stable peace is established can threaten the survival of the victimized population, and endanger humanitarian aid workers and peacekeepers. David Rieff of the New York Times wrote: “to secure a peace in Darfur means negotiating with Bashir rather than fantasizing about arresting, trying and imprisoning him.” It may be that the Darfuri population values peace and stability over justice. However, in the end, without justice there will be no lasting peace. It is unlikely that Darfur will find peace if Sudan remains governed by a regime bent on committing war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. This leaves human rights advocates, political leaders and international lawyers with a Catch-22: without justice there will be no peace but there can be no justice without first securing peace.

Clair Apodaca is an Associate Professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Florida International University. Dr. Apodaca has published extensively in the areas the international protection of human rights, women’s human rights and refugee studies. She is the author of Understanding U.S. Human Rights Policy: A Paradoxical Legacy (Routledge 2006). Her work has appeared in the Journal of Human Rights, International Studies Quarterly and Human Rights Quarterly among many others. In recognition of her scholarship in the field, human rights scholars and practitioners elected her to the first Executive Committee for Human Rights at the American Political Science Association (APSA) in 2001. Presently, Dr. Apodaca serves on the Executive Committee for Human Rights Section of the International Studies Association.

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Human Rights or Inhuman Wrongs

by Edward Friedman, University of Wisconsin-Madison
"More is at stake in this debate than the fate of millions of innocents in Darfur, though that would be more than enough. The deeper issue is whether the universal human rights agenda in general will even survive, let alone flourish. But should promoters of human rights surrender or struggle?"

The project of promoting universally recognized human rights, that is, the commitments of the U.N. General Assembly-ratified Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), is in danger. Military and political intervention, including economic sanctions, to stop genocide and ethnic and other political mass murder is under attack. Apparently the lessons of Hitler’s holocaust, the Turkish genocide of Armenians, Pol Pot’s slaughter of innocents, and the loss of life in Rwanda are being rethought and un-taught. So-called peace is now preferred over prevention. The dead may have died in vain.

Ethnic struggles (actually political struggles in which demagogues mobilize haters utilizing social stereotypes) are found to be too complex—Jews and Germans, Armenians and Turks, Khmer Rouge and non-KR, Hutu and Tutsi—who can sort it out? It is better to do nothing, it is claimed, than to try to end the annihilation of non-Arabic-speaking Black Africans in Sudan. We are advised to heed the propaganda of the killers that the victims are also responsible. All stories have two sides, we are told.

Personally, I’d heed the cries of the victims. Preventing their gratuitous suffering is largely what a commitment to human rights is about.

To be sure, no one doubts that “ Sudan’s army and a variety of militia” have “caused 300,000 deaths in Darfur since 2003.” But, hey, “everyone” commits atrocities, we are told. The African Union actually wants “all of the parties involved in the Darfur conflict” to talk. But, we are instructed, we should empathize first and foremost with the view of the genocidal regime in Khartoum, Sudan that “such meetings would…unify the rebels.” Apparently peace is possible only on the terms of the executioners. Human rights activists are dismissed as trouble-makers. This kind of analysis reflects a transvaluation of values similar to finding fascist racism superior to multicultural constitutionalism.

Yes, ending the slaughter requires talking to the leaders of the murderers, especially if one rules out organizing to control, stop and punish the murderers. But getting involved in trying to actually stop the genocidaires risks, it is said, being used by “the rebels and bandits…and the distinction between the two is frequently unclear.” Worse yet, lord alone knows what the head of the government of the killers might do if the International Criminal Court (ICC) moves ahead with an effort to bring the leader of the genocidaires to the bar of justice. Isn’t it better to maintain “stability,” we are asked, the stability and peace of the killing fields? Surrendering to the blackmail of the killers leaves no space for promoting human rights.

The general critique of human rights intervention that has been rising goes even further. It suspects human rights motives and highlights political interests. Didn’t the EU invite the U.S. to lead an effort in Yugoslavia to stop the killing by the Serb racist Milosevic in part because of European interests in keeping Europe democratic and not solely because the Europeans cared about rights and wrongs? Given these selfish interests, we are told, isn’t the most basic issue whether one is for or against the imperialist intervention of the capitalist West? Human rights activism is re-presented as evil imperialism.

In this discourse, the actual victims become irrelevant. It is enough to know that Pol Pot was against the CIA, that Hitler was against liberalism, that Khomeini stood against the so-called “West.” Which side are you on is the question. The wrong side is liberal constitutionalism. Potential victims of systemic crimes against humanity are not to be saved; they are to be found guilty of being on the side of universal human rights, supposedly a bourgeois imperialist agenda.
But these are not isolated individuals who have launched this assault on human rights. Underlying this screed against human rights is the rise of authoritarian powers, from China to Saudi Arabia. China backs the genocidaires in Sudan. It armed Pol Pot. It provided machetes to the killers in Rwanda. It backed Milosevic. It saw the attempt to democratize Yugoslavia—as the Color Revolutions in Asia—as practice runs for trying to subvert Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authoritarianism in Beijing, with the supposed hidden motive of restoring American global hegemony. To be on the side of human rights, it is claimed, is to be on the side of American imperialism.

That any serious person takes this CCP type propaganda amazes me.

Actually, human rights are the agenda of societal groups who embrace the UDHR as truly universal. They criticize capital punishment by the government in the USA and the torture policies of outgoing U.S. President George W. Bush. They denounce discrimination against Muslims by governments in Europe. They in fact do embrace universal values. They are on the side of the cause of humanity, of the democratizers in places like Burma and Zimbabwe and Iran. They try to pressure their governments and international organizations to act on some basic moral principles.

More is at stake in this debate than the fate of millions of innocents in Darfur, though that would be more than enough. The deeper issue is whether the universal human rights agenda in general will even survive, let alone flourish. But should promoters of human rights surrender or struggle?

According to democracy-promoter Larry Diamond in his book, The Spirit of Democracy, the freedom agenda is increasingly unattractive to the international community. “ Singapore…could foreshadow a resilient form of capitalist-authoritarianism in China, Vietnam and elsewhere in Asia” in an age where authoritarian “ Asia will determine the global fate of democracy” and human rights.

Right now, it is not looking good for human rights. The apologists for the killers—hiding under a cloak of non-intervention and anti-imperialism—fare winning. The world is changing for the worse.

Edward Frieman's teaching and research interests include democratization, Chinese politics, international political economy, revolution, and the comparative study of transitions in Leninist States. His most recent books are Chinese Village, Socialist State (1991), The Politics of Democratization: Generalizing the East Asian Experience (1994), National Identity and Democratic Prospects in Socialist China (1995), and What if China doesn't democratize? Implications for war and peace (2001).

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Challenging the International Criminal Court over al-Bashir

by Emma Gilligan, University of Connecticut
"The most problematic issue, however, that is not addressed adequately by either McDonell’s article or by de Waal himself rests in the question, if not through the ICC, how will the problem of justice be handled for those thousands of victims in Darfur?"
As of late November 2008, we are still awaiting the decision of the U.N. Security Council with regard to the request for the arrest of Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide put forward by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in July. With former Presidents Charles Taylor of Liberia and Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia as the only two heads of state formally indicted by the ICC since its inception in 2002, the question remains whether the U.N. Security Council will allow this controversial indictment of al-Bashir by Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo or invoke Article 16 of the Rome Statute to defer it?

The prospects for an indictment of the Sudanese President look discouraging. Britain, China, France and Russia have indicated that they may well support a plan to defer the investigation and prosecution of al-Bashir for the purported task of preserving the delicate 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement to stabilize the 22-year-old Sudanese civil war and to encourage the fulfillment of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement. Similarly, the Arab League and the African Union have employed the same legitimate, but problematic arguments, calling for the suspension, but not the cancellation of the indictment.

One of the chief supporters of this approach is the scholar, activist and consultant, Alex de Waal of Harvard University’s Department of Government. In all his permutations, de Waal has made a remarkable contribution to disentangling the conflict in Darfur, historicizing the problems in social, economic and political terms through his publications, as well as acting as a consultant to various bodies, including the African Union’s mediation team.

De Waal’s preferred approach to the crisis in the Sudan is diplomatic. He unequivocally rejects the ICC’s indictment of al-Bashir as a provocative gesture capable of destroying a negotiation process that demands a collaborative and inclusive approach. To pursue that end, he joined the politically neutral Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation organization formed in 2006 to popularize the terms of the Darfur Peace Agreement. Nick McDonell’s article in Harper’s Magazine follows de Waal into his meetings in Khartoum and Addis Ababa, as the British scholar seeks to shore up alliances. These meetings not only illustrate the extent of de Waal’s political contacts in the region, but the entrenched positions of the political factions in Sudan. These disturbing vignettes include de Waal’s meeting with Musa Hilal, the former government leader of the janjaweed forces, General Oyai Deng Ajak of the Southern People’s Liberation Army as he seeks munitions support in Ethiopia, Sudan’s Ambassador to Ethiopia, Ambassador Mohieldin Salim and most unnerving—a meeting with Abdullah Safi-al-Nur—the figure responsible for arming Hilal’s janjaweed.

De Waals’s arguments against the indictment of al-Bashir are legitimate and they resonate the same concerns others have had with regard to Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and Criminal Tribunals in transitional democracies. Would the President’s arrest only incite further civil war? Is this an appropriate time to deal with issues of accountability over Darfur? Will issues of accountability, as de Waal has claimed elsewhere, be marginalized in the negotiation process precisely because of the indictment?

These concerns are no doubt speculative and whether the negotiation process succeeds or fails in the Sudan depends on any number of historical contingencies that are by no means always predictable. And de Waal is not without his critics. The Save Darfur Coalition, a group of 180 faith-based, advocacy and human rights organizations rejects his position and leaders of the Darfuri diaspora have called it a “bartering of accountability.” Moreover, de Waal’s argument that issues of accountability may be sidelined in the negotiation process precisely because of the indictment is difficult to sustain. One wonders whether al-Bashir would ever allow for accountability clauses in any peace agreement, with or without the threat of an arrest.
The most problematic issue, however, that is not addressed adequately by either McDonell’s article or by de Waal himself rests in the question, if not through the ICC, how will the problem of justice be handled for those thousands of victims in Darfur? If not through the indictment of a leader responsible for perpetrating and sustaining such a gruesome and cruel conflict, through what channels will the ever-marginalized civilian victims be answered in moral terms? This too is a vision worth pondering.

After completing her doctoral studies in Russian history at the University of Melbourne, Australia, Emma Gilligan was a postdoctoral fellow in the Department of History at the University of Chicago from 2003-2006. During this time, she completed her book Defending Human Rights in Russia; Sergei Kovalyov Dissident and Human Rights Commisioner, 1969-96 (Routledge, 2004). This book traces the evolution of the Soviet human rights movement from the 1960s in Moscow to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. It analyzes, in particular, the rise of Sergei Kovalyov, Russia's first human rights commissioner under the presidency of Boris Yeltsin and the impact of former Soviet dissidents on the discourse of human rights in the post-Soviet era. Her second book, War Crimes in Chechnya (Princeton University Press, forthcoming 2008) examines the war crimes committed by Russian soldiers against the civilian population of Chechnya. The study places the conflict in Chechnya within the international discourse on humanitarian intervention in the 1990s and the rise of nationalism in Russia. Emma Gilligan is the author of articles for the Chicago Tribune, ‘Why there is no Peace in Chechnya,’ 2005 and ‘US Loses High Ground on Human Rights,’ 2006 and the International Herald Tribune. She is a member of the Gladstein Committee for Human Rights and a joint hire with the Human Rights Institute. She teaches courses on the history of human rights and genocide after the Second World War.

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Alex de Waal’s Shuttle Diplomacy

by Sarah Stanlick, Harvard University
"The multiplicity of actors, logistical issues, historical grievances, and mistrust has festered in the stalemate to create an environment rife for misunderstanding and miscommunication. The situation is broken, with unclear parties, unclear needs, and an unclear roadmap."

This month’s discussion piece, “The Activist,” is a critical look at one of the most renowned scholars of the turmoil in Sudan. Alex de Waal, a man with an almost encyclopedic knowledge of the different factions, aspects, and issues surrounding the conflicts in Sudan, is profiled under a careful eye. De Waal, a competent critic—as McDonell notes who “takes pride in his competence, and he does not hesitate to criticize activists he deems inexpert”— has built a career on a meticulously researched understanding of the conflict. He honed that reputation through careful action, critical thinking, and a critical voice for actors who do not hold the same academic and experiential pedigree; namely, activists.

Despite his disdain for activist intervention in the region, de Waal may be the best person to carry out activist’s biggest hope. In December 2007, the Enough Project (ENOUGH), an offshoot of the Center for American Progress, called for “aggressive shuttle diplomacy” to help bring about a transformation in Darfur. Shuttle diplomacy, recommended in cases of extremely complex and seemingly intractable conflicts, allows for mediated communication in rapid-fire succession to bring about a solution and limit outside input from those who could set the process off course. ENOUGH’s reasoning for this recommendation is that swift, controlled mediation would limit negative influence of regional actors, counter the unwillingness of rebel leaders to travel and meet official mediation teams, and address the fractured nature of the conflict.

As a member of the African Union’s mediation team in 2005 and 2006, de Waal has the official capacity and the legitimacy to undertake this shuttle diplomacy tack that is advocated by the Enough Project. As evidenced by de Waal’s work with Abdul Mohammed and his condemnation efforts against Bashir’s indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC), de Waal is already working his brand of shuttle diplomacy. Rather than use his shuttling skills to undermine the ICC—a legitimate construct that is indicting Bashir, who will get a fair trial—de Waal could turn his attention to shuttling information between parties to resolve the conflict. Breaching the divide between academic analysis and conflict “street smarts,” de Waal has the potential to usher peace into the region for the first time in decades.
The multiplicity of actors, logistical issues, historical grievances, and mistrust has festered in the stalemate to create an environment rife for misunderstanding and miscommunication. De Waal himself admits that the government in Khartoum is fractured, and it is apparent the power base is ill-defined in the region. The situation is broken, with unclear parties, unclear needs, and an unclear roadmap. However, if there is any singular person who can bridge the gap between the many factions, it would be de Waal. Leveraging connections which he has cultivated from his Ph.D. research days until now gives him ample resources and lines of communication that he could tap into. His vast wealth of cultural understanding, legitimacy, and credentials puts de Waal in a unique position to thrive in this position.

Furthermore, what de Waal can gain from his work in this capacity would be the ability to show his students that there is a nexus between passionate activism and pragmatism. De Waal's caution against hot-blooded activism is understandable. Action without understanding could prolong or worsen an already complex conflict. However, level-headed, logical approaches to activism surrounding genocide should not be shunned completely. The danger in staunch anti-activism is the ability to inspire passivity in others, including his students. McDonell notes that there has been many a frustrated student who has angrily asked the activist-wary professor, “What do you want us to do?!” Through his role as a shuttle diplomat, de Waal could concede that activists can be competent decision makers, and that their collaboration with academic heavyweights can yield great things.

Shuttle diplomacy is one approach that could be beneficial, and it is important to note that it is not a fail-safe strategy. Olusegun Obasanju’s recent efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo yielded a tenuous ceasefire which was quickly violated, and Henry Kissinger’s work in the Middle East did not forge a lasting peace. But shuttle diplomacy could also yield peace—as is evidenced by George Mitchell’s work in Northern Ireland. While academics argue about credentials, labels, cultural competency, and remedies, people continue to die. The impetus is on those who know the region best to take steps to forge a peace that lasts long enough to make inroads for a more permanent solution.

With a new administration swiftly being compiled, the hope for Sudan-watchers is that a massive policy shift will occur that will compel the United States to quick action. It remains to be seen, however, exactly what policies and plans will be put into place. In the interim, this remains a dire situation that commands immediate attention. The International Crisis Group notes that the changes to the conflict over the last year have been great, and not for the better. While shuttle diplomacy can yield results, the participants must be willing and the mediator must be both swift and careful—characteristics de Waal possesses and could leverage for positive action.

Sarah Stanlick is currently heading a health and human rights project working to alleviate health burdens on the underserved population of Lawrence, MA and as a teaching assistant at Harvard University. She formerly served as Research Associate to Samantha Power at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, and was also affiliated with the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at HKS. She graduated as a Trustee Scholar from Lafayette College and holds a Master’s degree in Conflict and Coexistence from Brandeis University.

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Monday, November 3, 2008

Editor's Introduction - November 2008


“Foreign Policy Myths Debunked.” The Nation. October 6, 2008.

An Annotation

Amid the competitive and somewhat heated rhetoric on the economy, race, taxes, and healthcare, noticeably down-played from the campaign for the White House has been an in-depth discussion of American foreign policy. With two ongoing and unpopular wars, and a faltering economic position in global markets, the new administration must rapidly address these, and other, demanding foreign policy concerns. In “Foreign Policy Myths Debunked,” the editors of The Nation attempt to outline the foreign policy myths that have adversely impacted American national security, economic growth, and most importantly, international standing.

“As the election draws near, a new set of myths and fallacies as misleading as those that led the Senate to support George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq have become embedded in our foreign policy discourse…If left unchallenged, these myths and fallacies could influence the outcome of the election and shape policy in the next administration.”

Given the pressing foreign policy challenges facing the new administration, and the different opinions and perspectives that Senators McCain and Obama would bring to the Oval Office, what can we expect to see from each? This month’s Roundtable asks how human rights factor into the election, and, more specifically, the positions of each candidate. Does the enforcement of human rights play a role in this election’s foreign policy? In the context of genocide in Darfur, and continued ethnic conflict in the Middle East, will human rights norms become the forefront of American foreign policy? If the new administration follows the path set forth by the Bush administration, particularly in the use of human rights rhetoric to justify aggression and intervention, the realities of grave human rights violations and abuses occurring throughout the world will no longer demand immediate, comprehensive action.

“The challenge for the next administration, then, is not how to restore American leadership but how to share these responsibilities in an increasingly multipolar world, and thus free up the energy and resources needed to rebuild American society.”

Come inauguration on January 20, 2009, Senator McCain or Senator Obama will be forced to examine the past, present, and future of American foreign policy. Moreover, their decisive action or inaction will impact, not only Americans at home, but also the entire world. The centerpiece this month asks the key question: Will myths and lies continue to be the foundation for American foreign policy, as they have been for the past eight years under the Bush administration? Indeed, the American people and the international community are watching and waiting to witness the next phase of American foreign policy.

These issues and others are considered in this month’s Roundtable.

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America as an Ordinary Nation

by William F. Felice, Eckerd College

"An effective U.S. foreign policy would recognize these limitations to U.S. power and understand the need for vibrant multilateral cooperation and diplomacy to address the most pressing security issues today, from global terrorism to global warming to the global recession."


For decades, scholars of international relations have called attention to the limits of American power. For example, in 1976 Cornel University Press published America as an Ordinary Country: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Future, edited by Richard Rosecrance. As the title indicates, Rosecrance’s book analyzed the impact of the economic, military, and foreign policy setbacks of the 1970s on U.S. power. Suddenly the U.S. seemed less the powerful, “indispensible” leader and more the vulnerable, “ordinary” country unable to control external forces lashing the society’s economy and foreign policy. These insights led many scholars to call for a reassessment of basic “common sense” assumptions about U.S. economic, military and political power. In 2003, Columbia University Press published Emmanuel Todd’s After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order. In this work, Todd picks up where Rosecrance left off and documents the many ways in which the world is learning that it can get along without American leadership. In fact, America today is burdened with enormous trade deficits, a declining dollar, and the unanticipated bankruptcies of leading firms and banks. Furthermore, the U.S. has become a dependent state, subsisting on foreign money. All of this, as Todd carefully demonstrates, has appreciably undermined the political and economic influence of the U.S. in international relations today. Other scholars, including Paul Kennedy, have added to this growing body of scholarship and posited similar concerns about the intense confines to American power. It can, in fact, be reasonably argued that the U.S. has become simply one liberal democracy among many with unique and growing economic, environmental, and social vulnerabilities. An effective U.S. foreign policy would recognize these limitations to U.S. power and understand the need for vibrant multilateral cooperation and diplomacy to address the most pressing security issues today, from global terrorism to global warming to the global recession.

Yet, the Bush administration never acknowledged how this new world of complex interdependence created such great power vulnerability and dramatically limited the utility of America’s hard power resources, in particular its military power. The current administration never understood how this pressing and dangerous new agenda of world politics demanded a multilateral approach, and that such a cooperative framework would enhance, not diminish, U.S. power. Instead, the neoconservative foreign policy team surrounding Cheney and Rumsfeld pursued a radical, more muscular foreign policy agenda based on American exceptionalism and unilateralism and a desire to make the world more like us. Instead of recognizing the critical role of international law and international organization in a world of common threats, the administration marginalized the United Nations and a rule-based world system, and sought to fight terrorism and promote democracy around the world according to its own determination of right and wrong. In the name of fighting terrorism, the administration abandoned the rule of law. The most basic norms necessary to create international cooperation and multilateralism were jettisoned, including equality, transparency, fair procedures, individual culpability, clear rules, checks and balances, and respect for basic human rights. In 2007, David Cole and Jules Lobel in Less Safe, Less Free documented how the Bush administration had systematically violated each of these basic legal commitments and instead imposed double standards, secret trials, guilt by association, obscured clear rules, asserted unchecked unilateral power, and sullied universal prohibitions on torture, disappearance, and the like. The tragic irony is that all of this has made the U.S. not only less free, but less safe and much more vulnerable to attack.

Sherle Schwenninger is thus absolutely correct when she writes in The Nation: “Neither campaign has grasped the central lesson of the Bush era: the world does not need strong U.S. leadership as much as it needs constructive U.S. participation as a great power.” American security and world peace depends upon the U.S. denouncing the neoconservative policies of exceptionalism and double standards, and committing our country to equality, justice, fairness, and the rule of law. In the end, an effective foreign policy and U.S. national security rest on a fundamental respect for human rights.

In his campaign for the presidency, George W. Bush stated: “If we are an arrogant nation, [other countries] will view us that way, but if we’re a humble nation, they’ll respect us.” Tragically, the Bush foreign policy was arrogant to the core and we now suffer the consequences. The next administration will hopefully reject this failed arrogant path and pursue the “humble” road with the realization that “humility” can be shown through a basic and even-handed commitment to human rights norms and standards. When we become a nation that practices what it preaches about human rights, we will be a state that others will want to join with to collectively address terrorism, ecological dangers, and economic malaise. Unfortunately, neither campaign has argued vigorously for this type of multilateral, common security approach to U.S. foreign policy. But, once in power, the new president could use the “bully pulpit” of the office to challenge the current malignant quagmire of U.S. exceptionalism and articulate a vibrant road forward based on respect, multilateralism, and human rights.

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Speak Softly...With Everyone You Can

by Todd Landman, University of Essex
"Fifty years of human rights achievements that had been originally crafted by Eleanor Roosevelt became undermined in one fell swoop with the establishment of the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay. And it is to the unintended consequences of American foreign policy that I would like a McCain or Obama administration to pay close attention."

From the Monroe Doctrine to the Bush Doctrine, United States foreign policy has been predicated on the assumption that somehow it knows what is best for the rest of the world. Monroe feared a potential encroachment from Russia and meddling in the “American” Hemisphere by the European powers and issued what originally appeared as a modest statement about resistance to intervention by any other country than the United States. Ironically enforced by the British Navy at that time, the Monroe Doctrine went far beyond its modest beginnings to set a precedent for the development of U.S. foreign policy. The logic of the doctrine would later be buttressed by other presidential decrees and doctrines, most notably the Roosevelt corollary, which extended U.S. “police power” over the whole of Latin America and the Caribbean; the Truman Doctrine, which sought to contain the Soviet Union through the establishment of allies and a ring of missiles in Europe; the Reagan Doctrine, which sought to “roll back” communism through the use of “proxy wars” in Latin America (the soft underbelly of the United States), Africa (most notably Angola), the Middle East and Central Asia (e.g. Afghanistan); and the Bush Doctrine, which justifies pre-emptive use of force against any threat that is deemed to be “imminent” (see the 2002 National Security Strategy).
Like Barack Obama, I was a freshman in the 1980s at the University of Pennsylvania, which also had its anti-apartheid and anti-Reagan Doctrine protests. While the Vietnam “syndrome” limited the willingness of the United States to engage directly in conflicts around the world and the Iran-Contra affair taught us about the abuses of executive authority (as the Nixon years did when I was a child), we implored our university to divest from South Africa to punish an unacceptable regime that had endured for an unacceptable period of time. My studies also led to a deeper understanding of the nature and extent of widespread human rights abuse committed by the military authoritarian regimes in Latin America. Many of these regimes enjoyed staunch support from the Reagan administration, which drew its foreign policy inspiration from Jeane Kirkpatrick’s misconceived notion that right wing authoritarian regimes were somehow more susceptible to democratization than left wing authoritarian regimes. The paradigmatic case was Pinochet’s Chile, where the full extent of U.S. involvement and complicity in what took place there between 1973 and 1989 has finally been authoritatively documented in Peter Kornbluh’s The Pinochet File (see also my 2004 review essay on this book published in HRHW).
Beyond the more famous cases from Latin America, the Reagan Doctrine also led the U.S. to commit covert funds, weapons, and materiel to Afghanistan through Pakistan to support the Muhajadeen’s battle against Soviet occupation, where the consequences have included the disenchantment with the United States, recruitment into Al Qaeda terror networks, and at least until the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, a training base for Osama Bin Laden. Again, like in the case of Chile, the links between U.S. policy and the most perverse of unintended consequences has been authoritatively documented in Steve Coll’s Ghost Wars.
And it is to the unintended consequences of American foreign policy that I would like a McCain or Obama administration to pay close attention. McCain’s hero is Teddy Roosevelt, but the “big stick” of American unilateralism, carried out with alacrity during the Bush years has led to huge loss of life around the world and significant discredit of the American ideal among many of its trusted friends and allies. Fifty years of human rights achievements that had been originally crafted by Eleanor Roosevelt became undermined in one fell swoop with the establishment of the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay. The general disdain for hard-fought international human rights standards in the name of fighting terror that developed within the upper echelons of the Bush administration was raised to high relief by the abuses committed at Abu Ghraib. Mr. McCain’s personal experiences with the excesses of “reasons of state” in Vietnam must surely make him wary of the pursuit of national objectives at any cost and his measured approach to committing U.S. troops abroad (perhaps with the exception of the war in Iraq) suggests that an administration under his leadership will be less bellicose than its predecessor. But his gaffes with respect to Iran suggest that voters ought to think hard about what kind of image and what kind of foreign policy America will have with McCain and Palin in the White House.Obama takes his inspiration from John F. Kennedy (or at least his handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and not the Bay of Pigs) and seeks a more consultative base for his foreign policy rather than the big stick of the “neo-Rooselveltian,” as Newsweek describes McCain. But JFK also had his fair share of unintended consequences, not least of which the Alliance for Progress, a foreign aid and technical assistance package extended to Latin America in the 1960s trained the military personnel and laid the foundations for the authoritarian period that soon followed. Obama’s Asian experiences have sensitized him in some degree to the plight of poor Muslims and poor people more generally and suggested one strand for U.S. foreign policy address the long term structural problems associated with maldistribution of wealth within the world. His choice of running mate suggests that he will have a firm knowledge of the travails of the Reagan and Bush Doctrines. Moreover, as a lawyer and community activist in Chicago, Obama should be well-versed in the power and meaning of human rights. But I do hope that the pressures of being the President and the many contradictions that come with holding that office will not distract him from a commitment to our most basic of human values.

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Myths, Reasonable Disagreement, and a League of Democracies

by James Pattison, University of West England
"The subsequent impact of the basing of U.S. foreign policy on the protection of human rights worldwide on these egregious lies is well-known, from Guantanamo Bay to the courting of tyrannies as partners in the War on Terror."

The United States’ election in 2004 was based on a number of foreign policy myths. Three of the most obvious were:
The war in Iraq was necessary as a response to the threat of international terrorism. As a result, the world is now a safer place; The institutions of the UN are corrupt and do nothing but restrict American power; Al Qaeda and international terrorism more generally are extremely significant threats to American national security.

These myths were the centerpiece of the Bush re-election campaign that realized, as the philosopher G. W. F. Hegel argued two hundred years ago, that the best way to quell domestic criticism is to wage war and exacerbate fear from external attack. The subsequent impact of the basing of U.S. foreign policy on the protection of human rights worldwide on these egregious lies is well-known, from Guantanamo Bay to the courting of tyrannies as partners in the War on Terror (such as Islom Karimov, president of Uzbekistan). More diffuse effects included the weakening of the U.S.’s ability to act as “norm-carrier” for human rights and related ideas, such as humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect. That is, the power of the U.S. to influence the Global South on such matters waned as skepticism of its War on Terror increased. Perhaps most notably, these policies stymied the possibility of more robust action to the crisis in Darfur, as American military resources and attention were focused elsewhere and the Global South became less willing to listen to a unilateralist, chauvinistic U.S.

While ramifications of the myths of the 2004 election for human rights were as clear at the time as they are now, I’m less convinced that the ten points listed by the editors of the Nation should be viewed as “myths,” “lies,” or “gross distortions.” Take, for instance, “Myth 2”—that the “surge has worked.” Although the editors may rightly point to the other factors involved in the reduction in violence and question the success of the surge, a reasonable case can be made that the surge has been a significant factor in the improvement of the situation in Iraq. Or, take “Myth 10,” that the “world needs American leadership.” A similarly reasonable case can be made for the need for strong U.S. leadership, particularly on human rights and environmental issues, where American leadership on such issues has been lacking. Of course, leadership on such issues may necessitate constructive engagement rather than unilateral obstinacy.

My point, then, is that most of the ten “myths” identified by the editors of the Nation are nowhere near the egregious lies of the Bush Administration. They are instead more like points of what John Rawls calls “reasonable disagreement” about the current international climate. To be sure, I’m sympathetic to many of the claims by the editors. But casting alternative arguments as “myths” is unhelpful in two ways. First, it denies the acceptability of debate about these issues, denying other positions as “lies,” when debate is surely what is required. Second, it over-exaggerates the extent to which the current election is based on myths. Unlike 2004, this election has a more serious, somber tone (despite some notable exceptions). Part of this is perhaps down to McCain’s seeming reluctance to go along with the Neocon’s dirty tricks, which he himself was subject to in 2000.

My focus thus far has been on the problem with the framing of reasonable, ulterior viewpoints as “myths.” But I have also said that I agree with the broad thrust of the editors’ arguments. There is one point, however, where I think they are wrong. This is their rejection of the idea of a League of Democracies. This idea has a long and rich history, and was most famously defended by Immanuel Kant in his proposal for Perpetual Peace. Kant’s suggestion is for a loose confederation of liberal democracies that would spread over the world as the pacifying effects of democratization are realized. To a certain extent, we already have a League of Democracies—NATO. One option would be the extension of NATO to include other democracies beyond Europe and North America. But perhaps a better option, and more in line with the Kantian ideal, would be to look to such a body not to provide military leadership, but to work as a political and economic forum to improve the promotion of human rights worldwide. It would essentially be a talking shop that deals in international legitimacy, working alongside the U.N. Security Council. The Security Council would still be tasked with dealing with matters of international peace and security. Indeed, the re-emergence of Russia and the growing power of China make an alternative to the Security Council on such matters unlikely. The League would instead meet every so often to debate key international issues, just as the non-aligned movement and the G8 currently do. This weaker institution would avoid many of the practical problems highlighted by the editors. And still, very occasionally, it may be able to pass resolutions endorsing humanitarian intervention outside the auspices of Security Council, helping to legitimize action such as NATO’s intervention in Kosovo 1999.
The editors of the Nation propose the expansion of the Security Council to include emerging powers such as India and Brazil. This would obviously increase the likelihood of stalemate in the Council. In fact, it would further exacerbate the need for alternatives sources of legitimacy, such as a League of Democracies, to ensure an effective response to serious humanitarian crises. Such a solution would, of course, face some practical hurdles, but we should not foreclose its possibility by viewing it as “mythical,” especially when it could have an important role in improving compliance worldwide with human rights norms.

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Human Rights and the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election

by Brent Steele, University of Kansas
"While it may not be the case that the 'world needs' U.S. leadership, certain areas may not resist it. This is especially the case if either of these men—Obama or McCain—can quickly regain the trust of the world community through a set of policies which approach global problems with honest assessments and earnest commitments."

There has been a vivid tendency this year by the conventional keepers of Washington wisdom to explicate the two presidential candidates’ foreign policy views using old frameworks of “hawk” and “dove.” Not only is this binary wrong, it fundamentally obscures some rather ironic potentials for how each candidate, if elected president, will focus upon human rights in their foreign policy. McCain’s neoconservative view of the world is founded upon the Wilsonian call for democratization—culminating in what he terms a “League of Democracies.” To use a concept that Arnold Wolfers first coined, and one which Joshua Muravchik has proffered as well, McCain has at heart “milleu” goals for the world. The U.S.’s prominent position as a great power can not only secure American national interests in anarchy, it can change that notion of anarchy altogether – a world constituted by liberal democracies is one which will be radically more peaceful than one where rogue states reside.

Obama, despite all of the grandiose rhetoric, and despite having liberal internationalist advisors such as Anthony Lake and Ivo Daalder, has emphasized and even championed realist principles of prudence, self-limitation, restraint and caution, which explicates his stated admiration for a variety of realist icons such as Reinhold Niebuhr, George Kennan, and Dean Acheson, (see Larissa MacFarquhar’s profile of him from May of 2007 in this regard). This also elucidates why he has been supported, either tacitly or explicitly, by realist Republicans such as Dick Lugar, Chuck Hagel and Colin Powell. It is the realist emphases on diplomacy, “soft power” and the U.S. national interest, which pulse Obama’s position on dialogue with adversaries such as Iran, rather than some cosmopolitan notion that he is trying to get us all to “get along.”

How will these policies impact human rights in the world? For starters, both men will move away from the current administration’s embrace of coercive interrogation techniques in combating terrorism. Arguably, there has been no darker turn in U.S. foreign policy than this, and it looks very likely the use of such techniques will end. Admittedly, there are differences on this issue between the two—such as McCain’s support for, versus Obama’s opposition to the 2006 Military Commissions Act which, among other provisions, will make it more difficult for either man as president to prosecute government officials for criminal misconduct in regards to interrogation. But overall either Obama or McCain would be, and have been as senators, more forceful in their condemnation of such techniques. And as constructivist scholars of International Relations would point out, both men have justified this condemnation with powerful references to U.S. identity: Obama repeatedly asserts his opposition to torture with the words “That is not who we are,” and McCain has mentioned on several occasions that regardless of who the enemies are (even terrorists), “We are Americans, and we hold ourselves to humane standards of treatment of people no matter how evil or terrible they may be.” For those who care about human rights, on this issue there is hope for optimism.

When it comes to other practices which implicate human rights, make no mistake that if Obama is elected, his Iraq withdrawal plan will inevitably entail some instability in Iraq such as a return of sectarian fighting between the Shia and Sunnis in Baghdad and surrounding areas. McCain’s stated goal to keep troops in Iraq would most likely in the short-term serve to continue the fragile peace between contentious factions there (I say “most likely” since it’s not entirely clear that the increased U.S. presence there via the “surge” is solely responsible for this fragile stability), but in the long term it may constrain the U.S.’s ability to deploy forces to stem humanitarian crises elsewhere in the world.

On the issue of genocide, those who see Obama as an “idealist” advocate of humanitarian interventions throughout the world are, I believe, going to be sorely disappointed if he is elected. Admittedly, he has had advisors such as Anthony Lake and Samantha Power who have articulately argued that genocide is an important U.S. national security threat. But the principles of realism that Obama supports—caution and prudence, for example—are not conducive to interventionist policies. Realist-influenced administrations, such as that of George H.W. Bush (a president for whose foreign policies Obama has on more than one occasion expressed admiration), have been extremely reticent to deploy force for humanitarian purposes, although they did, in rare occasions (such as Somalia). But if Obama were to support action in Darfur, for example, it would likely be done with the knowledge that U.S. material resources are finite, and accordingly U.S. actions to assist the humanitarian efforts there would need to be cheap and limited, as he intuited in his second debate with Senator McCain in early October, Obama’s approach would more likely emphasize long-term tactics designed to alleviate global poverty and the raising of individual’s living standards—purposes which would presumably reduce the need for interventions in the first place.

Senator McCain’s neoconservative leanings would lead one to tentatively conclude that he would be more supportive of intervention than Obama. But as Matthew Bai found out in an interview he conducted with the Senator, McCain has a very nuanced view of intervention that reflects a more sophisticated understanding of the situations where U.S. soldiers could stop humanitarian disaster, versus others (such as Zimbabwe) where they may exacerbate more than mediate humanitarian crises.

Finally, I must take a bit of issue with the 10th “debunked” myth in The Nation article. The article asserts that “much of the rest of the world is more skeptical, if not outright resistant, to Washington’s global leadership than at any time since the end of World War II.” This may be true, but in my brief interactions outside of this country in the past couple of years, I am amazed at how captivated some citizens of “the world” are with this U.S. presidential election. Many view it as an historic opportunity for the U.S. to re-enter the world community, and whether the individuals in these countries informed me of their preference (Obama, McCain, or, at the time of my travels, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton), they were all intensely interested in this election. While it may not be the case that the “world needs” U.S. leadership, certain areas may not resist it. This is especially the case if either of these men—Obama or McCain—can quickly regain the trust of the world community through a set of policies which approach global problems with honest assessments and earnest commitments. I am fairly optimistic that even if much of the world remains skeptical regarding U.S. leadership after what has transpired over the last eight years, Barack Obama and John McCain each possess the capacity to restore some semblance of the moral authority that the U.S. possessed in many pockets of the world community not so long ago.

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Monday, October 6, 2008

Editor's Introduction - October 2008


“Making Intervention Work.” by Morton Abramowitz and Thomas Pickering. Foreign Affairs. September/October 2008.

Recent events, including armed conflict and natural disaster, have alerted the international community of the critical demand for mechanisms that allow for the safe and effective facilitation of humanitarian intervention. To an increasingly larger extent, diplomacy, campaigns of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the international media play a significant role in raising awareness of human rights abuses and violations that occur worldwide. However, according to authors Abramowitz and Pickering, despite numerous calls to action, the United Nations remains the major enforcer of international conventions and norms.

“There have been remarkable advances in the fields of human security and human rights…terms such as ‘never again’ and appeals for ‘humanitarian intervention’ and a ‘responsibility to protect’ have become commonplace.”


Regardless of idealistic conceptions of enforcement and intervention, advocates, governments, and NGOs remain hampered in their efforts to protect lives on the ground. Thus, securing and providing for communities ravaged by war or natural disaster is increasingly stymied by political inaction and repression. In responding to such crises, Abramowitz and Pickering call for a revamped and reinvigorated United Nations to provide the much needed legitimacy, capability, and resources to protect those in need.

“Reinvigorating the UN–which is still perceived by most countries as the preeminent institution providing international legitimacy—will be essential. What is needed is a streamlined UN decision making process, ready UN access to military and other forces, and strong investment in diplomacy by key states and institutions.”


In making their recommendations on reforming the United Nations, Abramowitz and Pickering focus on restructuring the Security Council, establishing a limited peacekeeping force, and investing in high-level diplomacy. But, for the authors, improvements to the United Nations system will only be successful if they occur in conjunction with the continued participation of advocates, governments, and NGOs. Moreover, efforts made by the international community, particularly those made by governments and politicians, must take greater account of public sentiment surrounding human rights atrocities.

“These measures would not necessarily resolve the world’s many humanitarian disasters, nor do they represent the final word on these matters. But they would offer a greater likelihood that strong international action would be taken in the most challenging situations.”


Abramowitz and Pickering realize that simply restructuring the United Nations will do little to resolve problems of intervention. Specifically, more must be done to include the international community in the complex mechanisms and practicalities that ensure effective and legitimate intervention in all cases.

These issues and others are considered in this month’s Roundtable.

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Has the Iraq War Torpedoed the "Responsibility to Protect"?


by William F. Felice, Eckerd College

"Unfortunately, such pleas that call for strengthening global governance to forcefully intervene inside sovereign states, in the name of human rights and humanitarianism, will most likely be resented and then ignored by the majority of the world’s states and peoples. To a large degree, this is an unfortunate legacy of the Iraq war."

At a U.N. World Summit in 2005, the nations of the world approved the “responsibility to protect.” This emerging principle of international law, charges each individual state with the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. If a nation fails to protect its populations from these barbarities, the nations of the world declared that they would act, through the Security Council, in accordance with the U.N. Charter, to stop the violence against innocents everywhere and protect imperiled peoples. In theory, Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter gives the member states the military muscle to intervene inside a sovereign state in order to prevent future Rwandas.

Former U.S. Ambassadors Morton Abramowitz and Thomas Pickering, in this month’s Roundtable centerpiece article, advocate certain instruments to allow the U.N. to enforce the “responsibility to protect.” The Ambassadors seek to empower the U.N. to effectively “face down governments that massively mistreat their people.” The Ambassadors’ three-prong line of attack involves a “streamlined U.N. decision-making process, ready U.N. access to military and other forces, and strong investment in diplomacy by key states and institutions.” To accomplish these objectives, Abramowitz and Pickering hope that the U.N. Security Council’s five permanent members— China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—could agree “not to use their vetoes to block proposals for coercive intervention in extreme humanitarian crises.” They further make the case for the creation of a standing army of 25,000 well-trained and well-equipped troops to add credibility and professionalism to U.N. peacekeeping operations and to be able to militarily intervene quickly in a humanitarian emergency. In this regard, the authors go beyond the areas of jurisdiction outlined in the “responsibility to protect,” which were limited to interventions to stop genocide, war crimes, ethic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The Ambassadors argue that the U.N. should also be ready to intervene with force after a natural disaster (hurricanes, cyclones, and so on) when a national government is doing little to aid the survivors.

Unfortunately, at this moment in history, such pleas from former American Ambassadors that call for strengthening global governance to forcefully intervene inside sovereign states, in the name of human rights and humanitarianism, will most likely be resented and then ignored by the majority of the world’s states and peoples. To a large degree, this is an unfortunate legacy of the Iraq war.

After exhausting the other rationalizations for the war in Iraq (WMD, al-Qaeda connections, and so on), the Bush administration justified its killing as a humanitarian action to bring democracy and freedom to the oppressed Iraqi people. The so-called “liberal hawks” in the U.S., in particular, supported this call for a humanitarian intervention to liberate the Iraqi people from the brutality of the Hussein regime. Yet, as is well-known, the overwhelming majority of the nations of the world vehemently rejected these arguments for war before the 2003 intervention. In fact, it was not just the governments who opposed the war, but according to opinion polls the overwhelming majority of the world’s people as well. An unprecedented global anti-war demonstration took place in sixty countries, involved eight hundred cities, and included over ten million people around the world. This outpouring of protest was all designed to prevent a war from breaking out. Never before in history had such an event occurred before a war had actually begun.

As the U.S. ignored these voices, the world’s peoples looked to the U.N. to represent their interests. With their veto power, France, Russia, and China were able to prevent a U.N. endorsement of the globally unpopular U.S. preventive war in Iraq. This U.N. action—standing up to the biggest military power in the world—was ridiculed inside the U.S. But, outside this country, the majority of the planet applauded the U.N. and the international organization gained a new level of legitimacy.

There are at least two conclusions to draw from this recent history that are relevant to the Ambassador’s proposals to strengthen the U.N.’s ability to intervene for humanitarian purposes. First, this Iraq experience led many to a new appreciation for the veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council. As a result, this may be the wrong time for Abramowitz and Pickering to be calling for a “blunting of the power of the veto” during a humanitarian crisis. To many in the Southern Hemisphere, this call will most likely be seen as an attempt to blunt the power of Russia and China and open the door for U.S. unilateralism abroad. Even though the Security Council did not prevent the U.S. from invading Iraq, it was of tremendous moral significance that the U.N. refused to endorse this effort. Any talk now of removing or down-grading the veto power from those who opposed U.S. actions, will smack of retribution.

Second, the Iraq experience confirmed for many the ways in which the language of “humanitarian intervention” is used by the powerful to advance their interests at the expense of the weak states. Abramowitz and Pickering’s proposals to empower the U.N. could thus be seen as merely a means to give the powerful more freedom to intervene in the affairs of the weak. This will not necessarily increase global cooperation in response to humanitarian emergencies. Unfortunately, the great powers consistently analyze humanitarian crisis through the lens of national interest and act accordingly. China’s support and protection of the genocidal regime in Sudan comes foremost to mind.

As with China, the U.S. is also viewed by many as highly hypocritical in its human rights and humanitarian actions. The U.S. recently had an opportunity to change this negative reputation of utilizing the language of human rights and humanitarianism to advance an agenda of power politics. In September 2008, Hurricane Gustav devastated Cuba, damaging more than 100,000 homes and wiping out key sugar and banana-growing regions. The cumulative storm damage has been placed at $3 billion to $4 billion. Despite this humanitarian crisis, the U.S. has been unwilling to relax the outdated trade embargo and let Americans help Cuba. Instead, the U.S. offered Cuba a paltry $100,000, with enough “strings” attached that the State Department knew Cuba would reject the offer. This fiasco has again demonstrated that the U.S. applies “humanitarian” aid and intervention to promote its foreign policy agenda. It was a lost opportunity for the U.S. to prove its critics wrong.

Until the major powers—including China and the U.S.—demonstrate a firm commitment to humanitarian principles across the board, proposals to strengthen the U.N. bureaucracy ring hollow. It is putting the cart before the horse.

William F. Felice is professor of political science and head of the international relations major at Eckerd College. Dr. Felice was named the 2006 Florida Professor of the Year by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. He is the author of The Global New Deal: Economic and Social Human Rights in World Politics (2003), Taking Suffering Seriously: The Importance of Collective Human Rights (1996), and numerous articles on the theory and practice of human rights. More information can be found on his department website http://www.eckerd.edu/academics/irga/faculty/felice.php.

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The Responsibility to Protect and the Failure to Respond


by Todd Landman, University of Essex

"Any assessment of the plight of billions of people around the globe will undoubtedly recognize that real efforts to match in reality what is pledged rhetorically requires some sort of commitment, or “buy in” from today’s great powers. The proposals offered by Abramowitz and Pickering will need to confront the challenge of incorporating humanitarian and human rights concerns into a realist world."

Commentators on global politics frequently observe the abject failure of states and global institutions to respond to local, regional, and global crises ranging from dramatic climatic events, humanitarian crises, warfare and violence, to the continuation of unsavoury rights-abusive regimes. In my own work in the field of the comparative politics of human rights, the types of observations that Abramowitz and Pickering make in this piece are all too common, and have led many in the past to make similar such observations that powerful states constantly engage in a grand human rights “double standard.”

In a 1999 article in the New York Times Magazine, David Rieff argued that the selective intervention of states on behalf of human rights is a tragic betrayal of an otherwise impressive “triumph” of human rights in the latter half of the twentieth century. Stephen Krasner has long argued that powerful states will pursue human rights policies when they are in their interests to do so. Somewhat more critically, in Theory and Reality in the International Protection of Human Rights, James Shand Watson contends that the failure of states to prevent a century of state-led violence, genocide, and continued rights abuse, proves that human rights are merely a fiction.

Beyond these various arguments, systematic empirical analysis of foreign aid allocation shows that states behave strategically in often ignoring the human rights practices of recipient states (particularly now during the “war on terror”), while other cross-national comparative research shows that the impact of international human rights law on state behavior is non-existent, counter-intuitive, or in the case of my own research, “significant, but limited.” Indeed, it appears that domestic processes of economic development and democratization, coupled with greater openness to international linkages through non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations serve as important supporting conditions for improvements in human rights protection on the ground.

Any assessment of the plight of billions of people around the globe will undoubtedly recognize that real efforts to match in reality what is pledged rhetorically requires some sort of commitment, or “buy in” from today’s great powers. This, however, is an old chestnut of internationalism that has been with us from the early realist arguments found in Thucydides and Machiavelli, through the attempts to establish the League of Nations, the debates to give real teeth to the United Nations, the latest efforts to fortify the security and rights mechanisms within the U.N. (as well as within the regional systems of Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia), to the establishment of the International Criminal Court.

In addition to the different experiments mentioned by Abramowitz and Pickering, I would add the Community of Democracies (which is restricted to democracies) and the U.N.-sponsored International Conferences of New and Restored Democracies (which are open to all member states) that have been organized since 1988 and currently chaired by Qatar. But any of these projects is always subject to the realpolitick of the great powers, whoever they may be at the time a potential solution is offered. Abramowitz and Pickering are fully cognizant of this point as they discuss the difficulty of overcoming the veto on the U.N. Security Council and in realizing their modest idea of a small U.N. force that could respond to various crises in the world. In addition to the absence of response to the typhoon in Myanmar, the impotence of the United States and European Union in the face of the situation that developed recently in Georgia shows the limits and additional challenges to breaking this cycle of selectivity.

Perhaps one way to proceed is to start to cast human rights and humanitarian arguments in realist terms. Is it not in the national interests of states to surround themselves and to associate themselves with what Jack Donnelly calls “rights-protective” states? Can the rationalist approach and the realist paradigm (even in their most material manifestations), as well the real decision makers within the world’s great powers, incorporate the idea that the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights are actually in their interests as an end in themselves and as a means to achieving greater overall security and peace?

For too long, such arguments have been cast as against realism rather than within realism. Some worry that repeating the realist mantra (especially to international relations students) becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, but the observable behavior of states in terms of their selective attention to the world’s humanitarian and human rights problems (either immediate or long term) suggests that the balance of evidence still very much weighs in favor of the realist perspective. It thus seems that if any progress can be made, it is within realism and within the minds of policy makers who are worried about national interests and national security on a daily basis. The proposals offered by Abramowitz and Pickering are certainly laudable, but their realization will need to confront the challenge of incorporating humanitarian and human rights concerns into a realist world.

Dr. Todd Landman is Director of the Centre for Democratic Governance, Department of Government, at University of Essex. He is author of Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics, 3rd Edition (Routledge 2008), Studying Human Rights (Routledge 2006), and Protecting Human Rights (Georgetown 2005); co-author of Governing Latin America (Polity 2003) and Citizenship Rights and Social Movements (Oxford 1997); and co-editor of the Sage Handbook of Comparative Politics (Sage 2009). Dr. Landman has served as international human rights and democracy consultant for UNDP, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CIDA, DFID, DANIDA, IDEA, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Foreign Ministry of the Netherlands, Foreign Ministry of Mongolia, International Centre for Human Rights Policy, and Minority Rights Group International. His personal website can be found at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~todd.

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Improving the Agents and Mechanisms of Humanitarian Intervention


by James Pattison, University of West England

"Much of what I have said may give the impression that I think that we should abandon the U.N. as the focus of peace operations. This is mistaken. The frequently-highlighted inefficiencies of the U.N. are, in practice, overshadowed by the understated, but notable, successes that it has with its peace operations."

I agree with the broad thrust of Abramowitz and Pickering’s article. They rightly highlight the failings of the current agents and mechanisms of humanitarian intervention. The problem, however, is twofold. First, all the currently-existing interveners possess notable, and well-known, flaws. The U.N. and regional organizations suffer from serious shortfalls in funding and equipment. States frequently lack the commitment and willingness to act. And, although NATO’s operations in Bosnia and Kosovo raised hopes that it would be a willing and powerful humanitarian intervener, the reluctance of many of its members to commit troops in Afghanistan (where member states have clear interests) has cast serious doubts over whether it can be relied on as an effective agent of humanitarian intervention in the future (where the interests of its members may be less clear). Second, there are problems with the authorization of intervention: there are many occasions when humanitarian intervention should be rapidly undertaken, but is not because it has been stymied in the U.N. Security Council. There needs, then, to be notable improvements if the international community is to possess the capacity to intervene effectively for humanitarian purposes when necessary.

However, I am less convinced that the solutions offered by Abramowitz and Pickering would do much to improve the international community’s capabilities in this regard. To start with, take their suggestions that concern the authorization of force and, in particular, the proposal to curb the use of the veto. This has been mooted for a number of years (for instance, it was suggested by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001 (ICISS)), but there has been little, if any, indication of a willingness by the permanent members (P-5) to restrain themselves in this way. I fear that this is a political dead end. What we need instead are alternative, additional sources of international legitimacy. Indeed, this is one reason why the notion of a “league of democracies” has been floated. Other options for improving the authorization of intervention include the strengthening of regional organizations (more on that later), a reinvigoration of the Uniting for Peace procedure of the General Assembly and, more ambitiously, the development of cosmopolitan democratic institutions, such as the world parliament endorsed by Andrew Strauss and Richard Falk. My point is that finding alternatives to the U.N. Security Council is the best way of making it work. These alternatives would pressurize the Council into making the right decisions more often, for fear of losing power and influence.

Abramowitz and Pickering also present two proposals for improving the mechanisms to undertake humanitarian intervention: (i) a contribution of 5,000 troops from each of the P-5 (a 25,000-strong force in total); and (ii) a 5,000-strong autonomous U.N. rapid reaction force. There is reason to be cautious about the first proposal. Having the P-5 authorize, and then undertake, their own interventions could risk putting too much power in their hands. The second solution, however, has more merit. Indeed, I have written elsewhere that such an option is the most desirable long-term solution to the problems faced by the current agents and mechanisms of humanitarian intervention.

That said, the particular proposal made by Abramowitz and Pickering of 5,000 troops would run into a number of problems. If the force fulfilled its role in one region in the world, it would not be able to intervene elsewhere. The need for rotation of troops would also mean that it would be a “one-shot option.” That is, after undertaking one mission, it would not be able to intervene for a number of months afterwards while its troops regenerate. Furthermore, there may be no backup troops forthcoming to replace the force, which would leave it with the dilemma of either leaving, thereby letting the crisis go unresolved, or staying, and thereby depriving others access to its protection. Moreover, having funded the force, states would expect it to remove some of their peacekeeping and intervention burden (or humanitarian relief burden), and therefore may be less willing to provide troops and equipment themselves. As such, this proposal, if established, would add little to the currently-existing options.

To be fair, Abramowitz and Pickering seem to see this force as a stepping-stone to something more significant. But the same problems would apply to a larger, more developed force (including their other suggestion of 25,000 troops from the P-5). To be more valuable, a standing U.N. force would need to be much larger. But this leads to problems of its own, including feasibility and the potential for abuse.

Accordingly, I still believe that regional organizations offer the best solution for improving the capacity to intervene. The potential of the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) in particular is substantial. To be sure, both institutions are currently a long way from being able to conduct major humanitarian interventions by themselves. But given their general support for humanitarian intervention (e.g., in the African Union’s Constitutive Act) and the interests that they possess in halting humanitarian crises, we should pursue the development of their capacities. A stronger AU and EU will add much to the ability of the international community to undertake humanitarian intervention.

Much of what I have said may give the impression that I think that we should abandon the U.N. as the locus of peace operations. This is mistaken. The frequently-highlighted inefficiencies of the U.N. are, in practice, overshadowed by the understated, but notable, successes that it has with its peace operations. Likewise, the problems that UNAMID has had getting up to strength in Darfur should be put into the context of what is a boom time for U.N. peace operations. According to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, there are, as of August 2008, 107,503 troops, police, observers, and other officials serving in 16 U.N. peacekeeping operations. This is the largest number of peacekeepers to date and, what is more, it looks like this number will continue to grow. Of course, this should not be a reason for complacency. We should continue to improve the agents and mechanisms of humanitarian intervention to build on the U.N.’s abilities and to offer more options when faced with the mass violation of basic human rights. Augmenting regional organizations’ capacities would be one way to do so.

Dr. James Pattison is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of the West of England, U.K. He recently completed his PhD on humanitarian intervention, for which he was awarded the “Sir Ernest Barker Prize for Best Dissertation in Political Theory.” He has written various articles on the ethics of war and intervention and is currently working on a book on the Responsibility to Protect for Oxford University Press. Please visit his website: http://www.uwe.ac.uk/hlss/politics/staff_jPattison.shtml.

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Reforming Humanitarian Rescue


by Brent J. Steele, University of Kansas

"The U.N. performs many functions very effectively—but armed humanitarian rescue has never been one of those. While the authors fully recognize the problems with the U.N. as it currently stands, in my view the main issue is the constitutive basis of the U.N. itself."

There is much to commend in Morton Abramowitz and Thomas Pickering’s article “Making Intervention Work.” They propose to reform the United Nations’ capacity for intervention with the creation of an autonomous U.N. force largely constituted with forces contributed by the Security Council’s member-states. If such a force were kept to a minimal operational mission, “a small rapid-deployment force with special engineering, logistical, medical, and police skills,” as the authors suggest, then I think this is a good idea. If such a force would, however, become more than this—an autonomous army of military personnel meant to intervene with force into any humanitarian crisis in which it is needed or sanctioned—then I fear this would be a counter-productive entity.

I do concur with the authors’ important points on the obstacles inherent in democracies that make their propensity for intervention very rare indeed. This is a point that Samantha Power most stridently made in her seminal book A Problem From Hell. Leaders in liberal democracies see all risks and no rewards in pursuing an intervention to stop a genocide, although Power also seemed to think that liberal democracies were still the most likely actors to recognize the horrors of genocide. Yet I’d even take Abramowitz and Pickering’s argument further—perhaps the reason why liberal democracies are risk-averse when it comes to genocide is because they are liberal, in a classic philosophical sense. By focusing on the self-interest of individuals, and forming a government around those interests, such regimes are not meant to initiate any “other-regarding” sentiment in their populaces, even if they pay lip service to such a notion in speeches and ceremonies promoting the phrase “Never Again.”

Had I read this proposal ten years ago, I would have been whole-heartedly behind its prescriptions. And still today I applaud the attempt by these authors to try and resolve a problem (humanitarian crisis) seemingly desperate for a systematic solution. But in 2008 I am less inclined to see this as anything more than another “top-down” one-size fits all solution to a “type” of crisis (humanitarian disasters) that is as diverse as it is urgent. In short, I do not see the U.N. resolving these crises—even an autonomous force of “first responders” would still be log-jammed with bureaucratic obstacles. The U.N. performs many functions very effectively—but armed humanitarian rescue has never been one of those. While the authors fully recognize the problems with the U.N. as it currently stands, in my view the main issue is the constitutive basis of the U.N. itself. The U.N. was created to promote sovereignty and stability. To paraphrase the tenor of many English School theorists, the U.N. is here to promote order, not justice. In a world of nation-states, such an entity constituted by states will not be able to transcend the Westphalian tension between national and international interests.

So I would suggest that in order to support humanitarian intervention we need to by-pass the nation-state as rescue’s main instrument, and instead look towards non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and even private military firms (PMFs). These come with costs, of course, but in humanitarian crises, debate and consensus-building cost precious time and lives. NGOs and PMF’s are quicker and more efficient. NGOs are most preferable—because as glorious as an armed intervention against a genocidal regime or militia may be, the most comprehensive way to save lives is still the well-organized distribution of medical and food aid. PMF’s of course challenge the monopoly of violence that the sovereign state is supposed to have, but if sovereign states have no interest in intervention, then PMF’s are a potentially prudent last resort, as Michael Walzer suggested in a recent article in The New Republic. Again, this is one of several possibilities that should be considered depending upon the context of the humanitarian crisis. Such a complex problem deserves a diverse array of solutions, but I am afraid that the solution proposed in “Making Intervention Work” would have limited feasibility, if it ever came to pass in the first place.

Brent J. Steele is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Kansas. His primary research interests cover a wide array of international relations topics, including international ethics, international political theory, United States foreign policy, Just War theory, ontological security theory and international security. In addition to his first book, Ontological Security in International Relations, he has published articles in journals such as International Relations, International Studies Review, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of International Relations and Development, Millennium and, Review of International Studies. Please visit Dr. Steele’s website: http://www2.ku.edu/~kups/people/Faculty/Steele_Brent.shtml.

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Tuesday, September 2, 2008

Editor's Introduction - September 2008

"The New Colonialists" by Michael A. Cohen, Maria Figueroa Küpçü, and Parag Khanna. Foreign Policy. July/August 2008.

For many, international aid agencies and humanitarian organizations provide incomparable services to those in the world’s poorest and weakest states. However, according to authors Cohen, Küpçü, and Khanna, the increasingly direct role of these groups demands further consideration. Specifically, the authors contend that when weighing the positive aspects of foreign aid assistance, it is necessary to examine the underlying causes and consequences that have allowed for the entrenchment of these groups in the politics and economics of states and populations in need.

“The thin line that separates weak states from truly failed ones is manned by a hodgepodge of international charities, aid agencies, philanthropists, and foreign advisors. This armada of nonstate actors has become a powerful global force, replacing traditional donors’ and governments’ influence in poverty-stricken, war-torn world capitals.”

Comparing the typically invasive policies and practices of aid agencies and humanitarian organizations with those of former European empires, the authors label these groups “new colonialists.” The authors point to the fact that in providing drastic degrees of political, economic, and social-welfare assistance, these groups do little to allow feeble states to grow and develop independent of outside support.

“As a consequence, many of these states are failing to develop the skills necessary to run their countries effectively, while others fall back on a global safety net to escape their own accountability.”

Thus, the development of national infrastructures in weak and vulnerable states remains hampered due to continued dependence on aid agencies and organizations, which in turn actively maintain structures and cycles of dependence. As a result, it is necessary to question the apparent role of aid agencies and humanitarian organizations in contributing to the failure of stable development. Moreover, the argument continues, the “new colonialists” have been instrumental in further establishing detrimental policies and practices that cement their position in places and among populations of need.

“Many aid organizations will say that their ultimate goal is to ensure their services are no longer needed. But aid organizations and humanitarian groups need dysfunction to maintain their relevance. Indeed, their institutional survival depends on it…No matter how well-intentioned, these new colonialists need weak states as much as weak states need them.”

Given the business aspects of aid assistance, particularly in providing much needed services across the globe, aid agencies and organizations rely on the continued inability and lack of resources of weak states for sustained employment. Furthermore, as these groups create a competitive market for access to needy states and populations, one must ask if the established structures of dependence will ever be broken. Needless to say, it is essential for the international community, states, and, most importantly, aid agencies and humanitarian organizations to reconsider the methods and consequences of assistance.

These issues and others are considered in this month’s Roundtable.

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Saving Lives: A First Step Toward Freedom Not Dependence

by William F. Felice, Eckerd College

"Unfortunately, Cohen, Küpçü, and Khanna fall into this revisionist quagmire by conflating colonialism solely with dependency, ignoring the most vicious and brutal components to the over 450 years of colonial domination... somehow today it is OK to talk about empire, imperialism and colonialism as if these were almost neutral terms."


During the nineteenth century, European powers extended and deepened their brutal domination of the so-called “uncivilized” (sic) nations and peoples around the world. These efforts were named “colonialist” and were based on the uprooting of indigenous peoples, the export and pillage of natural resources, cultural displacement, direct political control, and economic exploitation and the creation of dependency by the Europeans. While the European states gained colossal economic benefits from these arrangements, the colonized peoples were left with failed states and bad governments. Advocates of these colonialist policies often justified these actions on the basis of a deep-felt ideological belief in the superior morality of the West and the need to take up the “white man’s burden.”

So who, according to Michael Cohen, Maria Küpçü and Parag Khanna, are the “new colonialists” of the 21 st century? I first thought that perhaps the title of their Foreign Policy article (“The New Colonialists”) might be referring to Russia’s attempt to exert political and economic control over the Commonwealth of Independent States. Or, if not Russia, perhaps the authors would label the Chinese efforts to expand their political, cultural, and economic clout throughout African, Asia and Latin America as colonialist. And if not Russia or China, the last option, I thought, was for the authors to analyze the global actions of the U.S., including the establishment of 737 U.S. military bases in nations around the world, in relation to the nefarious history of colonial interventions. Boy was I wrong. According to Cohen, Küpçü, and Khanna, the “new colonialists” are Oxfam, Mercy Corps, Doctors Without Borders, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation!

Cohen, Küpçü, and Khanna claim that these NGOs and development groups “direct development strategies and craft government policies” in dozens of states with corrupt or feeble governments. These international actors have now “taken over key state functions, providing for the health, welfare, and safety of citizens.” The authors claim that this “largesse often erodes governments’ ability to stand up on their own” and results in “a vicious cycle of dependency.” As a consequence, the “failed” and “failing” states are unable to develop the skills necessary to run their countries effectively and are dependent on the NGOs for survival. “These private actors have become the ‘new colonialists’ of the 21 st century.”

This analysis of “the new colonialists” brings two disheartening developments into the open. The first is the way in which the language of colonialism, imperialism and empire has been sanitized and misused in the current period. Some scholars, for example, push hard for a new U.S.-led imperialist empire to globalize Western approaches to democracy and freedom. Others look fondly back at the era of British colonialism with rose-colored glasses. Unfortunately, Cohen, Küp ç ü, and Khanna fall into this revisionist quagmire by conflating colonialism solely with dependency, ignoring the most vicious and brutal components to the over 450 years of colonial domination. It should not be so easy to label an organization “colonialist.” In fact, given the real meaning of the term, it is absurd and scandalous to call the Gates Foundation “colonialist.” One would not lightly brand a group “fascist” or “totalitarian.” Yet, somehow today it is OK to talk about empire, imperialism and colonialism as if these were almost neutral terms.

Second, broadside attacks from the left and the right of the political spectrum on NGOs have escalated in the recent period. In addition, terrorists have declared war on NGOs, aid groups, and the United Nations. Within the academy, a “cottage industry” of scholars writing books and articles centered on the illegitimate power of humanitarian NGOs, faith-based organizations, and mega-philanthropies has emerged in the last decade. Many of these analysts have usefully documented cases of unaccountability, waste, and cronyism within the NGO community. Others have shown that, some so-called NGOs are actually profit-driven organizations with private agendas that are of little help to a poor country. However, such critiques do not apply to most of the major NGOs and philanthropies, including Doctors Without Borders and the Gates Foundation. These organizations have done reliable work in alleviating human suffering. Cohen, Küpçü, and Khanna acknowledge that these organizations “unquestionably fill vital roles, providing lifesaving healthcare, educating children, and distributing food.” Yet, despite this overall record of achievement, the authors believe that the consequence of effective NGO work is to relieve the government of the failing state of the responsibility to protect and provide for their people. These declining states are unable “to develop the skills necessary to run their countries effectively.” The authors wonder if the “new colonialists” have gone “too far in attempting to manage responsibilities that should be those of governments alone” These NGOs are thus faced with an impossible Catch-22: If they don’t act, literally thousands of lives could be lost; Yet if they do act to save these lives with interventions, for example, of food and medicine, the authors argue these actions will contribute to the poor nation’s long-term dependency on outside aid.

Cohen, Küpçü, and Khanna doubt that these humanitarian organizations really hope for a day that their services are not needed. The authors argue that the survival of these organizations depends upon the continued existence of weak states. Perhaps there are some individuals working in these NGOs who think and act the way the authors describe. I’ve never met such individuals. I have, on the other hand, met and interviewed many people in the NGO world, including staff with Doctors Without Borders, who very much yearn for a world that privileges the rights of the poor. These individuals would absolutely prefer to be working in the safety of their home nations. Yet, to advance global social justice, these global pilgrims set aside those personal goals. The amount of human suffering that would occur if these individuals and organizations packed up shop, out of a fear of creating dependency, is immeasurable.

For a people to be able to assert their collective and individual rights, and to hold their governments accountable, they first must be able to eat and to be free from devastating disease. There are countless examples of NGOs giving individuals the opportunity to focus beyond survival needs. A final example will perhaps make this point clear. Nicholas Kristof describes the work of a clinic in Ethiopia funded by outside individual donors and humanitarian aid groups. The clinic repairs obstetric fistulas, one of the most awful injuries humans can sustain. A fistula occurs when a physically immature teenage girl tries to give birth and the baby gets stuck. Without a doctor to help, the baby is stillborn, and the girl is left with perforations between her vagina and bladder or rectum. At a very early age, these girls’ lives are ruined. Globally, approximately two million girls and women suffer from this affliction. At the cost of about $450 per operation, supplied by individuals and humanitarian NGOs, these teenage girls are brought back to life. Of course, the Ethiopian government has responsibility for the welfare of its citizens and should be providing a system of basic health care. But, until that day comes, it is truly glorious to see these individuals and humanitarian NGOs working to save these young girls’ lives. These actions to save lives do not create dependency. On the contrary, these actions give these girls the freedom to actualize their human capabilities, perhaps for the first time. These outside medical interventions create the conditions for these girls to act against state corruption and inefficiency, and hopefully someday put an end to destructive forms of dependency.

William F. Felice is professor of political science and head of the international relations major at Eckerd College. Dr. Felice was named the 2006 Florida Professor of the Year by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. He is the author of The Global New Deal: Economic and Social Human Rights in World Politics (2003), Taking Suffering Seriously: The Importance of Collective Human Rights (1996), and numerous articles on the theory and practice of human rights. More information can be found on his department website http://www.eckerd.edu/academics/irga/faculty/felice.php
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Nothing "Colonial" About It: Service Delivery and Accountability

by Todd Landman, University of Essex

"The argument in 'The New Colonialists' is highly negative, inaccurate in its use of the term 'colonial,' grossly over-simplified, and does not reflect the growing attempts to provide the kind of accountability mechanisms for which they advocate."

At one level, there is little in “The New Colonialists” with which I disagree. The necessary state capacity in developing societies for basic service delivery is in many cases absent, significantly weak, or has been corrupted in ways that produce tremendous inequality of access and disproportionate social outcomes that are related to race, ethnicity, poverty, gender, and other categories of social identity. It is true that in the presence of weak state institutions, widespread corruption, and underdeveloped infrastructure, a large number of national and international non-governmental agencies and organizations have sought to redress such imbalances through their work in providing basic social services in ways that states have been unable to do.

It is true that the market for such organizations is highly competitive and their survival is dependent on recurring forms of funding within the larger world of overseas development assistance. It is also true that in certain instances, the non-governmental sector has become so dominant that it represents a set of parallel institutions that compete directly with the state. Indeed, while I was working on a project to develop human rights indicators in Bangladesh, a representative from a donor country told me that the non-governmental sector was so “overdeveloped” that the best course of action was to nationalize it, but in the absence of such an event from occurring, they had to continue to fund those groups and organizations that actually delivered the targeted development outcomes.

In this way, partner countries are dependent upon non-governmental organizations, national and international non-governmental agencies are dependent on donor countries and international donor agencies, which are in turn dependent on the non-governmental sector for service delivery and the achievement of development outcomes.

At another level, however, the argument in “The New Colonialists” is highly negative, inaccurate in its use of the term “colonial,” grossly over-simplified, and does not reflect the growing attempts to provide the kind of accountability mechanisms for which they advocate. Words such as “abyss,” “motley,” “hodgepodge,” “armada,” etc. are not particularly useful or helpful in providing a balanced assessment of the real problem of state capacity and the ways in which thousands of organisations and individuals, often working on shoe string budgets with low overheads, attempt to hold together some form of social fabric and provide social justice under exceedingly difficult conditions.

The presence and activities of these organizations are simply not equivalent to the types of colonial authority established by the great powers of Europe. Colonial expansion involved the establishment of enclave communities from which rent and natural resources were extracted for the center economy and political administration in Europe, which local governance involved a blend of military conquest, authoritarian administration, religious conversion (especially in Latin America), and imposition of foreign legal codes that undermined indigenous systems of governance, inheritance, communal property ownership and many other features of pre-colonial society. To equate the activities of the donor agencies and the organizations on the ground with this kind of history is simply erroneous, inaccurate, and provides little by way of a solution.

While the current system is one in which development assistance continues to be inadequate (only a handful of developed countries allocate more than the U.N. target of .7% of annual GDP), state institutions in partner countries continue to be weak, and the market for non-governmental organizations competitive, there is a growing emphasis within donor agencies and their partners on the role for accountability.

My own experiences in assessing the effectiveness of nine international human rights organizations in receipt of funding from the Netherlands revealed that many organizations have strong accountability mechanisms in place that tag project and program outputs, outcomes, and impact to particular lines of funding and particular donor agencies. Donors, for their part, have increased the reporting requirements for their partner organizations in ways that enhance accountability across the sector.

While such reporting requirements have created new demand on organizations and occupy larger proportions of their annual budgets, good reporting procedures and mechanisms of accountability, impact assessment, and feedback, mean that it is now more possible than ever to assess the value of these activities and the contribution that they make in providing much needed redress in some of the world’s most difficult settings. Like “The New Colonialists,” I too have a certain optimism for the role that aid agencies and their partner organisations can have, but they are simply not colonialists and they are much further along the route to establishing systems of accountability than the article suggests.

Dr. Todd Landman is Director of the Centre for Democratic Governance, Department of Government, at University of Essex. He is author of Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics, 3rd Edition (Routledge 2008), Studying Human Rights (Routledge 2006), and Protecting Human Rights (Georgetown 2005); co-author of Governing Latin America (Polity 2003) and Citizenship Rights and Social Movements (Oxford 1997); and co-editor of the Sage Handbook of Comparative Politics (Sage 2009). Dr. Landman has served as international human rights and democracy consultant for UNDP, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CIDA, DFID, DANIDA, IDEA, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Foreign Ministry of the Netherlands, Foreign Ministry of Mongolia, International Centre for Human Rights Policy, and Minority Rights Group International. His personal website can be found at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~todd.

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Cosmopolitanism and Rationalizing Tendencies

by James Pattison, University of West England

"We should not let the pejorative language of colonialism lead us to forget that what matters is securing people’s basic needs, and not let dependency provide us with another convenient rationalization for why we don’t do anything wrong when we choose not to help those less fortunate than ourselves."

When phone-in talk shows, the press, and undergraduates debate the case for cosmopolitan accounts of global distributive justice, there are a number of standard rationalizations given for why we don’t have a duty to help. These include: “we have duties only to our fellow countrymen”; “poverty is caused by corrupt leaders, so not our fault, and therefore not our responsibility“; and “humanitarian aid is counter-productive.” Unlike the other two sorts of rationalization, the latter claim does not necessarily deny the moral cosmopolitanism premise that we have extensive duties to relieve the suffering of those beyond our borders. Rather, it follows that good cosmopolitans shouldn’t give aid because doing so will violate the negative duty not to harm others, including those in other states. Yet I think we ought to be wary of this claim, given what Thomas Pogge calls our “rationalizing tendencies.” That is, we often interpret our moral values and empirical judgments in own favor. Consider, for instance, the frequent flyer who convinces herself that global warming is exaggerated in order to excuse her own significant carbon footprint. Claims of dependency by the “new colonialists” may fall into the same category. They provide a convenient excuse for individuals not to support aid agencies and international charities—our donations and support are only going to worsen the situation of those needing help anyway.

To be sure, allegations of donor dependency may have some substance and, as such, be more than simply selfish rationalizations. But it is questionable how much significance we should we give to this problem. It is important to remember that what ultimately matters is the effective provision of vital services, such as education and healthcare. This is not to deny that donors acting on cosmopolitan sentiments should be aware of the potentially detrimental effects of their beneficence. More specifically, aid agencies and other benefactors should take steps to help secure the accountability and long-term sustainability of the services that they provide. My point, however, is that dependency seems, by comparison, a minor complaint when what is at stake is the provision of services that are inextricably linked to the basic health and welfare of citizens.

The provision of these services can be said to be cosmopolitan not only in a moral sense—fulfilling duties to those beyond our boundaries—but also in the political sense of the term—the agents that provide the services are non-state, global actors. Some may feel uneasy about the growing influence of such cosmopolitan agents, but we should not romanticize the system of states. Those that revere the state often view it as the ultimate political community. It should be strong, the argument runs, and political leaders should be free to make their own decisions without external influence. The obvious problem with this perspective is that it takes the state to be a “black box”: what goes on within it is no one else’s problem. And, on this view, aid that can help the state’s people but harm the state is problematic. This gets things the wrong way round. As most modern, liberal conceptions of the state tell us, the state exists to provide for its citizens. It follows that if cosmopolitan agents can provide basic services that better secure people’s needs than then the weak state, so much for the state.

It is perhaps inevitable that the services provided by cosmopolitan agents will lead to allegations of dependency. This may be testament to the job that some of them are doing: they’re providing effective services that people want to use. It is also perhaps inevitable that their presence will give rise to accusations of being “new colonialists.” However, we should not let the pejorative language of colonialism lead us to forget that what matters is securing people’s basic needs, and not let dependency provide us with another convenient rationalization for why we don’t do anything wrong when we choose not to help those less fortunate than ourselves.

Dr. James Pattison is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of the West of England, U.K. He recently completed his PhD on humanitarian intervention, for which he was awarded the “Sir Ernest Barker Prize for Best Dissertation in Political Theory.” He has written various articles on the ethics of war and intervention and is currently working on a book on the Responsibility to Protect for Oxford University Press. Please visit his website: http://www.uwe.ac.uk/hlss/politics/staff_jPattison.shtml.

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In with the Old, Out with the New


by Brent J. Steele, University of Kansas

"The problem with this thesis is that the authors do not seem to entertain the possibility that the nation-state is itself an (old) colonial construct, and that even the longing for the 'strong' structures of the nation-state in these at-risk areas represents, at least implicitly, a somewhat outdated way of thinking."

Michael Cohen, Maria Figueroa Küpçü and Parag Khanna make some compelling arguments about the inherent drawbacks regarding the role diverse networks of NGOs play in keeping at-risk populations alive throughout the world. We are informed that these groups are “the new colonialists,” agencies much like the old European empires. These new colonialists are apparently enforcing a cycle of dependency which prevents the development of state structures, structures that apparently sustain these populations more effectively. The problem with this thesis is that the authors do not seem to entertain the possibility that the nation-state is itself an (old) colonial construct, and that even the longing for the “strong” structures of the nation-state in these at-risk areas represents, at least implicitly, a somewhat outdated way of thinking.

While NGOs can indeed, as they note, help rebuild houses and vaccinate children, they threaten the “authority of an already weak government” in the areas they operate. Another way to put this argument is that we should value the structure of the Westphalian nation-state over the needs of individuals, presumably because over the long term the former ultimately ensures the latter. But as they also admit, the reason that the “new colonialists” are here in the first place is because the governments of these states are ineffective. Perhaps they were ineffective precisely because the nation-state itself was doomed from the start in those areas—areas that were arbitrarily carved up by European colonial empires. Take the Afghanistan example—are we really to believe that Karzai’s government would be any better at delivering aid to some of these at-risk populations in remote areas than the “new colonialists”? And if not, then why are we to consider Karzai’s opinion forceful?

Another problem identified by the authors with the new colonialists is that they “bleed the country” in which they are aiding of “local talent.” Again, however, this is talent that could presumably be better used towards building up the national government, the state. But if we understand that the nation-state system itself is useful and effective in only certain contexts (temporal and spatial), if we free our mind of the idea of a Westphalian system as the default form of international order, if we are willing, moreover, to admit that a system where a multitude of specialized actors (states, NGOs, IOs, etc.) perform different functions, then the authors main beef with the “new colonialists” is a rather narrow one indeed.

Throughout the essay, the authors admit that the “new colonialists” are effective—they “get results,” they are “reliable.” Yet for them, two further problems remain. First, according to the authors, the “new colonialists need weak states as much as weak states need them.” That may be true, but they provide very little evidence that this cycle of dependence is intentionally perpetuated by the aid groups. They give the example of Georgia, asserting that the writing of grant applications for the Georgian government by NGOs “result[s in] a vicious cycle of dependency as new colonialists vie for the contracts that will keep them in business.” But how this extends into dependency is not entirely clear. A second issue for the authors is that NGOs are “unaccountable.” But how accountable are nation-states? If we assume that nation-states are more accountable than NGOs (and depending upon which state we are talking about, that’s not entirely true), we must also assume that those who fund NGOs (their members) do not hold their organizations to account. In fact, that is precisely what they can do if they threaten to withdraw their memberships and financial support.
I, and indeed most individuals of my generation, first “experienced” the idea of international politics by viewing the globes on display in a grade school classroom. In those depictions, the surface area of the seven continents was distinguished by nation-states—each coded by different colors. This was a quick and easy way to conceptualize the world at that time, but it was not always accurate. It is even less accurate today—in a fluid age where the nation-state exists in both complementary and contentious form alongside many other political organizations. The proliferation of these organizations, including what these authors have termed the “new colonialists,” has come about in part because the old order of nation-states, far from being an absolutist solution to “global order,” instead worked only in particular contexts. In others, where acute intra-state competition occurs, groups vied to capture their state institutions in order to have a “legitimate” basis for authority to do what they wished to do within their own sovereign borders (think the Hutus who spoke for Rwanda at the U.N. Security Council during the 1994 genocide). That there are problems with the practices of non-state actors is a valid point brought forth by these authors—that these problems would be ameliorated by a return to the “one size fits all” nation-state model found on the globes of my youth is, however, an argument whose time has passed.

Brent J. Steele is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Kansas. His primary research interests cover a wide array of international relations topics, including international ethics, international political theory, United States foreign policy, Just War theory, ontological security theory and international security. In addition to his first book, Ontological Security in International Relations, he has published articles in journals such as International Relations, International Studies Review, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of International Relations and Development, Millennium and, Review of International Studies. Please visit Dr. Steele’s website: http://www2.ku.edu/~kups/people/Faculty/Steele_Brent.shtml.

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Friday, August 1, 2008

Editor's Introduction- August 2008

“Still knocking, as the doors close.” The Economist. June 19, 2008.

An annotation

The plight of refugees remains one of the most pressing and contentious facing the international community today. Despite passage of international legal standards on the treatment and protection of refugees, many of those fleeing harm and persecution are increasingly greeted with hostility and discrimination upon arrival in “safe” foreign lands.

“After a welcome decline between 2001 and 2005, the number of refugees—in the classic sense of people forced to leave their countries because of war or persecution—rose in 2007 for the second straight year.”

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) the increase in refugees is due in large part to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As stated in the 1951 Convention Relating the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, “refugees are those individuals fleeing from their home country due to a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a certain social group or political opinion.” However, this definition does not account for individuals displaced by mounting international problems of natural disaster, economic instability, and food shortage. The UNHCR comments that if statistics on refugees were expanded to include these individuals, the numbers of fugitives would increase drastically. Here, questions arise over the established UNHCR definition of refugees, and the possible need for expansion of international norms.

“Many of the rich countries which might be able to help [refugees] are hardening their hearts, often under electoral pressure.”

With growing numbers of refugees crossing their borders, wealthy and prosperous receiving states are often left with the unpopular task of sheltering and caring for these fugitives. Amid growing public unrest and hostility towards refugees, rights groups call for a shift in the perception and treatment of those fleeing their homelands. However, this raises important questions regarding the responsibility of the state to provide for and protect refugees. Also at issue for rights groups is the fact that in many instances, based on their country of origin, some refugees are detained under harsh conditions or even turned away. Thus, with the livelihoods of millions of fugitives at stake, it is essential for states to re-examine not only the plight of refugees, but more importantly their treatment upon arrival in another country.

These issues and others are considered in this month’s Roundtable.

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Who Counts? Refugees and the Politics of Indifference

by Sonia Cardenas

"Challenging the politics of indifference towards refugees further requires exposing narratives of fear and animosity, or hidden assumptions about who counts as a full and equal human being.”

The contemporary plight of refugees, asylum seekers, and other marginalized groups reveals the limits of international human rights norms. Numerous internationally recognized standards and laws exist for the humane treatment of people. Yet despite enormous progress, the reality is that some people are simply deemed to be less fully human than others. Nationalism and racism underlie popular indifference to today’s unwanted refugees. This is the unspoken truth that lies at the heart of the global refugee problem.

Overcoming entrenched indifference towards refugees consequently requires looking beyond state sovereignty. Effective refugee policies must turn to global governance for solutions, challenging narratives of fear and animosity as well as tackling the root problems (political and economic) that displace people from their homes. Compassion toward refugees cannot be assumed or coerced—note recent EU restrictions for asylum-seekers—though it can be constructed politically.

National governments cannot sustain liberal refugee policies indefinitely; they are too captive to short-term political calculations. In democracies, electoral pressures can push leaders to restrict migrant flows, especially during periods of economic downturn or perceived terrorist threats. In non-democracies, governments are often implicated in the conflicts from which people are fleeing; even if they offer safe passage or haven, refugees’ rights still may be compromised.

By definition, the protection of refugees poses an international problem requiring a global solution. Once people cross state borders (or once a government permits internal displacement), other states cannot be trusted to protect refugees. People who have lost the protection of their home countries should not have to depend on the goodwill of strangers. The international community must have reliable and effective mechanisms for protecting them. If this admonition sounds naïve, it is only because state sovereignty trumps human rights.

Challenging the politics of indifference towards refugees further requires exposing narratives of fear and animosity, or hidden assumptions about who counts as a full and equal human being. Here, the media can play a productive role, revealing stories of dispossession and abuse while giving a human face to distant victims. Activists should ask uncomfortable questions about why only certain refugees are worth protecting: for example, would we really close our doors to those most closely resembling us? Advocates must also confront myths about the prohibitive costs of hosting refugees, including purported rises in crime or unemployment. Where public opinion is largely indifferent or hostile to refugees, liberal political discourse should strive to be more substantive than polemical.

Fundamentally, the most effective refugee policy is comprehensive, addressing the root causes of displacement and conflict. This requires proactive inter-agency coordination, incorporating refugee issues alongside diplomatic and economic negotiations. The goal—however elusive—is ultimately to make the political category of refugees obsolete. States must become convinced that refugee problems undermine international security, making it in their interests to stem foreign conflicts. A robust international refugee policy is therefore necessarily attentive to peace building and conflict resolution.

The reluctance of wealthy countries to accept growing numbers of refugees confirms the importance of political will. Who counts as a human being worthy of protection is subject to bigotry, often manipulated by political elites. In contrast, more equitable refugee policies call for global regulatory approaches, explicit challenges to fear-inducing rhetoric, and comprehensive policies targeting the root sources of conflict. Debates over refugee policy understandably focus on sovereign states, but the key to protecting refugees lies with transforming public opinion: replacing the politics of indifference and fear with an informed politics of compassion.

Sonia Cardenas is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Human Rights Program at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut. She is the author of numerous publications, including Conflict and Compliance: State Responses to International Human Rights Pressure (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007). She is currently completing two book projects, both for the University of Pennsylvania Press— Chains of Justice: The Global Rise of State Institutions for Human Rights and a textbook, Terror and Hope: The Politics of Human Rights in Latin America.

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Social Contract in a Borderless World

by Daniel J. Graeber

"Given the declining world economy and the global uptick in violence, it is no wonder the issue is in the spotlight. Extending the social contract to outsiders in the name of philanthropy would make Milton Friedman stand up in his grave.”

Addressing the American Political Science Association in 2000, the international relations theorist Robert Keohane of Princeton University noted that effective governance in a globalized world depends more on interstate cooperation and transnational networks than any type of world body. Keohane made the claim that the people and players in a globalized world stand to gain from the system through cooperation across borders and boundaries. Nevertheless, Keohane also observed that the actors may exploit interdependence in that system by transferring blame to others and that, although institutions may be essential, they can also be dangerous. So it is when confronting the issues of forced migration and displacement. While the economic and security issues concerning displaced persons place the matter at the forefront of the global agenda, it is largely a matter for people to settle.

The article in the June 19 edition of The Economist entitled “Still knocking, as the doors close” presents the notion that many of the so-called rich countries are bowing to a widening sense of xenophobia among the European community by closing the doors on displaced persons fleeing conflict zones. The Economist says the “luckless people” in conflict zones in Central Asia and the Middle East are turning to Europe as a place of safety and source for a better future. And why shouldn't they? As Europe moves toward the next phase of geopolitical identity, that of a national federal system rather than a provincial federal system, she should expect to experience the same wave of immigration that eventually defined the multinational demographic of the United States. But at the same time, why should Europe not tackle the issue in the same fashion that the United States is tackling its own immigration problem? At which point does a nation, or supra-nation, extend its social contract to wards of the state that operate outside that contract?

The Economist points to a general rise in the number of displaced persons in the world and blames the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq for contributing to that factor. As of December 2007, the number of displaced persons rose from 1.6 million in the previous year to 26 million. “And if you throw the net really wide,” the report says, to include non-conflict issues such as climate change, food shortages and natural disasters, that figure rises to 67 million.

Of these displaced millions, however, The Economist says only a small fraction sought the assistance of the U.N. human rights agency by demanding asylum in another country. It would be curious to compare that fraction with those displaced persons who are aware of such procedures or those who find U.N. procedures expeditious. Migration of a populace tends to move from a situation of deteriorating living conditions to a situation of improved living conditions. Many of the displaced, one could argue, are at or below the middle class demographic and lack any resources to give them the benefit of time. The U.S. Helsinki Commission said in an April 2008 report that the majority of Iraqi refugees in Jordan, for example, fled their homeland with few resources and have depleted whatever income they had while living as refugees. Fleeing conflict or disaster does not allow time for procedure.

The report then goes on to condemn the “returns directive” in the European Union that permits at least six-months of detention for those entering Europe illegally. The directive allows further detention of immigrants beyond the six-month term should they “fail to cooperate” with authorities. At least some of those detained as illegal immigrants, the report says, are asylum seekers and the “returns directive” is perhaps enforced in such a manner that the distinction between the two is blurred. The report then asks if it is therefore permissible for the “other rich countries” to condemn Europe for its treatment of the less fortunate. The answer is an emphatic no.

The displaced Iraqi in Jordan poses the same question facing America concerning the migration from Latin America. Specifically, illegal migration, displaced persons, and asylum seekers may become wards of the host nation, who, sometimes at great cost, use revenue derived from their populace to care for the disadvantaged. The government of Iraq, and the United Nations for that matter, heaped praise upon Jordan for its generosity in hosting refugees, but Jordan cannot maintain that assistance indefinitely. Americans, for their part, face similar issues when confronting their own immigration problem. Given the declining world economy and the global uptick in violence, it is no wonder the issue is in the spotlight. Extending the social contract to outsiders in the name of philanthropy would make Milton Friedman stand up in his grave.

The Economist notes a softening of the public perception extended toward forced migration. It points to policies embraced by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd who closed several detention centers in the country and moved to ease the process by which asylum seekers become full citizens. Keohane noted that leaders have a variety of goals, but staying in power is very near the top of their agenda. Europe may address the burdens of migration with its “returns directive,” and American may address the burden with a border fence, but it is not Europe or America who is making those decisions. It is the people who are dealing with their own degree of xenophobia that are calling the shots. The Economist notes that a lack of distinction exists in public opinion between asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. But what really is the difference when the social contract is involved? Institutions such as the UNHCR may provide a means by which displaced persons address their concerns, but for better or worse, it is not the institution’s decision to make.

Daniel J. Graeber has been a contributor to the Foreign Policy Association's Great Decisions series since its inception, writing on war crimes and international law. He has focused considerably on the legal aspects concerning the U.S.-led "war on terror" and various war crimes tribunals. He has lectured on the history of war crimes in the international arena and served as a professor of ethics at Grand Valley State University. He has published works on the history of the U.S. relationship with Israel and the U.S. foreign policy regarding Hamas. He is currently a writer for United Press International covering Iraqi political developments, as well as the oil and energy sector. He lives in Grand Rapids, Michigan.

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Appealing to the Realist Nature of the Problem: An Attempt to Find Common Ground

by Eric K. Leonard

"But [my students] are aware of the complexity of the problem and the need to view all issues, even those of a seemingly liberal, global governance-laden human rights perspective, from all angles. And they begin to realize that the protection of human rights, on a universal scale, may actually be in their national interest."

Whenever I teach my undergraduate course on human rights, I inevitably have one student who argues that state sovereignty trumps all and that states should act in their “national interest” in regards to issues where human rights and sovereignty clash. They usually continue the argument by stipulating that “human rights” are not defensible unless they are universally accepted, meaning contained in a universally ratified document (and they use the term “universal” literally), because all authority resides in the state. Thus, it is always an interesting discussion when we turn to the issue of migration, and more specifically, refugees. As the focal piece for this month’s roundtable, “Still knocking, as the doors close,” points out, the number of refugees continues to climb along with the number of individuals under the care of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), while the reaction of many nation-states to these increasing numbers has been to restrict the flow of migrants and tighten restrictions on these population flows. The question that I must always pose to my students is how to deal with this ever deepening issue, and more pointedly, where does responsibility reside in regards to protection?

The obvious argument of my state sovereignty focused student is that responsibility does not exist unless the state in question is a party to some international convention; and even then international law remains so ambiguous and lacking real means of enforcement, most states can simply ignore the “law” if it is not in their national interest. In other words, they take a classic realist approach to the problem. Therefore, despite the fact that there exists a widely accepted legal basis for protection of refugees, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, it remains questionable for some whether any state responsibility to protect exists. As a result, the argument in favor of such acts as the European Union’s “returns directive” remains dependent on the notion that state sovereignty continues its preeminence in the global affairs arena.

Adding another layer to this discussion is the distinction that exists between a refugee and a migrant. According to the 1951 Convention, a refugee is defined as any person who holds a:

well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

This differs from a migrant who typically moves in order improve their socioeconomic status. However, does such a distinction matter when examining the human rights violations of individuals? It appears clear to me that although the violations of refugees may be more intense in nature, this does not dissipate the fact that socioeconomic migrants also often lack the basic human rights that are legally codified in international legal statute—such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Thus, I believe that our discussion should extend to both refugees and migrants; however, this also makes the ability to counter the state sovereignty focused student’s argument that much more difficult.

So where does responsibility reside? Do states have a responsibility to accept refugees and migrants whose human rights were being violated by their home state? My realist student would unequivocally argue no—but instead of engaging this student in the typical argument of sovereign rights versus cosmopolitanism, I believe it is more constructive to take a different tact. Yes, I could espouse the argument that the cosmopolitan basis of our humanity leads to a responsibility to protect the world’s refugees and migrants because of the human rights violations perpetrated against them. In fact, I have supported the cosmopolitan perspective and its non-state centric approach in previous roundtable entries as they pertain to such issues as the power of the Human Rights Council and humanitarian intervention. However, the problem with approaching any of the world’s problems within this argumentative framework is that the parties engaging in dialogue tend to talk past one another. If I begin my classroom discussions by espousing a definition of cosmopolitanism and the moral imperative to act, it is guaranteed that all of my realist students will simply shut down. They will find little value in this argument and fail to recognize a need to act on human rights issues such as refugee flows and mass migration. But if we refocus the topic to include a discussion of national interest, now I have their attention.

So how does the responsibility to protect affect the United States’ or any other countries’ national interest? The most obvious impact is financial, but the literature often cites concerns of national security, xenophobia, impact on scarce resources, among others. This is not say that there are no positive influences on host states, but again, such rhetoric often times fails to pierce the ideological positioning of my students. This financial burden provides an alternative rationale for action that is couched in a language that realists can understand. It provides them an impetus to act in situations of conflict and economic degradation. In fact, this was the rationale that ultimately caused President Clinton to act in Haiti during the 1990s. It was not for democratization or the promotion of his “engagement and enlargement” policy that caused a U.S. response to the crisis— it was refugee flows and the impact this had on our national interest. Such an approach tends to invoke an interesting response—my realist students begin to pay attention and the core of their argument, state sovereignty, begins to fade. They may see this issue as a responsibility to their own citizens or to their national interest, but they also understand the need to address the problem at its source. So are they now clamoring for intervention in war torn nations around the world in order to rectify the refugee problem? No. But they are aware of the complexity of the problem and the need to view all issues, even those of a seemingly liberal, global governance-laden human rights perspective, from all angles. And they begin to realize that the protection of human rights, on a universal scale, may actually be in their national interest. As a result, in a small way and in a small classroom setting, I have allowed the cosmopolitan global governance liberals to converse with the sovereignty-based realists—a small act that can hopefully be exported to a larger stage.

Eric K. Leonard is the Henkel Family Endowed Chair in International Affairs and Director of General Education at Shenandoah University in Winchester, VA. He has published several articles, case studies and a book on such issues as the International Criminal Court, humanitarian law, theoretical conceptualizations of sovereignty, and global governance. His book is entitled, The Onset of Global Governance: International Relations Theory and the International Criminal Court (Ashgate, 2005).

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Tuesday, July 1, 2008

Editor's Introduction- July 2008

"Armed and Humanitarian" by Bruce Falconer. Mother Jones. May 19, 2008.

An annotation

As the "war on terror" continues to drive American foreign policy, those waging this "war" have broadened their understanding of what constitutes a security threat to include failed states, and those teetering on the brink of instability. Among the new security risks are states ravaged by natural disaster. And, with the U.S. defense establishment's concern with humanitarian aid as of late, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that have traditionally provided relief are placed in a compromised position. With often divergent motives, there is increasing tension between the NGO and military sectors, and caught in the middle are destitute populations. One must question the political and social implications of cooperative missions between these "strange bedfellows."

"NGO officials are grateful for the US military response to disasters. But the struggle to be seen as independent players, unaffiliated with any government, is crucial to NGOs' ability to operate."

While it is essential to realize the resources that the military can contribute in disaster zones, humanitarian organizations must contend with the political baggage that accompanies this external assistance. When NGOs depend on their legitimacy and perceived altruism for access to communities in need, their fear is that the presence of military support jeopardizes that perception. However, since humanitarian aid workers operate with limited capabilities, working alongside the military allows for a collaborative effort that serves the need of vulnerable people and enables a more effective response. Considering what is at stake in humanitarian terms, what is gained and what is lost when aid workers stand side-by-side with military personnel?

"When the military undertakes what appears to be humanitarian or development work.'decisions are being based on tactical considerations of whether this area has a strategic importance with regard to broader military activities. That is not humanitarian.'"

If security interests continue to be weighed against human rights priorities, what are the consequences for humanitarianism? To hand over the reins to the military would run contrary to the core principles of humanitarian relief work and sacrifice the higher moral ground. As well, the benefit garnered by Western NGOs, who contribute significantly to positive relations with the developing world, might also be lost. Failed states do indeed pose security threats; but, can these states be repaired without waging the political battle for "hearts and minds"?

These issues and others are considered in this month's Roundtable.

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Mission Creep: De-Militarizing Humanitarian Protection

by Sonia Cardenas

"Overall, the U.S. military's new humanitarianism is problematic. It is not humanitarian in intent, it is premised on faulty assumptions about failure in Iraq, and it disregards a global consensus about the value of multilateralism.”

Over a decade ago, the U.S. military was warning liberal internationalists about the dangers of "mission creep." Today it is doing the opposite, incorporating relief and development work into its operations. In the devastating aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in Burma , the U.S. military's newfound mission may seem compelling. Unfortunately, expanding the military's role into humanitarian work reflects a flawed logic that should be resisted. There are more promising ways to protect victims of humanitarian disaster.

The term "mission creep" has been used to describe the gradual and unwanted expansion of the military's role into non-traditional areas, such as human rights. First mentioned in a 1993 Washington Post article by Jim Hoagland, warning against intervention in Somalia, mission creep has become part of the political lexicon. In 1994, President Clinton assured Congress that mission creep would not occur in Rwanda. In 1995, Senator John McCain and military officials warned of military creep in Bosnia . A decade later, Paul Wolfowitz applied the term to the World Bank, describing mission creep as the pursuit of "sweeping international causes that sound good without any evidence to show that they can be accomplished."

Post-September 11 th exigencies may have dissipated the military's anxiety about mission creep. The U.S. military now asserts that it is essential to engage in non-combat activities, which it dubs "stability and support operations." The goal is to stabilize volatile political situations, the potential breeding grounds for terrorism. For the military, one of the key lessons of Iraq is that brute force is insufficient to assure security. Humanitarianism-defined broadly to include relief, development, and nation-building-is also necessary.

While the U.S. military has long engaged in non-combat missions, the emphasis today is quite different. Humanitarian operations are to be considered a "core military mission" of comparable priority to traditional combat missions, according to a 2005 Department of Defense Directive. The primary rationale for non-combat operations, moreover, is geo-strategic. An Army Field Manual in 2003 admits the goal is to "retain U.S. access or influence abroad." This is a new brand of militarized humanitarianism.

Not surprisingly, some observers are skeptical of this doctrinal shift and its practical implications. NGOs, which thrive on independence, worry about coordinating on-the-ground logistics with military forces and appearing politically partisan. Many critics of the war in Iraq (including some who supported humanitarian intervention in the heyday of the 1990s) have become broadly suspicious of U.S. motives, accepting what Madeleine Albright recently labeled "the end of intervention." Even the initial reluctance of the world community to intervene in Burma may be partly a backlash against the U.S. military's ostensible embrace of humanitarianism.

The expansion of the U.S. military into relief and development work should in fact be contested. First, unlike humanitarian interventions of the 1990s, which used force for humanitarian (and other) ends, non-combat operations today deploy humanitarian means mostly for military and economic ends. Yet as Michael O'Neill of Save the Children observes, "humanitarian work is based on need and need alone. It's valued for its own purposes." And it cannot be captive to prevailing military and economic interests, dictating which human beings are protected. When strategic calculations trump humanitarian concerns, human rights are likely to be compromised.

Second, insofar as the U.S. military's new humanitarian mission draws on its experience in Iraq, it has learned the wrong lessons. Even as Iraq reveals the limits of a military approach, the lesson of Iraq is not that the U.S. military needs to do more, adding humanitarian operations to its arsenal. The lesson of Iraq is that the military needs to do less, including desisting from forcible regime change.

Disengagement, however, is not the answer. In extreme cases, force should be used to protect human rights and the military should participate in the tactical delivery of humanitarian assistance. The 2001 Responsibility to Protect report offers concrete guidance for when and how to intervene. It invokes at least two criteria relevant for non-combat missions: the precautionary principle of right intent (even when states have mixed motives, the primary purpose must be to relieve human suffering); and the importance of a multilateral organization authorizing the intervention (i.e., the United Nations or a regional group like ASEAN).

Overall, the U.S. military's new humanitarianism is problematic. It is not humanitarian in intent, it is premised on faulty assumptions about failure in Iraq , and it disregards a global consensus about the value of multilateralism. More directly, it threatens to harm the work of humanitarian organizations. Jim Hoagland, who originally coined "mission creep," now warns against "mission shrink" in Iraq (or cutbacks in the military's democracy-building role). The terms of the military-humanitarian debate may have shifted, but the consequences for human rights are still largely negative.

Sonia Cardenas is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Human Rights Program at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut. She is the author of numerous publications, including Conflict and Compliance: State Responses to International Human Rights Pressure (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007). She is currently completing two book projects, both for the University of Pennsylvania Press— Chains of Justice: The Global Rise of State Institutions for Human Rights and a textbook, Terror and Hope: The Politics of Human Rights in Latin America.

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When Steel and Guns Meets Bread and Butter

by Daniel J. Graeber

"Now, instead of 'shock and awe,' the new face of the U.S. appears to take lessons learned from the adage of finding native solutions to native problems.”

Speaking before the 191-member United Nations in 2005, then-British Prime Minister Tony Blair said that "For the first time . we are agreed that states do not have the right to do what they will within their own borders but that we in the name of humanity have a common duty to protect people where their own governments will not." This notion, that of responsible sovereignty, says that nation states forfeit the right to uninterrupted internal freedoms when they no longer uphold the responsibilities associated with sovereignty. The evolution of international law has typically been to protect states from outside interference. However, the questions posed by such historical atrocities as Rwanda, and most recently the devastation in Myanmar following Cyclone Nargis, pave the way for a consideration for moral intervention. States have been historically reluctant to adopt humanitarian intervention into their military policy. The international legal regime, however, has widely recognized that intervention on behalf of humanitarianism is permissible when the use of force is restricted to that which saves lives.

Article 3 of The Montevideo Convention of 1933, which established the definition, rights and duties of a nation, says that one such sovereign duty of a nation is the right "to provide for its conservation and prosperity." This provision alludes to the emergence of responsible sovereignty. There are two ideologies of modern sovereignty. One conceptualizes sovereignty as a right of statehood, and another envisions a right to statehood. State responsibility to sovereignty invokes an obligation to maintain internal order and protection of its citizenry. A state takes on a duty to its citizenry when classic individual rights are exchanged for protections provided by the state. Furthermore, the responsibility of the state to adhere to internationally recognized normative relations, both intra and interstate, is an obligation of sovereignty. The inherent rights of non-intervention in state sovereignty in an interdependent system may be cast aside if the responsibilities of state sovereignty are not met.

Writing for the May 19 online edition of Mother Jones , Bruce Falconer comments in his piece, "Armed and Humanitarian," that U.S. military doctrine has evolved to embrace moral intervention by way of "stability operations." The U.S. Department of Defense defines stability operations as "[m]ilitary and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions." These operations may place military forces in disaster areas, such as the earthquakes in Pakistan in 2005, in order to bring victims humanitarian supplies. The purpose, Falconer says, is to prevent states "from slipping into chaos." However, Falconer notes that nongovernmental organizations such as Oxfam and Médecins Sans Frontières, worry that this new military doctrine will paint them as agents of the intervening force, or at the very least, it will put them in the line of fire. But as U.S. military doctrine tries to catch up with Mr. Blair's sentiment regarding the "common duty to protect," so too must the NGO community, and Falconer, to be perfectly frank.

Humanitarian agencies worry that the U.S. military's new found interest in operations other than war will muddy the line between relief work and regime change. The article makes reference to former Army Special Forces officer Roger Carstens, saying this emerging military doctrine makes sense. "We have the capability, we have the capacity, and we have the cash," Carstens says. "You put all the NGOs together, and they can't even come close to what an aircraft carrier battle group can deliver in a few sorties." But this is both duplicitous and contradictory to the mission for the NGO community to object to or complain about "the guns and steel of the military" being used to assist in humanitarian operations. In 2003, the U.S. military assisted in humanitarian operations in Bam, Iran, yet there were no underlying efforts at regime change here, only assistance in the face of mounting disaster. Falconer backs his allegations with a statement by former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to solidify the concern. "Just as surely as our diplomats and military, American NGOs . are out there serving and sacrificing on the front lines of freedom," Powell said in 2001. "NGOs are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team." But this doctrinal argument, in part, the Powell doctrine, has been largely replaced by U.S. military strategists with what could be referred to as the Petraeus doctrine, based on the counterinsurgency strategy laid out by U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus. This doctrine relies less on the "shock and awe" elements of the Powell doctrine and more on incorporating elements of the native population into providing solutions for violence. While the Powell argument certainly held validity in the 20 th century, it largely proved a failure in Iraq . Now, instead of "shock and awe," the new face of the U.S. appears to take lessons learned from the adage of finding native solutions to native problems.

Falconer's argument is off base, as is the NGO community's complaint that military force is malevolently utilitarian. When the United Nations closed its embassy in Baghdad following the devastating 2003 bomb blast that killed Secretary-General's Special Representative for Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello, the United Nations should have sent in more advisers equipped to manage 21 st century conflict, not withdraw in fear from it. The same holds true for the NGO community. It, and the rest of the world, must adjust to a new face of conflict. The clean Cold War notion of a state-centric division between civilians and the military, between conflict and peace, no longer exists. In a globalized world, when ethnic identity supplants nationalism, and military force is no longer exclusively for fighting wars, the consideration must be made that "steel and guns" may run tandem to bread and butter.

Daniel J. Graeber has been a contributor to the Foreign Policy Association's Great Decisions series since its inception, writing on war crimes and international law. He has focused considerably on the legal aspects concerning the U.S.-led "war on terror" and various war crimes tribunals. He has lectured on the history of war crimes in the international arena and served as a professor of ethics at Grand Valley State University. He has published works on the history of the U.S. relationship with Israel and the U.S. foreign policy regarding Hamas. He is currently a writer for United Press International covering Iraqi political developments, as well as the oil and energy sector. He lives in Grand Rapids, Michigan.

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Reconstructing Sovereignty: From Control to Responsibility

by Eric K. Leonard

"According to this new interpretation of sovereignty, Burma has a responsibility to protect its citizens, and if it lacks the adequate resources to fulfill this responsibility, it is incumbent on the international community to intervene."

As I stood with a standing-room only crowd last fall at a United Nations University of New York (UNU-ONY) event entitled, "Prevention of Mass Atrocities: From Mandate to Realization," I began to wonder how far the responsibility to protect (R2P) could be stretched. As defined by the UNU-ONY organizers, the purpose of the event was " to explore the work of mass atrocity prevention across the UN system, with a focus on the role of the new Office of the Special Representative for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities (SRPGMA)." As I currently look at the international community's response to natural disasters such as the cyclone that devastated Burma, I reflect on the core document of this conference, the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) entitled "The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)," and its applicability to situations that are not genocidal in nature or part of a broader civil conflict. As a result, the primary question for me is not who should be involved in such humanitarian/aid interventions, as is the case with the Falconer article, but whether the repressive government of Burma has the right, or authority, to keep any and all humanitarian assistance out of their country.

In order to address this query, it is important to first assess the viability of applying the R2P principle to a natural disaster situation. Upon reading the report, it is clear that the intent of the document is not necessarily to contend with the results of a natural disaster, but to deal with both the prevention and reaction to man-made disasters that involve conflict and civil strife. Most notably the R2P principle would apply to situations regarding acts of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. However, as one reads the report it appears reasonable to stretch that focus to situations in which a state neglects to react to crisis situations like Cyclone Nargis. If we couple that neglect with the large-scale loss of life and subsequent human rights violations, it is feasible to claim that such a situation provides a valid justification for intervention based on the responsibility to protect principle. As described by Human Rights Watch, Médecins Sans Frontières, and other prominent human rights' NGOs, the Burmese government's failure to react and subsequent denial of access to both aid agencies and willing states has resulted in mass starvation, wide-spread disease, a lack of adequate shelter and clean water, among other human rights' violations. According to a recent Human Rights Watch estimate, only 1.3 million people of the 2.4 million people affected by the cyclone have received aid. It is this type of preventable situation that necessitates outside intervention because of the Burmese state's neglect of its civilian population.

Ultimately though, the question of humanitarian intervention turns, as do most questions in international affairs, on the issue of sovereignty and how this defining term of world politics is applied to humanitarian aid situations. The ICISS properly recognizes the centrality of this question in their report. As a result, they provide a novel and important re-construction of how we interpret this term. Building on former Secretary-General Kofi Annan's seminal article, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty," the report calls on the international community to act upon the notion of sovereignty not as a form of control, but as a responsibility-a responsibility to protect one's citizens. The consequences of such a re-construction of sovereignty are cogently stated in the report:

First, it implies that the state authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that the national political authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and to the international community through the UN. And thirdly, it means that the agents of state are responsible for their actions; that is to say, they are accountable for their acts of commission and omission.

This third and final point is where international humanitarian intervention for natural disaster situations, such as Cyclone Nargis, becomes pertinent. As stated earlier, it is the omission of action by the Burmese government that allows for the international community to intervene based on the R2P principle. According to this new interpretation of sovereignty, Burma has a responsibility to protect its citizens, and if it lacks the adequate resources to fulfill this responsibility, it is incumbent on the international community to intervene. This is the point where the international community must act, but act with a diplomatic consciousness of the situation. This means that unilateral action must be avoided and the responsibility to protect resides with the U.N. Security Council. Although difficult to imagine the Chinese not vetoing a resolution requiring the opening of Burma's borders to all forms of humanitarian aid, the wide spread acceptance of the responsibility to protect principle in the 2005 U.N. World Summit final document provides a glimmer of hope. Regardless, it is simple cowardice by the international community to not react with a vote in the Security Council that, if vetoed, would result in the public shaming of the dissenting parties.

In my last roundtable contribution I called for a less state-centric system, and I believe that my current advocacy for a reconstruction of sovereignty is conducive to such change. This is not to say that the responsibility to protect principle results in a non-state centric system, but it is one way to re-orient state thinking on issues of authority and control. Such progress will only assist the international community to move beyond a Westphalian consciousness and towards the more cosmopolitan level of global governance consciousness that I advocate.

Eric K. Leonard is the Henkel Family Endowed Chair in International Affairs and Director of General Education at Shenandoah University in Winchester, VA. He has published several articles, case studies and a book on such issues as the International Criminal Court, humanitarian law, theoretical conceptualizations of sovereignty, and global governance. His book is entitled, The Onset of Global Governance: International Relations Theory and the International Criminal Court (Ashgate, 2005).

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Sunday, June 1, 2008

Editor's Introduction- June 2008

"A Screaming Start: The UN and Human Rights."The Economist. April 24, 2008.

An annotation

The formation of the new United Nations Human Rights Council in 2006, out of the ashes of the Commission on Human Rights, marked a step toward correcting the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the previous attempt at governance. The Council’s advocates raised issues concerned with the fact that the Commission was not credible because it listed infamously abusive states among its membership. These supporters were confronted by opponents to the Council such as former U.S. Ambassador John Bolton, a long-time critic of the U.N., who argued that nothing had changed when Cuba, China and Pakistan were among the first countries to join the new body. Two years into its infancy, it seems appropriate to consider how the Human Rights Council has improved upon its predecessor, as well as in what ways it has not.

“This [universal periodic review] marks the main difference between the council and its predecessor. The commission often focused on just a dozen states, which complained they were singled out because they lacked enough big friends to keep critics at bay.”

One step taken to improve governance and credibility is the establishment of a universal periodic review which all member states must submit to the Council every four years. Consisting of a self-evaluation, a report by the High Commissioner and a report by human rights groups and other relevant stakeholders, this review aims to inject egalitarianism and subject all states to the same processes and criteria before the Council makes its conclusive report. While this sounds like a convoluted system that could be easily manipulated, it also may be the first attempt at democratizing a situation hindered by entrenched power relations.

“The Muslim and non-aligned states often blame the West for focusing on abuses in poor countries while ignoring its own faults. But they rarely take any action in the council over alleged rich-world misdeeds such as mistreatment of terror suspects. That may be because poor, angry countries hesitate to threaten their relationship with powerful partners and aid donors by taunting them over human rights.”

In matters of global governance, power differentiation is an inevitable roadblock, and agenda-setting in bodies such as the Council is a clear exercise of power. In this case, as the Council becomes more democratic in its processes there remain inequalities that play out by preventing full, honest discussion of human rights records of all member states of the United Nations. It remains to be seen whether or not the Council makes decent strides toward fairness in its reporting and judgment.

These issues and others are considered in this month’s Roundtable.

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The Myth of Membership: Reforming the U.N. Human Rights Council

by Sonia Cardenas

"A productive dialogue about reforming the Human Rights Council should strive to be de-politicized, emphasizing notions of equal treatment. Who sits on the Council is less important than what they are permitted to do once there.”

The purportedly new-and-improved Human Rights Council is, by most accounts, failing to live up to its promise. Critics accuse the Council of following in the footsteps of its predecessor the U.N. Human Rights Commission because it permits rights abusers among its ranks and it focuses overwhelmingly on Israel. The dominant assumption, articulated by the United States, is that this is a problem of membership; more stringent criteria would result in a less biased body. This, however, is wishful thinking. Changing the rules of membership would only substitute one set of biases for another. A productive dialogue about reforming the Human Rights Council should strive to be de-politicized, emphasizing notions of equal treatment. Who sits on the Council is less important than what they are permitted to do once there.

The Council’s problem is not that it calls attention to Israeli violations, but that it does so to the exclusion of other potential cases. Critics attribute the Council’s bias to its control by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The reality is far more complex. Only fourteen of the Council’s forty-seven members belong to the OIC; and resolutions isolating Israel have been supported widely, including by Latin American countries. Nor is it feasible for an international organization concerned with regional representation to exclude members of NAM, comprising almost two-thirds of the world’s states.

For the United States, the Council’s defects are no surprise. Had Ambassador John Bolton gotten his way, the Council would be a leaner and tougher body: with thirty members maximum, elected by two-thirds of the General Assembly rather than simple majority. Rights-abusing states would be excluded (but not necessarily Security Council members Russia and China), and the Council would focus on the most egregious situations. When things did not go its way, the United States refused to participate.

While excluding violators from the Council may seem sensible, it is in fact problematic. Here are the reasons why:

-How are states to determine fairly which violations count or which victims matter? It is delusional to assume that voting will be free of political calculations;

-Human rights practices are a matter of gradation. Consequently, dividing the world into rights violators and protectors is misguided and counter-productive. It inhibits dialogue, reinforces global cleavages, and disenfranchises many states;

-In practice, human rights norms are contested. Should civil and political rights be privileged? Can national security ever justify torture? Should religious tolerance limit free speech? Only a Human Rights Council that debates these positions will be most credible; and

-The prospect of Council membership is not an incentive to change state practices. Accession conditionality is typically effective vis-à-vis organizations promising large benefits, such as the E.U. or NATO. The benefits of belonging to the Council are, in contrast, small, ambiguous, and realizable in less costly ways than by altering human rights practices.

The new Human Rights Council is not all bad. During the most recent session, it issued twenty resolutions, only five of them country-specific (two on Israel, one on Palestinian self-determination, and two targeting Sudan and North Korea). Other resolutions addressed topics as varied as disability rights, counter-terrorism, and the right to food. The new broader-based electoral system—direct vote by the General Assembly—has kept former Commission members like Libya, Zimbabwe, and Sudan off the Council, even if critics deride Saudi Arabia or Cuba’s election, and secret ballots undermine transparency. In principle, moreover, the new system of universal periodic review introduces some fairness, subjecting all states to scrutiny, while more frequent meetings give the Council greater flexibility in emergency situations.

The Council’s special procedures—a legacy of the earlier Commission—are also crucial. These procedures currently consist of twenty-nine thematic and nine country mechanisms. Critics are correct that, among country mandates, only the special rapporteur for violations in the Palestinian territories has an indefinite tenure. But it is also true that special-procedure mechanisms have been robust, leading in 2007 alone to a total of sixty-two fact-finding missions to fifty-one countries. This work should not be forgotten in the rush to highlight weaknesses.

While the Council is scheduled for self-review in 2011, serious dialogue about potential reforms must begin now. UNGA Resolution 60/251,which created the Council, pushes the body to promote human rights “in a fair and equal manner.” It further encourages “the principles of universality, impartiality, objectivity and non-selectivity, constructive international dialogue and cooperation.” Can this be achieved, or is it another human rights chimera?

Institutional design matters, more so if premised on political realities. Reforming the Human Rights Council requires changing procedural (not membership) rules to promote equal treatment of violators. For example, agenda rules could re-structure the amount of time or number of resolutions devoted to single cases. Country-specific resolutions might be restricted to the special-procedures mechanisms or newly arising emergencies, while Council resolutions could be largely thematic. Above all, reforms should be framed in terms of general principles like equal treatment, not the particular interests of member states. Political exclusion should not drive a body dedicated to human inclusiveness.

Sonia Cardenas is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Human Rights Program at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut. She is the author of numerous publications, including Conflict and Compliance: State Responses to International Human Rights Pressure (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007). She is currently completing two book projects, both for the University of Pennsylvania Press— Chains of Justice: The Global Rise of State Institutions for Human Rights and a textbook, Terror and Hope: The Politics of Human Rights in Latin America.

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Exile: Why the Human Rights Council Will Not Work

by Daniel J. Graeber

"Only through a level of communal consent can a human rights regime emerge that will encourage full cooperation. Interaction between states, not exclusion, is likely to alter the preferences and behavior of states operating at the margins of normative behavior.”

The Economist writes in an April 24 th edition that the U.N.’s Human Rights Council, the predecessor to the sixty-year-old U.N. Commission on Human Rights, is a “one-sided Israeli-bashing” organization. The Economist argues that the inclusion of second- and third-tier countries from the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) makes it a forum for targeting offenses committed by the Israeli government against the Palestinian people.

The Human Rights Council was established in 2006 to replace the Human Rights Commission. Human rights groups heaped criticism on the Commission for including member states who failed to take the issue to heart and who themselves committed grave violations of human rights. The new body faces much the same criticism, as did its predecessor. Human rights groups called on the U.N. General Assembly to oppose Bahrain, Gabon, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Zambia, and on May 22, Sri Lanka lost its bid for a seat allocated to Asian partners due to deteriorating human rights conditions in the country.

The British Ambassador to the United Nations, John Sawers, told Voice of America that the point of the Council is to raise the benchmark of acceptable human rights behavior across the globe. Yet he also observed that the Human Rights Council “is not about those who do against those who don’t. I think it is inevitable that every country will have its own issues on human rights.”

Considerations regarding historical and cultural context bear mentioning here. When we speak of any sort of system like a democratic government or a body such as the United Nations, we need to consider several factors. The Islamic states will converge as a bloc, the Eastern European states will converge as a bloc and so on. Each bloc will voice the concerns of their particular sphere of influence. From this constellation of influences come major decisions. And, as the United Nations is only as strong and only as effective as its member states, the concerns from this constellation of influences must be considered if the world body is to function as the pragmatic voice of the international community. The Economist argues that the Islamic and Non-Aligned members “hone in on Israel” because their status in the geopolitical hierarchy makes challenging the West a futile endeavor. But to sideline certain blocs is the diplomatic equivalent of cherry-picking.

One of the early resolutions from the Council, The Economist says, was a decision backed by Russia and the Islamic members that allows for certain degrees of “respect for religions and beliefs.” Hardly a measure embraced by Israel, one could argue. The Economist points to press-freedom groups who said they were appalled by such a resolution. Here again, we must weigh the considerations of other cultures when trying to reach a pragmatic benchmark of acceptable behavior—especially in an interconnected world forum. Too often, it seems, the West looks at the rest of the world with bewilderment and thinks it needs fixing because it does not match their prescription of “How Things Work.” Nor can the West understand the criticism against Israel. However, it is tremendously narrow sighted to believe that Western ideals are the last word in modern, functioning society, especially at the United Nations.

In a group, the most influential and most successful members define the rules of the game, but those rules are not immune to the constellation of influences. Why isn’t Israel subject to the concerns of all members, the “others” ask—and rightfully so. International players must either seek alternative means to success (honing in on Israel), play by the rules of those who have mastered the game, or fall by the way side. The same holds true with the United Nations. Through the various blocs represented, a unified voice should emerge reflecting what works, what’s acceptable and what defines the rules. Excluding or condemning a member of the conglomeration inflects a certain degree of bias that makes the general purpose ineffective. If the “ritual abusers” are not performing well and not playing according to the rules, excluding them from the game will not help them win.

The Economist says “Human rights are one of the three pillars on which the U.N. is supposed to rest.” If the purpose of the Human Rights Council is to establish the benchmark of acceptable behavior across all member states, it should include a fair representation of all member states. Exclusion encourages dissent. “I reiterate our position again–we don’t see a need for a foreign body to monitor us,” said Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama.

The veto-wielding members of the United Nations often look to the international forum as a way to arrange the world as it sees fit. But the United Nations is a body of engagement, not exile. To single out Sri Lankan human rights abuses while ignoring, for example, the rights of detainees in Guantanamo Bay, or the oppression of the Palestinian people, is duplicitous. International provisions require a certain level of guidance from all parties. Only through a level of communal consent can a human rights regime emerge that will encourage full cooperation. Interaction between states, not exclusion, is likely to alter the preferences and behavior of states operating at the margins of normative behavior. Convene a representative human rights forum, or don’t convene one at all.

Decisions series since its inception, writing on war crimes and international law. He has focused considerably on the legal aspects concerning the U.S.-led "war on terror" and various war crimes tribunals. He has lectured on the history of war crimes in the international arena and served as a professor of ethics at Grand Valley State University. He has published works on the history of the U.S. relationship with Israel and the U.S. foreign policy regarding Hamas. He is currently a writer for United Press International covering Iraqi political developments, as well as the oil and energy sector. He lives in Grand Rapids, Michigan.

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The Human Rights Council: A Failure in Global Governance

by Eric K. Leonard

"The flawed state-centric system is the origin of the Council's problems and until a time in which the global governance structure is not reliant on states, humanity will continue to fail in its attempt to protect global human rights."

“The UN and Human Rights: A Screaming Start,” makes several valid points of concern in regards to the recently formed Human Rights Council. As the article stipulates, in many ways the Council does not look radically different from its predecessor, the Human Rights Commission, in that it fails to provide membership regulations that would keep “not free” states of the Council (with only twenty-three out of forty-seven states defined as free) and it lacks the clout in the political hierarchy to truly accomplish anything of substance. However, the article does point out that the one mechanism that could prove useful is the new universal periodic review process in which every UN member state must submit to a peer-review of their human rights record every four years. Such a process is a tremendous step forward and it may even provide a mechanism of increased public shame and humiliation of serial offenders of human rights law. However, what this article fails to address in its critique of the Council is the origin of the organization’s flaws, which is not its membership or its anti-Israeli focus, but its state-centric approach to curtailing human rights violations.

One of the primary problems in the fight to improve human rights is the state-centric nature by which the world approaches this issue. This is not only a quandary for the area of human rights, but for many of the global community’s issue-areas. The Human Rights Council, although laudable in its mission, rhetoric, and stated goals, fails to provide a meaningful mechanism by which to correct and/or punish the world’s violators of human rights law. One mechanism that may assist in assessing the Council’s success or failure to fulfill its mandate, which includes both the promotion of and prevention of human rights, is the literature on legalization. This theoretical approach to international law and organization provides a lens by which scholars and practitioners can gauge the plausibility of international organizations to impact the global system and uphold international legal standards. It basis the strength of an organization on three characteristics: obligation, precision, and delegation. The term “obligation” refers to the level of legal commitment that binds the agents; “precision” involves an analysis of the level of ambiguity that surrounds the rules that define the institution; and finally, “delegation” refers to the amount of authority that the institution grants to third parties. This authority concerns the ability of third parties to implement, interpret and apply rules; resolve disputes; and make future rules.

It is this final characteristic that is most pertinent to a discussion of the Human Rights Council and its impact on the global governance structure. As the Council is currently constructed there is an authority structure that is solely reliant on member states to not only review the human rights record of its peers, but to also elect those that will serve on the Council. This structure of governance provides a system of “soft law” which is bound to fail—failure being defined as the inability to uphold the organization’s mandate. John Locke recognized this problem in his famous characterization of the state of nature. In his state of nature, autonomous self-interested entities, in this case states, residing in a state of anarchy have the ability to serve as judge and executive in their own cases. This method of adjudication results in a biased method of judgment that serves the interests of the stronger party involved. The rational byproduct of such a system was Locke’s recommendation that the social contract contain a known and neutral arbitrator.

In essence, that is what the global system also needs and what the Human Rights Council fails to provide. The Council is not neutral and it lacks any real power of adjudication. Thus, it fails to fulfill either of the requirements Locke set forth. As a result, if the global governance structure is to ever implement a system that truly protects human rights and prevents future violations there must be a system of authority predicated on third-party arbitration. Until that time it is my belief that the global community will continue to establish flawed institutions that uphold the façade of human rights protection when in essence they are only maintaining a self-interested or national interest agenda that may occasionally accord with the principles and norms of the human rights movement, but never fully embraces these norms.

If we look at the Human Rights Council, and for that matter its predecessor the Commission on Human Rights, it is clear that they both lack a system of delegation that relies on a neutral-arbitrator. This is the fundamental problem of the Council and although it provides viable means by which to begin a dialogue on human rights, it will never fulfill its mandate in total. The flawed state-centric system is the origin of the Council’s problems and until a time in which the global governance structure is not reliant on states, humanity will continue to fail in its attempt to protect global human rights.

Eric K. Leonard is the Henkel Family Endowed Chair in International Affairs and Director of General Education at Shenandoah University in Winchester, VA. He has published several articles, case studies and a book on such issues as the International Criminal Court, humanitarian law, theoretical conceptualizations of sovereignty, and global governance. His book is entitled, The Onset of Global Governance: International Relations Theory and the International Criminal Court (Ashgate, 2005).

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Thursday, May 1, 2008

Editor's Introduction- May 2008

"China's Olympic Delusion" by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom. Nation. March 19, 2008.


An Annotation

With the Beijing 2008 Summer Games peeking over the horizon, the People’s Republic of China is at center stage—an unfamiliar place for the long-time isolationist and consistently secretive country. With this new attention, however, comes new responsibility. China postures to be the superpower of the future and a trustworthy business partner, but its continued repression of democratic freedoms and suppression of Tibetan self-determination severely impede China’s ability to legitimize itself and garner the necessary credibility emblematic of a global leader. Wassertrom’s article takes a particular angle on this widespread debate by discussing whether or not China will be able to control its public image under the bright lights of the Olympics, given mass communication as accessible as it is and the critics as vociferous as they are.

“…it remains doubtful that the regime will be able to keep tourists or spectators in Beijing from voicing support for the Dalai Lama or making eye-catching pro-Tibet gestures while the games are actually taking place in August.”


While in the lead up to the Games, China attempts to utilize visual imagery to malign Tibetan protestors as violent, or deploy nationalistic bloggers to tote the Party-line online, when international media descends on Beijing, much will be out of the hands of the central administration. Outraged human rights advocates will seize on this opportunity to leverage China’s exposed vulnerability in the eyes of the world. However, to what lengths is the Chinese government willing to go to protect its public persona in preparation for its “coming-out” party? We have already witnessed crackdowns against pro-democratic activism within China and will likely see more. The short-term costs could well be high for what some see as a long-term project of integration into international society.

“…the tragic and farcical developments in recent weeks underscore the inherent conflict between China’s desire to place itself in the global spotlight and its hope that no one will focus on the nation’s flaws.”


Within human rights circles, there is an ongoing debate surrounding China and nations like it: is steady constructive engagement likely to provoke change within a traditional stalwart or is a tougher, abrasive stance more productive in prompting human rights progress? Providing China with the ultimate stage on which either to shine or embarrass itself in the process may be the perfect control group for this experiment to play out. Or, as critics suggest, has the international community honored and appeased China the abuser by allowing it to host an Olympic games? Looking forward, for China to truly emerge as a global leader it must confront international norms, including universal human rights protection. And this summer we will all be witness to this major face-off.

All this and more in this month’s installment of HRHW’s Roundtable.

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Seductions of Imperialism: Incapacitating Life, Fetishizing Death and Catastrophizing Ecologies

by Anna M. Agathangelou

"It is also crucial to juxtapose the human rights violations with the demands made for the longest time by U.S.-European-Japanese leaders and managers of capital for China to integrate itself into the capitalist production system.”

“China’s Olympic Delusion” is a great piece which gestures to the ironies and/or contradictions of political systems in bed with imperialist-capitalism as we know it at this time: the tensions between a dominant idea that liberal democracy is the best political system to pay attention to and address human rights, and capitalism with no limits, can go hand-in-hand. This is merely the delusion, and also the fantasy, that keeps “us” (i.e., citizens, intellectuals etc) put, and from thinking critically. This is not merely an irony, but I think this idea and its contingent practices have been for the longest time what has mediated and acted as a major subsidy to imperial-capitalism’s reign. Much of human rights talk now focuses its attention on China with regards to Tibet. This is, I do not doubt, a very important strategy, especially now with the attention (i.e., financial investments, economies of profit) that China is taking with the Olympics. As a strategy, it is useful transnationally as it makes these violations known to many in the world, particularly toward mobilizing resources and voices against the bourgeois regime of China when much is being invested there to allow for the “smooth” performances of the Olympics. Yet, China is not only violating Tibetan rights. Authors like Balbir K. Punj have brought to our attention the fact that China is also meddling in other areas (i.e., the appropriating of a section of Kashmir up to 5,800 square km) “in the Shaksgam valley along the Karakoram range with the connivance of Pakistan.” It is also crucial to juxtapose the human rights violations with the demands made for the longest time by U.S.-European-Japanese leaders and managers of capital for China to integrate itself into the capitalist production system. Indeed, it has done so. Yet, this integration can only be sustained by another major violation: incapacitating and catastrophizing our multiple ecologies, including our own bodies. Indeed, if China moves to capitalist production at the rate done in North America and Europe, we would soon be faced with a global environmental crisis. Yet, these human rights violations are not juxtaposed next to each other and next to this major environmental violation. However, human rights violations, including our move to catastrophizing our multiple ecologies are not merely China’s problem. Human rights violations are the norm and have been so in Somalia, Rwanda, Sierre Leone, East Timor, Aceh, Tibet, Iraq, North Korea. They are the norm regarding the Kurds, Palestinians, Tutsis, and Uygurs. They are the norm when one-quarter of the world's population lives below the international poverty line of $145 per year per capita, one billion lack safe water to drink, 880 million lack access to basic health, and millions of us are engaging daily in the destruction of the environment. These are not merely China’s problems. These are global problems that require innovative strategies against structural/ecological/bodily violations that the erection of imperial-capitalism depends on. The United States, for instance, left many poor, black, and queer bodies in New Orleans who now find themselves in the stream of death. Millions of U.S. children live in poverty, some thirty percent of all Americans have no medical insurance, and five to ten million are homeless. One-quarter of all African American males under the age of twenty-five are in jail, on probation, or on parole. And a U.N. Special Rapporteur describes capital punishment in the United States as arbitrary and racially discriminatory. The highest incarceration rate is found in the most liberal democratic country in the world. This is an irony!

As different states, including China, attempt to muffle the voices and the stench of dead bodies piling up around us, testaments to imperial-capitalist efficacy (See Agathangelou, Bassichis, and Spira 2008), it is crucial for us to re-think strategies and interventions to disrupt these dominant discourses that hide/make invisible, and indeed make possible, human/environmental rights violations in the world. The violated, the dead and the dying, the ecologies speak, perhaps in grammars and methods that those who claim liberal democracy and/or economic viability cannot or do not desire to apprehend. History seems to refuse to rest as it persists to “not let us forget” the daily catastrophes we are faced in the world. And we are left to listen and re-direct our energies to disrupt the many violations, but also to articulate socialist projects beyond unlimited profits and ontological structural adjustments and violences. We are left to become intimate with all the human/ecological rights violations, including those we sanction, so that we might resist the seductive calls to a future unmoored by our history. The many different violations and deaths, including the destruction of our ecologies in our communities cannot any longer be marginalized. We must reckon with them (i.e., the killings of people in Iraq all in the name of freedom; the killings of Rwandans all in the name of ethnicity; the killing of Palestinians all in the name of security, etc.) if we are to wrestle ourselves from the thick fantasies and mystifications of a democracy that collapses violence with liberty, and human/ecological rights with imperial capitalism. Demystifying such moves and problematizing such human/ecological rights violations and their contingent structures is the way to counter the forces of structurally adjusting themselves by drawing “value,” and indeed by attempting to ontologically kill people’s lives, bodies, and ecologies to generate more capital and power. It is only then that the “impossible dreams” of unlimited expansion can be exposed and disrupted.

Anna M. Agathangelou is Associate Professor of political science at York University, Toronto and the director of Global Change Institute, Nicosia, Cyprus. Author of The Global Political Economy of Sex: Desire, Violence, and Insecurity in Mediterranean Nation-States (Palgrave 2004), Agathangelou is currently working on a book-project Terror-Necrotic Ontologies of Capital and Empire: Greek Theory and Possibilities for Substantive Democracy.

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Beijing's Olympics: Pride, Appearance and Human Rights

by Thomas Beal

"Some wishful thinkers hold out hope.The more likely scenario is that prideful Chinese leaders will continue to act on their obsession with appearance, despite backlash in the court of public opinion.”

One lazy summer evening in Beijing, about fifteen years ago, my wife and I were strolling down Jianguomenwai, the bustling street adjacent to our flat in the Qijiayuan Diplomatic Compound. The day had been sweltering, and as the sun began to set the sidewalks filled with pedestrians who, like us, had escaped their stuffy apartments to take in a cool, soothing breeze.

Just past the Jianguo Hotel we came upon an odd scene: Several dozen people stood transfixed around two men trying to apprehend a strikingly beautiful young woman. One man held her by her arm in a vice-like grip. The elder of the two, whom I took to be her father, wore a watchful, sorrowing expression as he stroked her shoulders and pleaded, “Return home, return home.” The woman cried and half-struggled to break away.

A few seconds passed before my wife nudged me in the arm. I scanned the street corners for a policeman worrying what exactly I would do if I offered the girl help and she were to answer “yes.” But before I could open my mouth, an old woman clad in blue pajamas emerged from the throng. Wagging a menacing finger at the scufflers, she yelled: “What are you doing? Foreigners are watching!” A few moments of awkwardness ensued before the crowd dispersed and the two men and the young woman walked quickly away together.

I thought this incident was worth remembering as we move into the home stretch of the launch of the 2008 Olympic Games: In a culture obsessed with appearances, China ’s leaders will try to prevent the outside world from seeing anything that reflects badly on either the government or nation. As Jeffrey Wasserstrom suggests, responding with a mailed fist to unrest in places like Tibet and Xinjiang, blocking access to Internet sites, arresting dissidents, and censoring foreign entertainers—all of these and more possibly egregious acts of control to come are necessarily required by Beijing’s Olympic “script.”

China’s leaders view the Olympic Games as a national "coming-out party", an historic opportunity to showcase the country’s economic achievements and offer proof that China is worthy of the world’s respect as a global power. And rightly so. Communist Party policies in place since the early 1980s have helped lift an estimated 400 million people out of poverty. Most of the country’s coastal cities are engines for economic growth and prosperity. In recent years, painfully aware it must narrow the widening income gap between the cities and countryside or reap the whirlwind, China’s government has abolished the age-old agricultural tax, ushered in land-lease reform, and implemented a new national medical insurance scheme intended to make health care more affordable for the rural poor. In 2006, the National People’s Congress made nine-year compulsory education in rural areas free. Such gains—and the political stability they help promote—could be undercut by a global economic slowdown if it dampens China’s economic growth rate below the level needed to create a sufficient number of jobs.

Beijing ’s Olympic script must therefore be followed primarily for the way it bestows symbolic approval of Communist Party rule. Playing the part of Olympic host well bolsters the legitimacy of China’s leaders before their own people. In recent weeks, we have seen what happens when the script is not followed; disruptions such as the one in Tibet are interpreted by many Chinese as an embarrassing sign that their leaders may not be in control. Fierce criticism by the West of Chinese policies and actions add to already high dudgeon. Intense feelings of frustration and injustice— acted out on the streets in front of French-owned supermarkets, for example—make everyone a little nervous, including China’s leadership. Traditionally, the Olympic Games end with a fanfare; the Olympic flame is extinguished, and while the Olympic anthem is played the Olympic flag is lowered, unfurled, and carried out of the arena. But Beijing’s Olympic script ends climactically and symbolically when Party leaders and their families move from Zhongnanhai, the secluded compound sheltering them near the Forbidden City, to a glitzy new complex adjacent to the Olympic Green.

Sticking to the script means China’s crackdown on human rights in the run up to the Olympic Games will likely continue. And during the Games? The script includes building the world’s biggest swimming pool and controlling hundreds of thousands of visitors and thousands of journalists, as well as snaring Falun Gong followers, Tibet independence groups, and other pesky activists. The police state will mobilize several hundred thousand members of the security forces, special SWAT teams, a citizen’s army of more than 600,000 Beijing residents and students (one for every expected foreign visitor and journalist), and a cadre of 100,000 official volunteers, half of whom will also have full-time security duties. Surveillance systems cover phone and Internet and include more than 300,000 cameras on streets, subways, hotels and major venues. Doing whatever it takes requires weathering international outrage, should there be any. In this respect, China also has had plenty of valuable experience. For example, in preparation for their bid to host the 2000 Olympic Games, China’s leaders let nothing stand in their way. Then, as now, they launched a nationwide crackdown on dissidents, accompanied by a systematic “clean up” of Beijing. Hundreds of homeless people, petitioners and migrant workers were forcibly removed from the streets, sentenced to re-education camps and detention centers, and even confined to mental hospitals. Factories were shuttered and electricity cut off to clear the air of smog. The campaign intensified in early 1993 as the International Olympic Committee prepared for an inspection tour of the capital. Preparing for the 2008 Games, Chinese authorities arrested 742 people in 2007 for such offenses as “endangering state security”—twice as many as in 2005 ( The official arrest figures for 2007 were announced by a senior Chinese law enforcement official on March 10, 2008.) .

In recent weeks, China has said it will resume human rights talks with the United States and jumpstart dialogue at higher levels with respresentatives of the Dalai Lama. The Chinese government is also said to be ready to hire an international public relations firm in the wake of the Tibet crisis. Some wishful thinkers hold out hope that these are signs China’s leaders might yet “right the ship in the coming months,” as one wrote, with a startling concession, such as the release of political prisoners, aimed at repairing China’s image before the Beijing Olympics. But this hardly jibes with the conviction and sentencing of civil rights activist Hu Jia in April, and what are likely to be grotesque show trials held throughout May f or the more than 1,200 people arrested in the violence in Lhasa in March.

The more likely scenario is that China’s prideful leaders will continue to act on their obsession with appearance, in mainly harsh but predictable ways, despite backlash in the court of public opinion. They are politicians who must wield unchallenged power or appear weak and incapable. Pride, concern with appearance, fear of the loss of face, and the “delusion” Wasserstrom alludes to—these are also themes central to Lu Xun’s novella “The True Story of Ah Q,” whose main character Ah Q symbolizes flaws of the Chinese national character, such as saving face by finding spurious moral victory in defeat. In one scene, a demoralized Ah Q slaps himself on the face. But because he is the person doing the slapping, he sees himself as the victor:

But presently he changed defeat into victory. Raising his right hand he slapped his own face hard, twice, so that it tingled with pain. After this slapping his heart felt lighter, for it seemed as if the one who had given the slap was himself, the one slapped some other self, and soon it was as if he had beaten someone else—in spite of the fact that his face was still tingling. He lay down satisfied that he had gained the victory.

Soon he was asleep.*




* Lu Xun Selected Works, trans. Yang Xianyi & Gladys Yang (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1985), pp. 111-112.

Thomas Beal is an adjunct instructor at the University of Denver's Josef Korbel School of International Studies. He lived in China for more than 12 years, during which time he was deputy editorial page editor of The Asian Wall Street Journal, staff reporter for The Wall Street Journal in Hong Kong and foreign correspondent for United Press International in Beijing. He has also worked at Agence France-Presse and as a freelance reporter for The Christian Science Monitor. Mr. Beal was honored by Amnesty International and the Hong Kong Journalists Association in 2001 with a special merit award for outstanding editorial/op-ed articles about human rights in China. He holds a master's degree in international relations from Cambridge University, England.

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Sport and Politics

by Christine Bell

"I reject the view that we should enforce a separation between politics and sport that does not exist. Sport, and particularly the Olympics, is intrinsically linked with notions of nationality and belonging, and laced with an ethic of fair play and even justice."

I found the reflection interesting, but unsurprising. Protestors use the Olympic spotlight (or should we say torch?) to shine on China’s flaws, and China tries to re-direct or extinguish its beams.

Was China delusional to think that it could boost its reputation through hosting the Olympics? Or did it make a calculation that what it had to gain from the Olympics was more than it had to lose? Do most states try to place themselves in the global spotlight yet hope that no one will focus on their flaws? Do most states not try to rig the spotlight in some way, so that flaws remain in the shadows?

To me, and to the British public, the more interesting question has been whether and how sports events should be used with relation to political change. The developing “torch saga” which post-dated and played out many of the article’s points, has seen the merits of the South African sports boycott and the Moscow Olympic boycott, all re-hashed. In Britain at least, even protestors have been torn between how far to try to interfere and even damage the running of the Olympics, and how far effective protest requires cherishing the Olympics as bigger than the country that hosts it. The show must go on precisely because it does harness aspirations of peaceful unity through diversity. The paradox of course is that it is precisely this bigger side of the Olympic dream that makes it a vehicle for effective protest.

Typically the debate moves as two ships passing each other by at night. Sports should be kept completely separate from politics, versus sports cannot be separate and sporting bodies must be wise to, and even use, the cachet of large scale sporting events to promote other social ends, such as respect for human rights. Personally, I often find myself somewhat torn. I reject the view that we should enforce a separation between politics and sport that does not exist. Sport, and particularly the Olympics, is intrinsically linked with notions of nationality and belonging, and laced with an ethic of fair play and even justice. A country seeks to host a large scale international sporting event precisely because it can enhance its economic and political standing.

However, the types of protests and the effectiveness of them never occur evenly across all human rights violators. Once we open the door to tying sport to human rights issues, we enable wrapping sporting events up in broader geopolitical wrangles, a là Moscow. Furthermore, is it just to penalize those countries with poor civil and political rights records, while ignoring the global socio-economic rights deficits for which Western liberal democracies also bear responsibility? Can not the revenue and job-creating Olympics go some way towards addressing this deficit? In a world in which widening inequalities are one of the major human rights issues, this would also be a human rights problem.

As the torch wend its troubled journey, I found myself in sympathy with those protestors attempting to link their protests with the Olympic spirit, and to counsel the right to disrupt whole-scale celebration without seeking to derail the entire Olympic event. I do not get too upset about television presenters and celebrity personalities who voluntarily undertook the torch-carrying task under full police protection, having to endure protests and even a few runs at the torch. The torch trail is the market place of free speech, and I welcome conflicted spaces where the torch procession can be simultaneously celebrated and cherished and vilified. This is local and global democracy in action.

Also, although I am relatively uninformed about the work of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), I found myself wishing that it had been clearer about the human rights conditionality attached to hosting the event, with a clearer mechanism for ensuring that this was implemented. Most of the problems that arose could have been easily anticipated and responded to in some way—a mediation role that should have taken place appeared to have been missing. But it also seems clear to me that the Olympics alone could not reform China and should not bear that responsibility. The role of the Chinese people and other world powers is much more crucial and they hold more responsibility.

But the sport and politics debate plays out a larger debate about cause and effect and what are effective forms of human rights advocacy. This is the debate as to whether economic liberalization will naturally herald and “bear forth” political liberalization, or whether pressure for political liberalization must be demanded as a condition of greater economic participation. Does giving China the Olympics bring it into a set of relationships, including with the global media, in which human rights abuses will inevitably become more difficult? Or is it dangerous to assume that a reduction in human rights abuses will just happen because this risks shoring up China’s sense of impunity, if and when it finds out that it can get away with “business as usual”?

In essence, this is an argument also about carrots and sticks, and its implications go well beyond China. Do people comply with human rights standards by being made fully participating members of communities whose other members value norms and where “norm-promotion” happens in diffuse ways through subtle forms of international “peer pressure”? Or do the carrots need to be backed up by sticks, with international economic and political goodies conditioned on compliance with human rights and social justice? In an important and influential book, Buying Social Justice, Oxford University Press 2008, Christopher McCrudden has reframed this debate. In brief, he argues for human rights and social justice conditionality in the public procurement context. He does not put it exactly this way, but in essence he suggests that a space that is created enables a conversation between local and global actors in which the application of human rights values are negotiated. This is human rights, not as an inflexible advocated position, but as a way of talking to each other and a way of doing business. McCrudden does not address this year’s Olympics, but his ideas suggest a way of integrating globalized economic transactions and progress with ensuring the human rights of individuals and communities that we would do well to study more.

But if I had to nominate an Olympic Song for this year’s opening ceremony, I might wonder about Kaiser Chief’s “I Predict a Riot” with world leaders in the background crooning The Clash’s “Should I Stay or Should I Go?”

Christine Bell was born and brought up in Belfast. She is currently Director of the Transitional Justice Institute, and Professor of Public International Law at University of Ulster (based at Magee Campus). She read law at Selwyn College, Cambridge, (1988) and gained an LL.M in Law from Harvard Law School (1990), supported by a Harkness Fellowship. She has authored the book Peace Agreements and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2000), and a report published by the International Council on Human Rights Policy entitled "Negotiating Justice? Human Rights and Peace Agreements" (2006). She has also taken part in various peace negotiations discussions, giving constitutional law and human rights law advice, and also in training for diplomats, mediators and lawyers.

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"Instant Karma": How Globalization Contests China's Abuses

by Alison Brysk

"China's long march to global influence may intensify abuse in the short run-but it has the potential to open new pathways for progress in the long run."

China’s rise from impoverished backwater to prospective superpower has been accompanied by the repression of tens of millions of its own people, at the hands of a nationalist, developmentalist government. Under contemporary conditions of globalization, suppression of civil liberties, domination of ethnic minorities, and unholy alliances with resource-rich dictatorships are no longer plausible requisites of this model—if they ever were. The broadening and deepening of economic globalization towards a more sustainable complex of political influence involves “soft power,” including international reputation and norms. Thus, China’s Olympian reach for true hegemony provides the best chance for human rights advocates to weave a transnational “invisible handcuff” that will restrain the worst excesses of China’s rulers, and build a base for the long-term empowerment of China's civil society.

One marker of China’s shifting political environment is the difference between the response to the 1989 Tiananmen protests and the current unrest in Tibet. In 1989, China turned tanks on thousands of peaceful protestors in the heart of its capital city in full view of the world, cut communication links, and followed with a massive manhunt, detentions, and executions. Twenty years ago, China easily defied brief and tepid international sanctions. Today, China has exercised Chiapas-style preemptive caution in responding to less visible and more violent threats—but one reflecting widespread international support. All the major world leaders debate boycotts of the Olympic opening ceremonies, and ongoing consumer-based economic sanctions are a real possibility. Despite some nationalist backlash, world-wide pressures over Darfur boomerang back to inspire Chinese intellectuals to petition for peace in Tibet. China’s leaders carefully defend their response as necessary for sovereignty, “not a question of human rights.” China has clearly moved from the denial to bargaining stages of Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink’s “spiral model” of human rights reform.

International cultural and diplomatic ties are often seen as marginal to the pursuit of national interest and world power. But because sustainable power depends on recognition and reciprocity, nations seek legitimacy, membership, and influence—just as interest-driven firms seek good public relations, consumer confidence, and branding. From the Nazis’ reach for recognition at the Munich 1936 Olympics to Japan's increase in foreign aid as it sought U.N. Security Council membership, states value international prestige as a long-term investment. But that logic opens them to new forms of leverage, as Argentina discovered when hosting the 1978 World Cup which shined a spotlight on its disappearance of political opponents, bringing increased media coverage, transnational contact with activists, and eventually increased international pressure by the U.S. and OAS human rights machinery. Raising the reputational cost of quashing protesters in Lhasa or selling weapons to Khartoum forces China’s political elite to shift their calculus of political dominance, even before it wins hearts and minds.

China ’s long march to global influence may intensify abuse in the short run—but it has the potential to open new pathways for progress in the long run. Economic globalization creates new incentives for prison labor, sweatshop exploitation, trafficking in persons, and even organs, and pillage of resources from unsavory regimes. But meanwhile, informational and cultural exchange, along with increasing involvement in international institutions, may pull China ineluctably towards greater conformity with global norms of civil liberties and religious freedom. With continued pressure over time, illiberal global powers will be hobbled—if not halted—by their own contradictions. What defenders of human rights can learn from the Dalai Lama is how to speed up the karma a little, by turning around the soft power of globalization—while the whole world is watching.

Alison Brysk is Professor of Political Science and International Studies at the University of California, Irvine. Winner of the 2007-2008 Distinguished Mid-Career Research Award, she has authored or edited six books on international human rights. Professor Brysk has researched and lectured in a dozen countries, and in 2007 held the Fulbright Distinguished Visiting Chair in Global Governance at Canada's University of Waterloo/Centre for International Governance Innovation. Brysk is active in promoting human rights through campus, professional, international, and advocacy organizations and networks. Please visit her website: http://www.alisonbrysk.org.

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The Olympic Spotlight: The Beijing Games and China as a Future World Leader

by Eric A. Heinze

"By shining the Olympic spotlight on this year's hosts, the world community will be able to judge for itself whether China, as a potential world leader, is going to be worth following."

According to Jeffrey Wasserstrom’s article, if the Chinese think they can censor the Olympics, and the political showcasing that will almost certainly accompany them, they are sorely mistaken. I am persuaded by the thrust of this argument. I just hope that as China vies for global leadership and influence, whatever truths the Olympic spotlight reveals about its potential in this regard are more farcical than tragic.

The Olympics have frequently been accompanied by dramatic events that are indicative of the state of world affairs. Witness Berlin in 1936, Mexico City in 1968, Munich in 1972, and Moscow in 1980. This summer’s Olympic Games in Beijing may likewise reveal some sobering political realities about the world. Namely, is China ready to be a world leader? China’s Olympic theme song, “We Are Ready,” clearly indicates the political message the Chinese want to send. Yet it remains to be seen whether the Beijing Olympics will portray China as the emerging responsible global power that it aspires to be, or reinforce the caricatures of a repressive and undemocratic state that is intolerant of political dissent.

Recent events are indicative of China’s broader political message that it is capable of becoming a responsible world-power. The Chinese government’s “less harsh” response to the recent crisis in Tibet is an obvious one. Likewise, its criticism of Sudan’s policies in Darfur suggest that the Chinese government no longer wants to be known as the country that enabled a genocidal regime because it filled its coffers with money from buying its oil. Such moves are not surprising given what is at stake, even if the stakes are purely symbolic.

But this desire to avoid bad publicity has led Chinese authorities to pursue policies that may have the exact opposite effect. It seems logical that avoiding bad publicity would entail exercising as much control over the flow of information surrounding Olympic coverage as possible. One might therefore expect efforts to prevent reporters from showing China’s pollution problems, human rights abuses, or other problematic social issues. Yet even if China succeeds at controlling media coverage to a certain degree, thus saving face in front of its own people, complete control is impossible. The more China’s authorities try to have complete control over media coverage surrounding the Games and the inevitable demonstrations that will accompany it, the less they will convince the rest of the world that China is “ready.” Such efforts are already having counter-productive outcomes as stories like that of Chinese human rights advocate Hu Jia, who was recently sentenced to three and a half years in prison for “inciting subversion of state power,” begin to make headlines the world over.

In this sense, Wasserstrom is correct that the Chinese are delusional if they think they can fool anyone about their preparedness for global leadership. If the crackdowns on human rights advocates, reporters, and pro-Tibet partisans continue in the run-up to the 2008 Games, then the recent turmoil that accompanied the Olympic torch’s trip through London and Paris will be but a dress rehearsal for the international outrage that could ensue. The news story will then no longer be the Olympic events, but rather the accompanying political showcase—in this case, the censorship of the Olympics and the attempt to hide the uglier side of the communist regime. In this sense, the recent jailing Hu Jia undoubtedly does more harm than good to China’s international standing by distracting international audiences from how we are supposed to be seeing China.

Thus, if world leadership and international respect and attention are what China wants from the Beijing Olympics, then it cannot avoid subjecting itself to international scrutiny. The 2008 Olympic Games are therefore potentially more consequential than any in history. By shining the Olympic spotlight on this year’s hosts, the world community will be able to judge for itself whether China, as a potential world leader, is going to be worth following. In short, if China is not “ready,” then the Beijing Olympics will tell us this…again, hopefully as farce and not as tragedy.

Eric A. Heinze is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Oklahoma. He is the author of Waging Humanitarian War: The Ethics, Law and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (forthcoming, SUNY Press) and numerous scholarly articles on various aspects of international human rights and the ethics and law of armed conflict. Dr. Heinze teaches courses on international law and organization, international human rights, and international relations theory.

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Tuesday, April 1, 2008

Editor's Introduction- April 2008

“A World Enslaved" by E. Benjamin Skinner. Foreign Policy (March/April) 2008.

An Annotation

Touted as the first international human rights movement, the abolition of African slavery was a monumental paradigm shift in redefining who is a human being and how human beings as such should and should not be treated. However, we have recently seen a re-emergence of this phenomenon. As yet another repulsive outgrowth of globalization, modern slavery and the human trafficking channels that feed slaveholding necessitate another shift in the way we understand slavery so as to confront this old problem in new ways.

“Most people imagine that slavery died in the 19 th century. Since 1817, more than a dozen international conventions have been signed banning the slave trade. Yet, today there are more slaves than at any time in human history.”


How did this “solved” problem resurface? Why is it that the international norm against holding human beings as property weakened or collapsed? One response to these questions proposes, as Alison Brysk does in this month’s HRHW Roundtable, that the original abolition movement targeted states and state-sanctioned actors, while this new manifestation is an accumulation of “private wrongs” perpetrated beneath and beyond the state itself. Or, as Christine Bell suggests in her response, human rights is not about solving problems per se; rather, human rights advocates must be proactively and morally vigilant in their pursuit of emancipation lest the abuse return in a more dynamic form. Like a drug-resistant virus, slavery has made its way through the cracks in legal and political structures, and has survived its previous abolition in order to thrive through economic arteries.

“But, until governments define slavery in appropriately concise terms, prosecute the crimes aggressively in all its forms, and encourage groups that empower slaves to free themselves, millions more will remain in bondage. And our collective promise of abolition will continue to mean nothing at all.”

As slavery itself has changed, so its opponents must also change. Modern slavery exists in many forms, masked by various types of façade. The trade and ownership of sex workers and debt laborers are two notorious forms of modern slavery and, along with the multitude of others, will demand novel approaches to abolition. As Anna Aganthangelou remarks for the Roundtable, it is best to understand modern slavery as another incarnation of its predecessor, as imperialism over the body, an understanding that would beg a specific response supporting market regulation as well as advocating for individual self-determination. Or, as Eric Heinze suggests in his contribution, slavery should be categorized along with other human rights abuses that compete for prioritization among an array of foreign policy objectives. In any event, it is clear that the type of “on-the-ground” research that Skinner presents in this article (and in his book from which this is an excerpt, A Crime So Monstrous) is necessary for fruitful analysis and unyielding activism.

All this and more in this month’s installment of HRHW’s Roundtable.

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Forget Me Not: Bodies as Last Colonies of Capitalism?

by Anna M. Agathangelou

“In an imperialist capitalist context that demands...the commodification of people’s labor and bodies, we need to raise questions about the logics of capital and the intensification of slavery within it.”

Slavery is one technology of imperialism that serves to generate more profits worldwide. Skinner brings this issue to our attention, arguing that many people think that slavery ended in the 19 th century, but the current turning of peoples into slaves proves otherwise. Skinner points out that since 1817, there have been more than a dozen international conventions signed banning the slave trade and yet, the number of people sold as slaves is in the millions. He calls modern day slavery a “monstrous crime” and proceeds to provide us with insights from his research. He begins making his point through what is supposed to be a “fictional” story about the negotiation to sell a child in Haiti into slavery for fifty dollars. He later reveals that the story is not fictional but was recorded during his four-year research into slavery on five continents.

Skinner’s piece is timely as it highlights a phenomenon that violates the integrity of children, women, and the poor in the world today. The market has turned everything and everybody into a commodity for sale which brings to the fore again the question of “human rights” violations and political violence within the global context. As Skinner argues, it is important to bring “freedom to millions” by “tearing out the roots of slavery” and yet, at the same time his analysis of the United Nations’ inability to “hold its member states accountable for widespread slavery” “pushes” him to conclude that “absent an effective international body like the United Nations, such an effort will require pressure from the United States.” This position, while crucial, remains within the realm of the liberal pragmatic tradition where the human rights of individuals (which is turning them into slaves) would be less likely to be abused if the right to defend them was constitutively incorporated in the foreign policies of hegemonic states like the United States. However, such a pragmatic position makes invisible several issues: (1) the structural/institutional arrangements within which this “slavery” becomes a possibility; (2) who buys who and for what purpose; and (3) whether the capitalist logic of paying a laborer “$1-an-hour” is not the same logic that guides what Skinner calls chattel slavery.

In addition, and perhaps in a way that gleans a post-colonial sensibility to Skinner’s analysis, I would like to suggest that contrary to his position that “freeing slaves is impossible unless the slaves themselves choose to be free” (Skinner). I would like to argue that peoples in Haiti and other sites that engage in modern day slavery have contributed, and are continuing to contribute, to the articulation and practices of self-actualization and the development and disruption of conditions that enable their exploitation, oppression, and perpetuation of human rights’ violations. Let’s not forget that Haiti was where one of the major revolutions took place against slavery, and also against the capitalist world formation. In an imperialist capitalist context that demands more and more the corporatization of social relations, including the commodification of people’s labor and bodies, we need to raise questions about the logics of capital and the intensification of slavery within it. Why is it crucial at this moment for capital to draw extensively on bodies (and mostly, bodies of color) to reproduce itself and to legitimize a (neo)liberal political power and authority? Why is it that the (re)production of capitalist social relations of power depend on the “intensification” of the private appropriation of the use-value and surplus labor of those who own nothing but their labor to sell?

Even when slavery was legally abolished, the (re)production of the structure of capital required in different “forms” such as cheap wages, women’s “free” labor at home, etc. The capitalist structure always depended on those bodies and those “unfree” subjects. It is my contention here and elsewhere (e.g., 2004) that the production of a “free wager” depends on the creation of the “unfree” and reproductive subject (i.e., domestic workers, sex workers, wives, etc.) to secure profits even if it means re-introducing a new form of slavery. Being “equal” and “free” in the market to pursue one’s choice of labor does not account for the fact that these “democratic” market rules are constantly suspended, especially when the imperative of the market, that is the generation of profits, is not happening at the rate that the decision makers and organizers of it think it should be.

This brings me to my next point: many states, including many organizations in the Global South and the Global North struggling to put slavery and trafficking on the political agenda, have been struck down by the priorities of foreign policies which have redirected many of their resources to consolidate a Global state and a Global military-industrial complex to secure the demands made by capital to restructure their economies; this has had serious implications upon peoples’ lives, land, and capacities to seek alternatives, including their ability to earn a basic living in their sites of birth and/or countries of origin. As many states redirect their resources from the social welfare of their people to the welfare of corporations, taking care of the majority of peoples and especially women and children is pushed to the margins. Simultaneously, the state pushes to contain social struggles and movements by funding non-profit organizations which, in the process of trying to secure funding, end up stripping down complex social struggles into digestible, rationalized ‘‘issue areas.’’ This is significant insofar as ostensibly non-state ‘‘civil society’’ becomes and is presented now as a primary site of social struggle (as if it is were not before such a site). However, subservient to the market itself, NGOs and civil society are placed in a position to concede to market logics which push more and more to understand social problems (i.e., lack of social welfare; investment in militarization of the state; gender and racial inequalities, indeed, turning the bodies of peoples into slave conditions) as ‘‘individual problems with market solutions’’ (Brown 2006, 704) in order to procure funding. These logics, including Skinner’s, silence nuances of power and, more pertinently, cordon off racial and sexual contradictions from the domain of both the state, the market, and the other institutions of power such as the family where women, children, and the poor of the world find themselves turning into “slaves” serving the desires, wills, and demands of upper and middle class families worldwide (See Agathangelou and Spira 2006). So, change begins with changing this asymmetrical socio-economic and power relation. But the mere desire of the “slaves” will not enable the disruption of the “crime” that Skinner talks about.

The countries and peoples Skinner engages as sites of slavery and trafficking are the same post-colonial nations that many of their resources, including their labor has been expropriated and exploited consistently even after their colonizers left their countries. It is not mere coincidence that now these countries are selling their people to sustain their power in world politics. Yet, it is crucial that we do not forget that these same countries and these “slaves” are the ones who fought revolutions against legalized slavery and articulated socio-political imaginaries as standards by which to measure social acts and political relations. These same people articulated and designed “ethical precepts” and continue to do so with the purpose of bettering the conditions and human rights of people and collectives everywhere.

Anna M. Agathangelou is Associate Professor of political science at York University, Toronto and the director of Global Change Institute, Nicosia, Cyprus. Author of The Global Political Economy of Sex: Desire, Violence, and Insecurity in Mediterranean Nation-States (Palgrave 2004), Agathangelou is currently working on a book-project Terror-Necrotic Ontologies of Capital and Empire: Greek Theory and Possibilities for Substantive Democracy.

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Slavery and "Abuse Regeneration"

by Christine Bell

"A crucial dynamic in abuse regeneration is the recreation of categories of people to whom human rights do not apply—those who are somehow less human, less to be protected."

Skinner’s depiction of modern day slavery is graphic and challenging. Anyone viewing prohibitions on slavery, or abolition, as historical anachronism, or requiring reinterpretation for modern-day practices, must think again. Skinner persuades us that slavery in its most old fashioned sense is alive and well and, worse than that–on the rise.

In one sense, Skinner’s conclusions are profoundly disturbing and depressing. A practice accepted not just for years, or decades, but for over a century, as morally wrong, and which has been extensively codified as legally wrong, can nonetheless regenerate. What hope is there then for less established, more morally ambiguous human rights issues, such as fair trial rights for the nastiest criminals, or abolition of the death penalty?

However, I suggest that the return of slavery is but one example of a common dynamic in human rights struggles – the dynamic of “abuse regeneration” in which the practices of the human rights violations continue in a changed form so as to raise new challenges for an effective response. This response focuses on what I assert are five key dynamics of “abuse regeneration” as they apply to modern slavery, but also more broadly. I suggest that the concept of “abuse regeneration” must be understood as part of the struggle for human rights.


1. Complacent desuetude. People become complacent about past human rights abuse and moral consensus, and public will to enforce the right is slowly undone.

Human rights abuses often happen under cover of secrecy. The protection of human rights requires ongoing vigilance. Skinner’s article demonstrates that human rights battles are seldom won for all time, but require ongoing renegotiation. The vigilance required is two-fold. First, proactive vigilance is required to seek out new cycles of abuse that tend to happen away from the public’s glare and Skinner’s exposure of modern day slavery is one such attempt. Without investigations such as Skinner’s we might never know the full extent of contemporary slavery.

The second type of vigilance required is perhaps more fundamental, and can perhaps best be termed “moral vigilance” as regards to the content of the right itself. Moral vigilance proactively works to safeguard the moral consensus around the right in question. This vigilance is more difficult to achieve and it is also difficult to demonstrate concrete results to funders of human rights work. The right can be protected by brining in new cross-cutting coalitions, but the coalition-building project must sit somehow with the notion that the right has a universal non-negotiable core. Skinner’s piece demonstrates the types of counter-intuitive coalitions that can be built, but also the complexity of the negotiating between these coalitions and the right’s core essence.

Without moral vigilance to preserve the right, the connection between revealing the rights violation and galvanizing public pressure to end the abuse, is broken. The two go together: without people thinking the right is important and may be at risk, they may be effectively deaf and blind to its presence, under cover, alongside their daily lives. Without an idea that the right is at risk, they may be complacent about supporting those who seek to monitor its enforcement.


2. Performative transformation of wrong into right.

Abusers find ways around the law, and abuses become more subtle so as human rights violators and states can argue that it is beyond the reach of human rights law.

Human rights standards operate in a dialectical relationship with human rights abuses. Rather than stopping human rights abuses, effective enforcement of human rights standards often cause one of two things. First, effective enforcement can prompt little more than new cycles of state and individual denial. As Stan Cohen famously pointed out, as people are confronted with human rights abuses, they often shift from “it is not going on” to more subtle defenses such as “there are reasons why it is difficult to eliminate.” The denial aims to perform a legal evasion: by re-characterizing the problem away from a direct violation which must be stopped, to something less clear, less clear-cut, and with less straightforward means of addressing.

The second result of effective enforcement is mutation of the anti-human rights practice. Soldiers stop blatantly shooting civilians dead, and move to construct elaborate self- defense set piece operations. Or, the state contracts out summary execution to death squads. The state moves torture offshore, and argues that it is beyond the reach of any legal regime, or redefines what torture might be. Skinner provides an example of technical “debt” which slaves work to pay off, which attempt to redefine the relationship as “employer/employee.”

One of the key elements of performative transformation is that it uses law and legal argument to turn non-compliance into possible compliance. Even when this is not fully successful as a technical legal argument, it often succeeds in muddying any clear moral waters (there are not two sides of what the law requires), and so aids and abets “complacent desuetude” to continue.


3. Post-post modern despair.

The above two factors play into a third factor. This is the overwhelming feeling that it is impossible to gain consensus on moral action, that morality is itself an old-fashioned concept and that the world in which we live is so large, with so many problems, so little capacity for political and moral consensus, and so in the grip of structural dynamics of globalization, that we cannot do anything about the most egregious of violations and abuses anyway. Belief in individual agency, and belief in the possibilities and value of collective action, seems out of date and naïve. Post-post modern despair is fuelled by, and fuels, complacent desuetude and performative transformation of wrong into right.


4. Dividing indivisible rights.

Skinner’s article demonstrates the close relationship between abuse of civil and political rights, denial of socio-economic rights, and an ongoing cost to viewing these rights as two separate frameworks. Just as pertinent to ending Skinner’s slavery, are rights 22 -27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as article 4 that prohibits slavery directly. These rights deal with: social security and economic rights necessary to “the free development of his [or her] personality,” rights to work, rights to rest and leisure time, adequate standard of living, education and a cultural life.

Skinner’s example is one of the starkest civil and political rights violations. However, its resurgence owes little to erosion of the concept of civil and political rights, and everything to the global and in-country socio-economic context. A widening gap between rich and poor within and between countries leads to a situation in which low or non-paid “mindless” labor will not be performed by the rich (wherever they are), but is demanded of a poor whose opportunities in life are so limited that slavery becomes possible. Slavery is impossible to sever from the economic factors that propel it, and impossible to address, I would have thought, through criminal measures alone.


5. Recreating the “in”-human.

A crucial dynamic in abuse regeneration is the recreation of categories of people to whom human rights do not apply—those who are somehow less human, less to be protected. In times gone by, this was often done by defining the “other” (women or African Americans) as somehow less than human, and therefore holders of diminished rights. The ambiguous history of human rights shows that often-great leaps forward for human rights were limited by limiting the group to which the new rights were to apply.

In modern times, the paradox of globalization is that while it has freed up lawful international movement of the rich, it has tightened the restrictions on inter-country working by the poor. Slavery, for example, becomes enabled by the illegality of workers, which mean that slaves will not seek the help of law enforcement agents. Even though human rights technically apply to all, for many slaves in developed countries, deportation to a country in which one was enslaved may seem like a poor emancipation.


6. Decoupling domestic and international enforcement.

Human rights were always understood as the primary responsibility of the domestic state, underwritten by international standards and international monitoring bodies. International standards and enforcement must be capable of the same regeneration as human rights abusers achieve. Reiteration as both a repetition and a clarification of time-honored standards must counter new performative legal tricks. State action must be matched with capacity for cooperation.

Depressing as Skinner’s article is, we must caution against complacency, post-post modern despair, performative transformation of wrong into right, and recreation of inhumanity. No struggle for justice is ever complete. The vision of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is still, well, visionary. Neither the U.N., nor the state, nor individuals are utterly ineffective. Agency still matters. Why else are you reading Skinner’s piece, and this response? Skinner’s agency, research, and writing matters, and so it now matters what you will now look for, what you will now see, what you will then do, and how many people you connect with in pursuit of justice.

Christine Bell was born and brought up in Belfast. She is currently Director of the Transitional Justice Institute, and Professor of Public International Law at University of Ulster (based at Magee Campus). She read law at Selwyn College, Cambridge, (1988) and gained an LL.M in Law from Harvard Law School (1990), supported by a Harkness Fellowship. She has authored the book Peace Agreements and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2000), and a report published by the International Council on Human Rights Policy entitled "Negotiating Justice? Human Rights and Peace Agreements" (2006). She has also taken part in various peace negotiations discussions, giving constitutional law and human rights law advice, and also in training for diplomats, mediators and lawyers.

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Slavery: From Public Crime to Private Wrong

by Alison Brysk

“The eradication of public slavery required a revolution in Haiti, and a revolutionary civil war in the United States. In the 21st century, eliminating private slavery will necessitate a revolution in our recognition of rights—and our exercise of global governance."

The fight against slavery was the first international human rights movement, and the elimination of legalized bondage represented a hallmark of Western civilization. But the persistence and revival of this ancient evil shows that in an era of globalization, a prohibited public crime has morphed into a massive private wrong.

Private wrongs” are contemporary patterns of human rights abuse committed by non-governmental forms of authority: from firms to families. While the enslavement of tens of millions of Africans in the Americas was state-sanctioned and sometimes state-sponsored, modern slavery operates in the gaps of governance: in rural backwaters, failed states, and the freefall of illicit migration. Its victims, like most current forms of exploitation, are second-class citizens and “disposable people”—women, children, outcastes, and the marginalized poor.

The key to understanding and combating private wrongs is to recognize these affronts to human dignity as abuses of power as much as any act of government, unmasking their justification as states of nature, cultural traditions, or personal choice. Slavery is not an accident or an atavism; it is a predatory strategy of commodification of fellow human beings in a privatizing world.

In this “race to the bottom,” traditional inequities and stigmas are brands, signaling who can be exploited and how. Women are especially vulnerable to the sex trade—but women are equally vulnerable to exploitation in the “maid trade,” and any other traditional role where domestic disempowerment meets globalized displacement. The problem with the Bush coalition’s undue focus on sex trafficking is that it avoids or distorts the nature and sources of disempowerment; sex is not degrading, subjugation is.

The solution to powerlessness is politics; in Hannah Arendt’s concept of coming together to act in the public sphere. This is more than just “prevention” in the narrow sense—it implies using the international human rights regime to move towards governance for the wretched of the earth. Elements of this system must include U.N. monitoring and coordination, pressure by strong powers, legal and development assistance to willing but weak governments, and sanctions on regimes that tolerate this horror. But above all, it means providing political channels and leverage to victim populations and at-risk groups.

Private wrongs are ameliorated when new groups are recognized as human, new leverage points of global connection are discovered, and new claims for governance are recognized as determinants of human dignity. Freeing the slaves requires recognizing an obscure Dalit debtor as a second-class citizen of a lagging democracy. Leveraging the slave-raiding Sudanese regime may range from imposing U.S. investment sanctions to pressuring the Chinese backers of Khartoum. And expanding governance for human rights means that criminalizing sex tourism is as important as prosecuting pimps, and that voluntary sex workers have as much right to protection as any other form of laborers. The eradication of public slavery required a revolution in Haiti, and a revolutionary civil war in the United States. In the 21st century, eliminating private slavery will necessitate a revolution in our recognition of rights—and our exercise of global governance.

Alison Brysk is Professor of Political Science and International Studies at the University of California, Irvine. Winner of the 2007-2008 Distinguished Mid-Career Research Award, she has authored or edited six books on international human rights. Professor Brysk has researched and lectured in a dozen countries, and in 2007 held the Fulbright Distinguished Visiting Chair in Global Governance at Canada's University of Waterloo/Centre for International Governance Innovation. Brysk is active in promoting human rights through campus, professional, international, and advocacy organizations and networks. Please visit her website: http://www.alisonbrysk.org.

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Combating the Slave Trade: Why Governments are not Good at Governing

by Eric A. Heinze

“What is particularly disturbing is that much of the modern-day slave trade takes place with the full knowledge, and even acquiescence of, state governments."

It is difficult to read Benjamin Skinner’s revealing piece on the international slave trade and not feel revolted that we still live in a world where so many people live in bondage. What is particularly disturbing is that much of the modern-day slave trade takes place with the full knowledge, and even acquiescence of, state governments. It is true that governments like the U.S. and the Netherlands have taken important steps in passing laws that outlaw human trafficking. But like so many of the challenges that confront the international human rights movement today, as well as a host of other international issue-areas, the problem is not a shortage of laws that outlaw or otherwise criminalize such activity. Slavery, the slave-trade, and other forms of human trafficking are outlawed in the domestic legal systems of almost all states, and there are numerous international instruments that likewise outlaw and criminalize such activity. The problem, rather, is that in those states where such problems are particularly pronounced, there is little or no interest in implementing or enforcing these laws.

Almost by their very nature, governments of states are particularly bad at being advocates of specific causes and working toward solving problems in narrow issue areas—whether slavery, environmental degradation, women’s rights, etc. The reason is simple. Unlike non-governmental organizations (NGOs), states governments do not have the luxury of preoccupying themselves with one particular issue or problem and dedicating all their resources to addressing it. It is almost a truism to say that governments will always have competing political imperatives. To be sure, governments do maintain various offices in their foreign ministries specifically intended to combat particular problems, such as the U.S. State Department’s Office to Combat Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. But as Skinner’s article suggests, at the end of the day the efforts of individuals working in these offices will end up as bullet-points in a policy hierarchy that will probably take a back seat to some supposedly more important concern. The author’s example of Condoleezza Rice’s refusal to scold India for its tolerance of human trafficking is no doubt a result of exactly such a process.

NGOs, on the other hand, do not share this dilemma. They do not have to be concerned with securing access to resources, procuring trade agreements, placating constituencies, and defending the homeland. It is therefore not especially surprising that the various grassroots organizations that Skinner mentions, and not state governments, have been at the forefront of the fight against the modern-day slave trade. Furthermore, unlike governments, which have to prioritize issues and “multitask,” NGOs specialize and can focus on “depth” instead of “breadth.” Unfortunately, aside from knowledge and specialization, the material resources needed to be truly effective in such endeavors lie almost exclusively with states—hence Skinner’s call for government partnerships with such organizations.

But such a call is indicative of a broader revelation in global efforts to regulate certain international activity. That is, paradoxically, governments are not very good at governing—at least globally. One need only examine the foreign policy-making process of the U.S., or the process by which international agreements are concluded among states to reach this conclusion. Duly designated representatives of states, in all their grandeur and formality, gather at U.N. headquarters in New York, extol the virtues of the non-binding declaration they are about to pass, cast a vote (sometimes), and then pat themselves on the back for taking such an important step toward eradicating some repugnant global practice, many of whom know full well that their government is complicit in such a practice.

Perhaps instead of the various offices in the U.S. State Department relying on the Secretary of State to be the tip of the spear in this fight, these offices should coordinate with their counterparts in other states, as well as the various grassroots organizations working in this area, and allow people with specialized knowledge and who are dedicated to solving this problem have a stab at it. As Parag Khanna argued in the article the HRHW Roundtable discussed last month, perhaps it is time for international relations to go beyond what takes place in foreign ministries, embassies, and sluggish, overly-formal diplomatic fora. This is already happening to a certain degree (among law enforcement agencies, for example), but unless it starts happening in the human rights arena, we can expect to read a lot more of these depressing articles in years to come.

Eric A. Heinze is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Oklahoma. He is the author of Waging Humanitarian War: The Ethics, Law and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (forthcoming, SUNY Press) and numerous scholarly articles on various aspects of international human rights and the ethics and law of armed conflict. Dr. Heinze teaches courses on international law and organization, international human rights, and international relations theory.

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Saturday, March 1, 2008

Editor's Introduction- March 2008

“Waving Goodbye to Hegemony?” by Parag Khanna. New York Times Magazine. January 27, 2008.

With a mixture of creative forecasting and a role call of “who’s who” in geopolitics, Parag Khanna presents a sweeping look at our collective future through the lens of globalization. What are the implications of an American fall from grace that some compare to the decline of the Holy Roman Empire? If this is already a process in motion, what have been its causes and what will be its effects on international peace and stability? Khanna argues that primarily economic and ideological forces are responsible for this shift, which has opened spaces of opportunity for gas-guzzling, capital-rich China and the recently-consolidated and ever-expanding European Union to assert themselves in a new global landscape defined by “tri-polarity.”

“The rise of China in the East and of the European Union within the West has fundamentally altered a globe that recently appeared to have only an American gravity—pro or anti....Even as America stumbles back toward multilateralism, others are walking away from the American game and playing by their own rules.”


One cannot ignore the simultaneous rise of the American hegemon and the modern human rights regime. Arguably, without the former, we do not have the latter. However, with the conspicuous shortcomings of humanitarian intervention (and non-intervention) over the past sixteen years and the post-9/11 adventures in Afghanistan and Iraq, which were in part justified on human rights grounds, the credibility of human rights doctrine has severely suffered. We have already begun to see the consequences of China’s involvement in countries like Iran, Sudan and Nigeria as it operates without strings attached to investment—what one commentator has termed “Rogue Aid.” If America is ultimately relegated and forced to compromise on stances it once held as non-negotiable, then the stage may be set for a rollback on policies and priorities that emphasized values like protection for individual dignity and welfare.

“Globalization resists centralization of almost any kind. Instead what we see gradually happening...is a far greater sense of a division of labor among the Big Three [China, E.U., and U.S.], a concrete burden-sharing among them by which they are judged not by their rhetoric but the responsibilities they fulfill.”

Khanna boldly identifies a new phase in this era of globalization as unipolarity gives way to joint stewardship of the international system. Sticking with his largely economic line of argument, the struggle for supremacy in this new phase will amount to the necessity for these competitive powers to orchestrate a “division of labor” around “burden-sharing.” America’s role in this future begins by accepting its diminished status, acting with uncharacteristic humility and serving as perpetual advocate for liberal, democratic and human rights principles. While this conclusion presents a whole new host of problems and questions, its strength lies in the notion that America, in some form, is an indispensable component of an international community concerned with progress and stability and were it to drop into obscurity, there would be a great deal lost in the process.

All this and more are discussed in this month's Roundtable...

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The "White but Not Quite Man's Burden": Disrupting the Apogee of Imperial Hegemony?

by Anna M. Agathangelou

“'Globalization' as an assumed fact and reality has disarmed peoples from engaging in struggles against these capitalist assaults on their positions.”

The victory of late capitalism and its supreme reign through intensified war have been triumphantly trumpeted in popular media, especially since 1989 after the fall of the former Soviet Union. These aspects do indeed need to be understood and explained and Khanna attempts, in the tradition of realism/pragmatism, to do so. He begins by articulating “globalization” as the competition for resources and terrains of influence by the U.S., the E.U. and China. “Globalization” is a major modality through which “frenemies,” as he calls them, attempt to integrate the world economy. Moreover, and in order to support his argument that the U.S. has to compete and play an exceptional role in world politics, he states “that globalization is not synonymous with Americanization” and that globalization “has eroded the American primacy.” Khanna’s interest is in articulating ways that the U.S. would remain a competitive power in this “geopolitical marketplace” and even reassume its exceptional and imperial role. To achieve his goal and political commitment, Khanna employs a few conceptual strategies. He articulates globalization as an “irreversible fact” of our times and that “the second world,” or what he coins as the “swing states,” is the ground for the struggle to secure a geopolitical order. This “call to arms” (or what Khanna calls a “Less Can be More” policy to-do list) to secure America’s role as a competitive, exceptional and imperial actor focuses mostly on those whose primary interest is capitalist accumulation and profits, and the engendered political “models for success” to secure that relation. This strategy is what I call here “globalism.” It is a “living material force” in the sense that it contributes toward the support of particular political commitments and interests.

Khanna quite accurately points to one of the major contradictions in world politics today: the rise in the rivalry between different imperialist powers that are engendering a dynamic of “cut-throat” competition and even outright hostility in their pursuit of power to support. This leads him to his central point that the apogee of the hegemony of the U.S. has arrived and, hence, the title of his piece “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony.” Yet, assuming globalization is an irreversible process and a fact articulates a fantasy and mystifies a major tension that exists in world politics today, that is, the unfettered attempt to integrate the whole world into a global economy, and the attempt to generate a global political order to guide these relations. So, how do we proceed to understand this major tension and for what purpose? What is crucial is to first begin with “globalization.” What is it?

“Globalization” as the term has been used cannot explain shifts taking place within continuity of capital. Khanna’s articulation of “globalization” as a gesture to the changes in world politics hovers ambiguously between a description of the “geopolitical marketplace” and a performative articulation; thus establishing this geopolitical marketplace and the position of the U.S. within it as a given truth and obscuring that the world capitalist system has been changing dramatically.

I suggest, as others have done, to use “globalism” as a conceptual tool to help us understand these changes and their many contradictions that have emerged nationally and internationally. “Globalism” here refers to a series of structural strategies, including the production of ideas, and refers to the dismantling of the barriers against the “free” cross-border flows of money, commodities, and productive capital, the extensive privatization of state-enterprises, the flexibilization of labor markets, and the development of lean production techniques. More so, globalism as a strategy has also been about the contestation of mega-capital and some imperial state powers in the world to restore capitalism in bureaucratic workers’ states such as Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and China. These changes are demanding and leading to the creation of a new set-up with dramatic consequences for the “equilibrium” of forces between classes, genders and racialized peoples at the international, national, and communal levels.

Globalism is a strategy where mega-corporations plan and organize the buying of labor power, raw materials, the production and sale of commodities within a single all-encompassing strategic plan, albeit with much struggle and contestation by different peoples. The mega-capital interests such as re-stimulation of a higher rate of surplus value and profits, however, cannot be pursued in a fragmented economy. For capital to achieve this “international” move, it has to articulate and imagine these processes as “smooth” by concealing the class/gendered/racialized assault of international bourgeoisies against those peoples who have been struggling to make ends meet and protect their environments from such theft, including state buffer mechanisms. “Globalization” as an assumed fact and reality has disarmed peoples from engaging in struggles against these capitalist assaults on their positions.

Mega-capital’s consolidation and its further extension and expansion geographically require a political order that does not set barriers against it and also secures its interests. Yet, the “state” still acts as a central site of class/gendered/racialized domination and inter-capitalist rivalry which challenges mega-capital’s desire to dispense of it and/or create a political order for this “new” capitalist formation. Its different international organizations/regionalisms (i.e., UNHCR, the IMF, the WTO, NATO, the E.U.) carry out specific tasks of a “world government.” The gaps generated with the fall of the former Soviet Union, etc., and the competition among different imperialist powers (and thus, the unfettered spread of their armies in the world) has intensified what I coined in another piece the “New World War Order,” the articulated political order, that is the new system globalism is trying to establish.

In sum, beginning with the recognition that liberal capitalism and “Confucian capitalism” with their contingent political organizations (i.e., America’s “coalition of the willing,” Europe’s consensus, and China’s consultative style) are only two modalities through which capital relations can be integrated internationally. These relations have to be brought about instead of being accepted as given. To grant this possibility is a world apart from saying that this is the best and most viable way to think and do social relations. It is time for those of us who are interested in an alternative world to begin thinking, planning, and embodying it now. Such an alternative world is indeed necessary.

Anna M. Agathangelou is Associate Professor of political science at York University, Toronto and the director of Global Change Institute, Nicosia, Cyprus. Author of The Global Political Economy of Sex: Desire, Violence, and Insecurity in Mediterranean Nation-States (Palgrave 2004), Agathangelou is currently working on a book-project Terror-Necrotic Ontologies of Capital and Empire: Greek Theory and Possibilities for Substantive Democracy.

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Waving Hello to Democratic Renewal

by Christine Bell

"There seems ever more limited room to consider what it means to be American, to be a liberal democrat, to be cosmopolitan—to truly belong to either local society or a global world."

Khanna’s argument is simple. American hegemony and the unipolar world have collapsed—without America noticing. The new world is tri-polar. America must compete with Europe’s soft power influence, and China’s economic power influence. The new global game for the “second world” (Turkey, South America, the former USSR “Stans”) is to play all three superpowers against each other, while pretending to be the friends of all.

Let’s leave aside whether Khanna is right. The arguments are well made and ring true at least as a broad brush account of the world’s main powerblocks and how they operate. The question is—so what? Khanna ends by suggesting a fivefold task of re-thinking U.S. foreign policy. First, change the rhetoric: global interests in place of U.S. interests; “No more ‘us’ versus ‘them’ only ‘we’.” Second, more joined-up thinking and a regional approach to coordination of U.S. diplomacy. Third, deployment of “the marchmen” by increasing diplomatic missions and cultural initiatives to operate as “the foot soldiers of empire spreading values and winning loyalty.” Fourth, making the global economy work for the U.S., by moving from a narrow evaluation of self-interest as served by isolationism. Fifth, to convene a meeting of the Big Three but suggest, rather than set, the agenda.

I am persuaded by the analysis. But I am not convinced by the prescription. Khanna’s re-envisioning reads a little too much like the need for a “newspeak” and a less abrasive style of communication— U.S. foreign policy in a European accent. (Or perhaps the softer tones of Obama, Clinton, or McCain, in place of Bush’s brass braying). Yet, as Khanna acknowledges, increased global influence will not be solved by a different accent or mere repackaging.

To convert style to substance another matter must be added to Khanna’s list as item number one: namely, internal democratic renewal within the US.

Let me overstate my case and do so as an Irish European. Rightly or wrongly, we share Khanna’s view of U.S. foreign policy as top-down and aggressive. We gasped in astonishment after September 11 th, as “ordinary Americans” agonised over how they had come to be so hated but with personal, rather than national, self-reflection. Was patriotism and military action the only appropriate response? Was there no space to engage in the existential nation-building deliberation that you seek of others who face conflict and violent threat?

Rightly or wrongly, we also view you as naïve about your own domestic situation. In Ireland, for example, we always loved America—its foreign policies were helpful here and we still owe a peace process debt. But that said, we often found visiting Americans hard to take. As they marvelled at and mediated our “ethnic conflict,” those of us who had been to the U.S. for any length of time quietly wondered where they lived. How many of the white men that visited us went for walks in Harlem, sent their kids to public school in inner cities, or had white servants in their houses? How many had genuinely close friendships across ethnic groups, most notably the black/white divide?

As we watch your election campaign the two matters seem to be linked. We find ourselves wondering whether it matters who gets elected. There seems to be so little room to manoeuvre against interest blocks. To enter the race one appears to have to recalibrate personal politics against fixed political poles. We worry that the future trend of domestic and foreign policy choices is beyond political reach, set for decades ahead in all but the details. To point to greater deficits of the systems of others does not allay our concerns.

There is no European triumphalism here. Clearly, we are not perfect. Our foreign policy is as much a product of our own internal politics as yours. However, there is indeed perhaps a lesson in our particular relationship. Europe’s soft-power approach in its foreign policy comes more from the difficulties for Europe in deciding what Europe is, than from clever strategic design. We do not have a constitutional consensus as to a concept of “ Europe” that we can all subscribe to concomitant with a commitment to national states. Rather we have ongoing debate about what Europe is and should be, and a tension between periphery (states) and centre (Europe) to be ever-managed in a situation in which there is no default position capable of claiming a trumping authority. We have, in essence, an on-going crisis and overt public negotiation as to what it means to be “European.” We forge foreign policy in the middle of this existential crisis as to how to reconcile our clashing political visions for our own shared future. The tension produces compromises and almost inevitably one of the few points of agreement is to on-going dialogue and pragmatic cooperation with neighbours. Soft power is one of the only forms of power we can agree to use, its soft edge crafted out of the difficulties of agreeing on when to use hard power.

And so I suggest that the inability to sell American values lies not just in the current difficulty of ascertaining those values, but in the limited political space in which to renegotiate them. There seems ever more limited room to consider what it means to be American, to be a liberal democrat, to be cosmopolitan—to truly belong to either local society or a global world. Unlike in Europe, articulating political uncertainty is subversive of the patriotic project rather than its accepted starting point. Until patriotism is understood to be served by democratic renewal that touches the heart of the U.S.’s deep political constitution, and this renewal becomes an imperative rather than wilderness cry of a few, foreign policy reform will be cosmetic. As an outsider I have no prescriptions: democratic renewal best comes from within and below.

But if Khanna really prompts us to search for our “inner Kennedy,” then I am tempted to say: Ask not what your country will do (to the “other”) for you, ask what you will do for your country so that the other ceases to be other.

Christine Bell was born and brought up in Belfast. She is currently Director of the Transitional Justice Institute, and Professor of Public International Law at University of Ulster (based at Magee Campus). She read law at Selwyn College, Cambridge, (1988) and gained an LL.M in Law from Harvard Law School (1990), supported by a Harkness Fellowship. She has authored the book Peace Agreements and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2000), and a report published by the International Council on Human Rights Policy entitled "Negotiating Justice? Human Rights and Peace Agreements" (2006). She has also taken part in various peace negotiations discussions, giving constitutional law and human rights law advice, and also in training for diplomats, mediators and lawyers.

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Goodbye to Hegemony-Hello to Thinking Globally

by Alison Brysk

“What purports to be a broad-minded analysis of the quest for “global equilibrium” under changing conditions, ends up being a playbook for the scramble for global goodies—with a disturbing dash of Huntingtonian Yellow Peril China-bashing."

While I was pleased to see a knowledgeable commentator offer the promise of a fresh approach to the decline of American empire, alas Parag Khanna’s provocative essay does not escape the delusions of your father’s realpolitique. What purports to be a broad-minded analysis of the quest for “global equilibrium” under changing conditions, ends up being a playbook for the scramble for global goodies—with a disturbing dash of Huntingtonian Yellow Peril China-bashing. The real lessons here are deeper: the danger of asking the wrong question, and the need to bring global knowledge into a global framework to understand 21 st-century realities.

Superpower rivalry is the wrong question, because power is always grounded in purpose, and because old-fashioned national interest is no longer the primary determinant of our fate. The Italian political theorist Antonio Gramsci identified an important dual meaning of “hegemony”—both material dominance and moral suasion. Purpose and principle translate into the ability to set agendas and guide institutions, and it is the loss of this kind of hegemony in the latter sense that should concern us far more than the checkerboard of oil supplies in the Stans. Even in the extremity of military conflict, the U.S. has been relatively more successful in Afghanistan than Iraq, in a more legitimate struggle supported by multilateral institutions and allies. As Khanna intermittently notes but does not fully digest, such multi-dimensional power is Europe’s secret weapon—along with reducing oil dependence and diversifying energy supplies, this multi-faceted power is a more sustainable basis for economic growth and political influence.

Globalization is the right question, because global connections are not just a reshuffle of resources, but a fundamental change in the determinants of the rights and welfare of the residents of all states. Global climate change and associated natural disasters, pandemics, and border-crossing conflict (including, but not limited to, terrorism) will affect far more people, even heretofore sheltered citizens of superpowers, than the alignments of nation-states. The most important shift is in the basis of identity, the glue and motor of societies, from nation-state loyalties to new zones and balances of religious ideologies, market motives, ethnic tribalisms, cosmopolitan mentalities, and anomic “failed societies.” Again, the seeds of this knowledge are visible within Khanna’s own analysis, when he describes the Latin American leftist backlash in America’s assumed zone of influence, and admits that “Chavez’s challenge…is ideological.” In a globalized world, the power of the American Dream is that migrants still vote for it with their feet.

The ultimate sign of the breakdown of Khanna’s hegemonic analysis is that the prescriptions it generates are inconsistent. His initial recommendations of the JFK vision of globalism plus “Pentagonization” is just the formula that brought us Vietnam, ground zero for imperial overstretch. Similarly, the author’s solution to the repeated refrain that “China is winning” is to sell them our infrastructure, rather than challenge the dysfunctional American neo-liberal distrust of government as a manager of public goods. One of the common features of our disparate European and Chinese economic rivals is the strong role of the state in guiding economic development, and (historically) in protecting the commonweal—American purpose and identity decline every time we allow one of our citizens to die of a preventable disease.

The real solution is thinking globally, in the triple sense of thinking comprehensively about power and purpose, thinking like citizens of the world as well as of America, and thinking of the greater good—a sustainable blend of peace, prosperity, and solidarity, even if it means less American dominance in a better world for all.

Alison Brysk is Professor of Political Science and International Studies at the University of California, Irvine. Winner of the 2007-2008 Distinguished Mid-Career Research Award, she has authored or edited six books on international human rights. Professor Brysk has researched and lectured in a dozen countries, and in 2007 held the Fulbright Distinguished Visiting Chair in Global Governance at Canada's University of Waterloo/Centre for International Governance Innovation. Brysk is active in promoting human rights through campus, professional, international, and advocacy organizations and networks. Please visit her website: http://www.alisonbrysk.org.

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Goodbye Hegemony, Hello.?

by Eric A. Heinze

“...while the type of power is different in this new version of power politics, the pursuit of an overarching imperative at the expense of “secondary” concerns for human rights and other moral norms will remain an enduring feature of international relations..."

Parag Khanna’s analysis of American hegemonic decline paints a bleak picture for the future of America’s role in the emerging global order. He is correct to emphasize how the misguided policies of the Bush administration have done untold damage to America’s credibility, prestige, and overall influence in international affairs. It is thus difficult to find fault with such a sobering analysis of the immense challenges that lie ahead for the next U.S. president in the realm of foreign affairs.

As an expert on geopolitics, it is not surprising that Khanna’s essay frequently makes reference to many of the fundamental principles that have guided the field of International Relations for decades. Utilizing the realist principle of balance of power, for instance, the author suggests we are living in a tri-polar order, with the U.S., the European Union, and China as the great powers. The “Big Three,” as Khanna calls them, are competing with one another in the “geopolitical marketplace” to win allies and influence others in a style eerily reminiscent of old-fashioned realist balancing and bandwagoning. The U.S.’s failure to co-opt these “swing states” from the “second world” is even reminiscent of the pessimist outlook of the realist tradition (though perhaps coincidentally), as the author continues to lament the demise of a has-been superpower in this new brand of power politics.

Khanna is certainly right that the balance of power has shifted at the expense of the U.S. He is also right that unlike previous eras of balance of power that were among only European states, this game of power politics is the first truly global and “multicivilizational” power struggle. The most obvious difference that Khanna does not explicitly recognize, however, is that he is talking primarily about an economic, not necessarily military, balance of power. He suggests as much when he downplays the statistics that point to American military supremacy as compared to the more meaningful trends that indicate the U.S. is losing in the geopolitical marketplace. This de-emphasis of military power could be no more obvious than the fact that one of the world’s great powers in this new order—the E.U.—scarcely has its own military apart from the separate forces of its members. (And this is to say nothing about the fact that the E.U. is not a sovereign state—a curious omission in a balance-of-power analysis). Despite this, according to Khanna, Europe’s economic strength alone is facilitating a “long-term buyout” of its unstable and potentially threatening neighbor Russia.

Yet as numerous scholars have pointed out, economic and military power are two sides of the same coin. However, the logic of the balance of power is premised on the assumption of an anarchical system of sovereign states who are engaged in a struggle for their very survival. States in such a world primarily balance one another militarily, not economically. But it seems that if the new distribution of power the author describes is measured primarily in economic and not military terms, then states no longer perceive their survival to be at stake. Cast in this light, America’s hegemonic decline is accompanied by the dawn of a new era of international relations where active fear of survival is no longer what motivates states.

Therefore, an important conclusion flowing from Khanna’s analysis is that current U.S. military commitments abroad are not only unnecessary for American security, but are contributing mightily to our precipitous decline. While Paul Kennedy and others have taught us the dangers of military over-stretch, this is only part of America’s current predicament. Not only are current U.S. military commitments unsustainable relative to our economic resource base, the continued preoccupation with military dominance is not conducive to the new, evidently less Hobbesian, realities of the global order.

The author’s recommendations for the U.S. to remedy this unenviable state of affairs draw from both the balance of power logic that underlies his analysis, as well as the recognition of a global reality based on international cooperation among networks of sub-state (and even non-state) actors. States will continue to compete and balance one another in pursuit of economic growth and influence (if not survival). But international relations are increasingly becoming the purview of domestic technocrats who coordinate with their foreign counterparts in a variety of issue areas to regulate various aspects of international relations. This is why, according to Khanna, “American foreign policy must be substantially more than what the U.S. government directs.” One even wonders whether the threat to states’ survival has diminished precisely because they decreasingly hold a monopoly over international relations.

Interestingly, the lingering reality of global power competition (albeit not in the military sense) resembles a decidedly realist amoral ethos. This raises some interesting implications for the place that moral concerns like human rights will occupy in states’ foreign policy agendas. Khanna’s article suggests that to renew our competitiveness in the geopolitical marketplace, the U.S. is going to have to compete with the likes of China to win allies (trading partners?) in the second world, many of whom have little interest in political liberalization. So while the type of power is different in this new version of power politics, the pursuit of an overarching imperative at the expense of “secondary” concerns for human rights and other moral norms will remain an enduring feature of international relations, at least for the foreseeable future. In short, while states may no longer be caught in a perilous struggle for their survival, the same does not necessarily hold true for those individuals living within them. It seems that the state-of-nature analogy to the international system has thus been turned on its head.

Khanna’s analysis therefore implies that the danger states pose to one another’s existence has diminished. (Non-state actors such as terrorists are a separate issue). At the same time, the threat posed by states to their citizens is likely to remain. Furthermore, human rights implications are sure to surface as global governance becomes increasingly orchestrated by an unaccountable “diplomatic-industrial complex,” as opposed to (sometimes) elected governments.
One can therefore only conclude that the place the U.S. will occupy in the new global order remains to be seen, but its arrival will almost certainly not mark America’s demise. Perhaps the more urgent concern for readers of this publication is what protections human beings will have from the excesses of power-holders—whoever they may be in the global order that is emerging after American hegemony.

Eric A. Heinze is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Oklahoma. He is the author of Waging Humanitarian War: The Ethics, Law and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (forthcoming, SUNY Press) and numerous scholarly articles on various aspects of international human rights and the ethics and law of armed conflict. Dr. Heinze teaches courses on international law and organization, international human rights, and international relations theory.

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Thursday, January 10, 2008

January 2008: Special Forum

This forum aims to begin a public conversation about the question of whether the American Political Science Association (APSA) should hold its 2012 Annual Meeting in New Orleans—a city governed by a Louisiana constitutional amendment legally defining marriage as "the union between one man and one woman." The consequences of this amendment for APSA scholars are discussed in the opinions below.

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APSA Practice for Annual Meeting Sites and the 2012 Annual Meeting

American Political Science Association memorandum
[originally posted on http://www.apsanet.org]

Memorandum

TO: APSA Council and Members
FROM: Michael Brintnall, Executive Director
RE: APSA Practice for Annual Meeting Sites and the 2012 Annual Meeting

In response to questions about how APSA selects annual meeting sites, and about the decision to site the meeting in New Orleans in 2012, President Pinderhughes asked if I would prepare the following information and make it available to the Council and membership.

Some of the key background points are this:

- APSA has a signed contract with the Marriott and Sheraton Hotels to hold our meeting in New Orleans in 2012. New Orleans was selected as part of a Council-approved rotation to go to all regions of the country. This contract was signed in 2003, one year before Louisiana adopted a constitutional amendment against gay marriage.

- The contract includes language asserting long-standing APSA policy that if the city establishes or enforces laws that violate civil rights of APSA members we may terminate the contract, including with respect to sexual orientation and marital status. This language was adopted many years ago at the request of the Gay and Lesbian Caucus.

- The Committee on the Status of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and the Transgendered in the Profession has asked this year that this principle be extended to state policy – specifically to states with Constitutional amendments banning gay marriage. Twenty-six states have such Constitutional provisions. The Committee’s documentation noted that 19 other states have statutory restrictions limiting marriage to one man and one woman, including many states in which APSA regular holds its meetings. (Only Massachusetts issues marriage licenses to same-sex couples and the remaining states allow different kinds of civil unions.) The LGBT committee themselves did not extend their petition to the states with statutory restrictions.

- The Annual Meeting Review Committee, considering the implications of a 26-state, and possibly a 45 to 49-state, limitation on meeting siting and other issues, recommended that the current city-level policy provision remain the policy.

- The Council accepted the Annual Meeting Review Committee position for the time being, while asking the Committee on the Status of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and the Transgendered in the Profession for further clarification of its recommendation and for continued discussion with the Annual Meeting Committee.

- APSA has deferred making any new annual meeting contracting decisions until the siting policy is resolved. Decisions about the Teaching and Learning Conference site are needed on an annual basis, and we will handle this on a case-by-case basis with wide consultation.

- With respect to the existing contract in New Orleans, if we terminated the contract, our understanding of the worst case is that we could face financial damages to the hotel that could be extreme (e.g. in the realm of the value of the sleeping room revenue the hotel would have expected had the meeting occurred).

Key Questions and Issues:

1) What is APSA policy about picking a meeting site? APSA chooses sites five or more years in advance, with an emphasis on circulating through the regions of the US, going to first-tier cities, and offering affordable hotels near to each other or linked to a convention center with adequate capacity. 1

2) What are provisions about anti-discrimination and civil rights matters? In response to a request from, and in conversation with, the Gay and Lesbian Caucus during Judith Shklar’s presidency in 1990, the Council voted that APSA should only meet in cities where all members are welcome. The contract language agreed upon focused on the behavior of the city, not the state, with particular focus on discrimination in employment, housing, and access to public accommodations. The language reads:

10.02 APSA has selected [name of city] as a site of its annual meeting in light of the city's anti-discrimination record. APSA reserves the right of termination of this agreement, without penalty or liability, if the government of the city in which the hotel is located establishes or enforces laws that, in the estimation of APSA, abridge the civil rights of any APSA member on the basis of gender, race, color, national origin, sexual orientation, marital status, physical handicap, disability, or religion.

3) What did the recent Annual Meeting Review Committee say about this policy? APSA undertook a review of all annual meeting policies this year, and the siting policy was included in this review at the request of the Committee on the Status of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, and the Transgendered. The Annual Meeting Review Committee, chaired by Joan Tronto, recommended the existing, city-based, policy continue. Their report said:

1. Non-discriminatory siting. APSA should continue its current practice which permits us to terminate an agreement that abridges the civil rights of APSA members.

Rationale: The current language in the termination section of our standard contract reads: 10.02 APSA has selected [name of city] as a site of its annual meeting in light of the city's anti-discrimination record. APSA reserves the right of termination of this agreement, without penalty or liability, if the government of the city in which the hotel is located establishes or enforces laws that, in the estimation of APSA, abridge the civil rights of any APSA member on the basis of gender, race, color, national origin, sexual orientation, marital status, physical handicap, disability, or religion.


While some members and groups within APSA have asked us to go further in affirming particular policies, this language gives us sufficient latitude to protect the Association's interests and to safeguard the rights and dignity of members. Moreover, we felt any larger change in this policy was a matter for the Council, not for us.

4) What did the APSA Committee on the Status of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and the Transgendered in the Profession (LGBT Committee) propose? In a July 12, 2007 memorandum to the Council, the LGBT Committee proposed a new siting resolution that reads:

Whereas the American Political Science Association would never hold its annual meeting in a state that allocated marriage rights on the basis of race, religion or ethnicity, the APSA shall not hold its national meeting in any state that, in its constitution, allocated marriage rights on the basis of gender or sexual orientation.

The resolution included information indicating that this provision would prevent holding the APSA meeting in 26 states: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin.

The documentation included with the resolution showed also that at least another 19 states have similar statutory restrictions limiting marriage to one man and one woman, including many states in which APSA regular holds its meetings. (Only Massachusetts issues marriage licenses to same-sex couples – the remaining states do not allow marriage but do allow different kinds of civil unions.) The LGBT Committee did not extend its petition to the states with statutory restrictions – explaining separately that they felt these states had greater potential to change policy since the provision was not constitutionally grounded.

The Committee memo also indicated they wished the principle in the petition to apply to siting of other APSA meetings such as the Teaching and Learning Conference as well as the Annual Meeting.

5) What action did the APSA Council take at its Chicago meeting in Fall of 2007? The APSA Council discussed the report from the Annual Meeting Review Committee and the proposal from the LGBT Committee, and accepted its recommendation that there not be a “larger change” in the policy at this time. The Council asked the LGBT Committee to fine-tune their proposed language for changing this policy. Matters for further consideration include the timing of the impact of this policy, its implications for APSA’s smaller meetings as well as larger ones, further interpretation of its application to states with constitutional bans but not to those with statutory bans, and other issues.

6) When did APSA select New Orleans as a conference city for 2012? APSA signed its contract in 2003 to hold its annual meeting in New Orleans. The Louisiana constitutional prohibition on same sex marriage was not adopted by the voters until September 14, 2004 – a year after we had contracted to site the Annual Meeting in the State.

7) Why did APSA select New Orleans as a conference city for 2012? Few cities in the South have the characteristics and configuration of space appropriate for the APSA meeting – mainly just Atlanta and New Orleans. We had not selected a southern site in a long time and previous meetings in Atlanta had seen a 14% decline in attendance. In 2003 the only other option in the South that met our configuration and space requirements was New Orleans, a location that had been acceptable previously to the Lesbian and Gay Caucus.

8) What would happen if APSA sought to terminate its contract and to move the meeting? In terms of our contracting with meeting hotels, we would face three kinds of consequences. First is the risk of financial loss from breaking the New Orleans contract. Our anti-discrimination clause is untested and framed to refer to city actions not state actions. Most likely we would be sued and our claims would be tested in court. APSA will require legal counsel to advise us about the legal grounds for terminating the contract, and what our likely liability would be.

In the worst case, we could face extreme financial damages compensating the hotel for the sleeping room revenue the hotel would have expected had the meeting occurred. The legal claim that we could terminate the contract in a state with a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage because civil rights of our members are violated is untested. A further question is whether our legal position is weakened if we terminated a contract in a state with a constitutional ban and then moved to a state with a state statutory ban. APSA will continue to explore these issues.

Second, we would need to find another location. It would be difficult to move the meeting until the legal interpretation of our policy was settled, which could be some time. With a short lead time, it is likely we would face higher costs. And we’d have not had a meeting in the South for many years.

Third, our ability to sign good contracts in the future would be harmed, given a record of having moved two meetings in recent years. This would result in higher costs for members and less options for sites for many years.

9) What are the implications for APSA to adopt a provision about marriage rights? The APSA Constitution says the Association “will not commit its members on questions of public policy nor take positions not immediately concerned with its direct purpose [to encourage the study of Political Science…]” 2

As a rule, this prevents the Association from taking a position on most policy matters. However, if a public policy prevents a member from attending a conference safely, conveniently, and equally, the policy issue may become a legitimate Association concern. For instance, discriminatory lodging policies would certainly impede participation at the meeting, and would be a legitimate policy concern of the Association. A general reason that APSA has based its anti-discrimination policy for annual meeting sites at the level of policies in the city is that such policies can be expected to have an immediate, proximate influence on participation.

In evaluating the proposal that APSA consider state constitutional provisions about marriage rights, one set of questions then arises as to whether this reaches beyond the level of committing members on questions of public policy. One claim has been that gay partners, particularly with children, might find themselves at risk in a state that did not recognize their legal relationship, if it were necessary to make, for example, emergency medical decisions.

Louisiana jurists did attempt to speak to this, when the state constitutional amendment was reviewed and found constitutional by the state supreme court. T he Chief Justice of the Court, Pascal F. Calogero, Jr. wrote:

“I wish to reiterate the majority’s observations, at note 31, concerning the impact of this decision on property and contract rights of unmarried couples. Nothing in the majority opinion would prohibit an unmarried couple from contracting to be co-owners of property, from designating each other agents authorized to make critical end of life decisions, or from leaving property to each other through wills. The majority opinion does not disturb or impair the fundamental contract and property rights possessed by all individuals, be they homosexual or heterosexual, married or unmarried." 3

APSA then may wish to inquire as to the actual civil rights record of the city of New Orleans on LGBT issues, particularly since the amendment was passed.

The APSA constitution tempers the prohibition against our taking positions on matters of public policy by adding: But the Association nonetheless actively encourages in its membership and its journals, research in and concern for significant contemporary political and social problems and policies, however controversial and subject to partisan discourse in the community at large these may be.

10) What is the history of APSA’s moving its Annual Meeting? Site selection for the Annual Meeting has always been constrained, and freedom of choice more imagined than real. Following APSA’s cancellation of its Chicago meeting in protest over the ERA vote, the settlement between APSA and the Hilton Corporation contractually bound APSA for 10 years to meeting only in cities having a Hilton Hotel. For many members, the Annual Meeting has come to mean the Washington, New York, San Francisco, Atlanta, and New Orleans Hiltons.

As the size of the meeting grew, APSA stayed within the contractual commitment to Hilton Hotels in major cities by adding non-Hilton hotels that supplied meeting as well as sleeping rooms. In San Francisco, Washington, Atlanta, New Orleans, and New York, the Annual Meeting functionally became a co-headquarters meeting.

Once the Hilton contract expired, the Association was free to solicit bids and contract with other hotel chains. In the face of competitive bidding, the Marriott and Sheraton chains more often than not have offered more favorable terms than the Hilton chain. The opening up to other hotels expanded the number of cities that could be considered for conventions, though other forces worked to limit choice. Boston and Philadelphia were added to the list of potential sites because, though lacking in Hilton facilities, adequate space could be found at a Marriott or Sheraton or both.

In 2005, APSA exercised a provision in its contract relating to labor actions that might prevent the meeting from proceeding effectively, and moved from San Francisco to Philadelphia. This move did not incur legal or financial consequences because of the performance clause in the APSA contract designed to handle unexpected events that might jeopardize the meeting. The clause reads:

10.01 Performance

Neither party shall be responsible for any failure of performance due to acts of god, war, government regulation, disaster, labor disputes and strikes, civil disorder, curtailment of transportation facilities, shortage of commodities or supplies to be furnished by the {hotel name}, or other emergencies making it inadvisable, illegal or impossible to provide the facilities or to hold the meeting in the hotel or city as originally planned. It is provided that this agreement may be terminated for any one or more of such reasons by written notice from one party to the other.

[a] The Hotel shall provide APSA written notification of pending labor contract terminations or changes.

[b] The Hotel shall advise APSA of city-wide conditions that would affect the meeting, especially strikes of public transportation and safety workers and renovation of transportation services and routes.


The San Francisco hotel could very well have challenged the clause. It is impossible to document, but there was a built-up trust between the hotel and APSA due to reliability of the Association’s past performance that certainly worked in APSA’s favor.

11) What other steps is APSA taking now? APSA has deferred making any future annual meeting siting decisions while these issues raised are addressed. Decisions about the Teaching and Learning Conference are needed on an annual basis. We will make these decisions on a case-by-case basis with wide consultation .

The Council, at its August meeting, asked for further study and recommendations from the Committee on the Status of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and the Transgendered in the Profession and from the Annual Meeting Committee, and is itself framing a number of questions regarding whether lesbian and gay partners can have their civil rights to make emergency decisions respected the specific legal vulnerabilities in various cities where we meet.

1 a. Contracts for meetings are signed 4-5 years out, sometimes longer, to secure a particular site; and multiple-year contracts are sought to secure concessions and lower rates.

b. Selecting Region. There is a longstanding practice that the meeting should rotate through regions as well as return to Washington, D.C. every five years unless the cost of doing so are unreasonable. There is not a fixed rotation to the regional representation so that possible sites in different regions can compete for the meeting. The selection of the region also allows for movement between cities within a region if possible.

c. First-Tier Cities. The Council has affirmed that the meeting should be held in first-tier cities, i.e. major metropolitan areas such as Washington, Chicago, San Francisco, Boston, etc. The cities also are also major air hubs to facilitate travel to and from the meeting. The cities offer variety of cultural experiences and broad range of restaurants.

(1). Cities we’ve customarily used are Washington, DC, Boston, Chicago, New Orleans, San Francisco, New York.

(2). Cities also used: Atlanta, Philadelphia, Denver (no longer big enough), Toronto.

(3). Capacity. A city must provide sufficient meeting rooms (75+) and exhibit halls, and sufficient sleeping rooms (in 2007 the room block on peak night committed for 3375 attendees for a total meeting attendance of 6925). The city must also be able to provide an all-space hold on space from Wednesday through Sunday unless the Association agrees to release the space. Hotel groups within a city are encouraged to compete with each other.

e. Cost. The hotels competing for the meeting must offer low rates. The meeting has remarkably low rates aided by its meeting history and the timing of the meeting.

2 The full language is:

1. It shall be the purpose of this association to encourage the study of Political Science, including Political Theory, Political Institutions, Politics, Public Law, Public Administration, and International Relations.

2. The Association as such is nonpartisan. It will not support political parties or candidates. It will not commit its members on questions of public policy nor take positions not immediately concerned with its direct purpose as stated above. But the Association nonetheless actively encourages in its membership and its journals, research in and concern for significant contemporary political and social problems and policies, however controversial and subject to partisan discourse in the community at large these may be. The Association shall not be barred from adopting resolutions or taking such other action as it deems appropriate in support of academic freedom and of freedom of expression by and within the Association, the political science profession, and the university, when in its judgment such freedom has been clearly and seriously violated or is clearly and seriously threatened.

3 The source is available at http://www.lasc.org/opinions/2005/04ca2477.opn.pdf

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